Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman

• Decision Date: 25 February 1907
• Citation: 100 S.W. 108,118 Tenn. 39
• Parties: BEDDINGFIELD ET AL. v. ESTILL & NEWMAN ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

100 S.W. 108

118 Tenn. 39

BEDDINGFIELD ET AL. v. ESTILL & NEWMAN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 25, 1907

Appeal from Chancery Court, Lincoln County; Walter F. Bearden Chancellor.

Bill by W. T. Beddingfield and others against Estill & Newman and others. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Estill & Newman, Lynch & Phillips, S. C. Tigert, and J. J. Lynch for appellants.

A B Woodard & Son, for appellees.

SHIELDS J.

Complainants' Effie Baird and Bessie Baird, infants under 21 years of age suing by W. T. Beddingfield, their next friend, bring this bill against C. W. Baird, Estill & Newman, and others to recover certain lands situated in Lincoln county, Tenn., in the bill described, and to have a deed in trust, which the said C. W. Baird made to N. F. Hancock as trustee, December 7, 1905, thereon, to secure certain indebtedness due from him to Estill & Newman and others, declared void, a cloud upon their title, and removed.

Complainants in their bill charge that previous to December 1, 1905, the defendants C. W. Baird and Mary G. Baird were seized and possessed of the lands sought to be recovered, under conveyances conveying the same to them, to "hold as husband and wife and tenants by entireties"; that upon said day the defendant C. W. Baird murdered his wife, Mary G. Baird, for which crime he was duly indicted upon a charge of murder in the first degree in the circuit court of Lincoln county; that on December 7, 1905, he executed the deed of trust therein attacked upon the lands in question to secure the fees of Estill & Newman and others, whom he had employed to defend him against said charge of murder; that at the February term, 1906, of said court, he was found guilty as charged in the indictment and sentenced to death; that they are the only children and heirs at law of the said C. W. Baird and Mary G. Baird; and that the latter died intestate.

Complainants further charge that, both under the common law and an act of the General Assembly of Tennessee (chapter 11, p. 22, Acts of 1905), the defendant C. W. Baird did not, by virtue of his wife's death, take or become vested with any right or estate in the said lands, and cannot hold the same, as survivor or otherwise, under the said conveyances made to him and his wife, Mary G. Baird, but that by reason of the crime committed by him he lost and forfeited his title to the said lands; that the said lands descended and became the property of complainants; and that the defendants Estill & Newman and others took nothing under the deed of trust made by C. W. Baird for their benefit to N.W. Hancock. These are the allegations of the bill, when stripped of immaterial matters and argument, upon which complainants predicate their right to the relief sought by them.

The defendants made defense by demurrer. The grounds of demurrer, which we will dispose of, are:

"(1) The bill shows on its face that demurrant C. W. Baird and his wife were seised of the several tracts of land described in the bill as tenants by the entirety, and that, therefore, nothing passed to the husband by the death of the wife.

(2) The bill shows on its face that demurrant C. W. Baird had vested rights in all the property therein described, and so much of section 1, c. 11, p. 22, of the Acts of 1905, as undertakes to forfeit his estate therein, is in conflict with and in violation of section 12, art. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Tennessee, which provides that no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estates."

The chancellor, upon a hearing before him, overruled this demurrer and sustained the bill, and allowed an appeal to this court, in the exercise of his discretion, at this stage of the cause.

This action of the chancellor in overruling the demurrer is now assigned as error.

Complainants, in order to sustain their bill, must show that they have title to the premises sued for and are entitled to the possession of the same. They cannot recover as heirs at law of C. W. Baird, because he is yet alive, and the living have no heirs at law; and, if he were dead, the deed in trust prayed to be removed as a cloud upon their title was executed by him when in life. They must recover, then, if at all, as heirs at law of Mary G. Baird, deceased.

The theory of the bill, if we correctly apprehend it, is that under the deeds, which are made exhibits, conveying the lands in question to C. W. Baird and his wife, Mary G. Baird, they were vested of the same by entireties, and that, while ordinarily the survivor of the two--in this case, C. W. Baird--would, upon the death of the latter, take the entire estate, under the facts of this case, by reason of the crime committed by him, he was incapable of doing so, and lost and forfeited all the estate in said lands which he otherwise would have had, and that the same have now become the property of the complainants, as heirs at law of their mother. Complainants, to sustain this contention, rely upon the rule of the common law that one cannot take or inherit property by descent, by distribution, or by virtue of marital rights from one whose death is caused by or results from his felonious act, as announced and applied by this court in the case of Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393-413, 79 S.W. 1042, 64 L. R. A. 458, and the provisions of our statute (chapter 11, p. 22, Acts of 1905), providing:

"That any person who shall feloniously kill, conspire with another to kill, or procure to be killed, any one from whom such person so killing, or conspiring to kill, or procuring to be killed, would inherit property of any kind, belonging to such deceased person at the time of death, or who would take said property by deed, will or otherwise, at the death of deceased, shall forfeit all right, interest and estate in and to said property, and that the same shall go to such other person or persons as may be entitled by the laws of descent and distribution, or by will, deeds or other conveyance made by the deceased when in life."

We do not think that either the common-law rule or statute, here invoked, apply to this case.

First. Mary G. Baird, the mother of complainants, did not have any title to or estate in the lands sued for which could descend to be inherited, or otherwise acquired by C. W. Baird, her husband, her heirs at law, or other persons, upon her natural death. C. W. Baird could not and did not inherit, acquire, or otherwise take any interest or estate in the lands from or through his wife, and would not have done so, had she died a natural death. The title which he claimed was acquired and vested in him by the conveyances made to him and his wife previous to her death, and he did not attempt to convey anything acquired through or under her. Where land is conveyed to husband and wife to hold by entirety, the survivor, upon the death of the other, takes and becomes vested of the entire estate--a fee-simple estate--by virtue of the grant or deed conveying the property to them; the interest of the deceased being terminated by his or her death. This is an ancient, familiar, and well-established doctrine of the common law, and enforced in this and all of the other states of the Union, so far as we are informed.

At an...