Bedingfield v. Jefferson County
Decision Date | 20 May 1988 |
Parties | Hoyt BEDINGFIELD, Jr., in his capacity as the acting director of finance of the City of Birmingham, et al. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al. 87-316. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Donald V. Watkins of Watkins, Carter & Knight and Joe R. Whatley, Jr., of Falkenberry & Whatley and David A. Sullivan and Samuel Fisher, Birmingham, for appellants.
Edwin A. Strickland, Birmingham, for appellees.
Guy Larry Tipton, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama AFL-CIO and the public employees local union No. 1317, Laborers Intern. Union of North America.
William R. Tillery, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce.
Frank C. Ellis, Jr., of Wallace, Ellis, Head & Fowler, Columbiana, for amicus curiae Shelby County.
This is an appeal by Hoyt Bedingfield, Jr., as acting director of finance of the City of Birmingham, and the City of Birmingham from a judgment upholding a Jefferson County ordinance, specifically Ordinance No. 1120, establishing an occupational tax. We affirm.
The action was filed on October 19, 1987, and was consolidated for trial with the case of Carolyn Phillips, et al. v. Jefferson County Commission.
Ordinance No. 1120 levies a license or privilege tax on natural persons engaged in any vocation, occupation, calling, or profession who are not required by law to pay any license or privilege tax to the state or county. This tax was promulgated by Jefferson County under the authority of Act No. 406, approved September 7, 1967, Acts of Alabama 1967, at 21-23. Pertinent sections thereof are quoted below:
Allegations of unconstitutionality made below were denied by the defendants. Following discovery, testimony taken in open court, and stipulation, the Jefferson Circuit Court upheld the ordinance, and this appeal followed. Because a number of issues are presented here, we shall treat them seriatim.
Did Act No. 406 manifest a legislative intent to authorize Jefferson County to levy an occupational tax?
Plaintiffs' argument here is multifaceted. First, they contend that the stated purpose of the Act is to authorize a tax only upon "certain businesses," and not "occupations." Further, plaintiffs argue that § 6 of Act No. 406 does not permit a privilege tax "which is in excess of the rate of license or privilege tax levied by the largest municipality of the County on the same or similar type of business activity," meaning that Jefferson County could not implement the Act by levying a tax in excess of that which had been levied by Birmingham. Because Birmingham had no such privilege tax in 1967, plaintiffs argue, any county tax under Act No. 406 would offend the Act. Finally, according to plaintiffs, the county's own implementation of the Act when it was enacted in 1967, as only a licensing code authorizing licensing of certain businesses, gives weight to the limiting nature of Act No. 406.
We must respectfully reject these arguments. While we are mindful that taxing statutes are to be strictly construed, State v. Seals Piano Co., 209 Ala. 93, 95 So. 451 (1923), it does not offend that principle to uphold this statute. Indeed, the express language of the Act authorizes the county "to levy a business or privilege tax upon any business, vocation, occupation, calling or profession." When the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of a statute that there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no room for construction. American Institute of Psychotherapy v. Alabama Board of Examiners in Psychology, 410 So.2d 54 (Ala.1982). Thus, § 4 is to be read as authorizing a privilege tax "upon any person for engaging in any business [or occupation]."
Municipal licensing authority has existed at least since the Code of 1907, see Code of 1975, § 11-51-90. Birmingham originally adopted its licensing code as early as 1916, and in 1967 it had an extensive catalog of business categories subject thereto. However, it was not until 1970 that Birmingham itself adopted Ordinance No. 70-76, providing for a license fee for occupations and professions. Given the fact that Birmingham had possessed the authority under state law to impose an occupational privilege tax since 1907, it is clear that by § 6 of Act No. 406 the legislature, cognizant of that power, decided to restrict the county's authority to a maximum as established by Birmingham's occupational privilege tax. It is a fundamental principle that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is presumed to have full knowledge and information on prior and existing law on the subject of the statute. Ex parte Love, 513 So.2d 24 (Ala.1987). Thus, we cannot agree with plaintiffs that Act No. 406 required Jefferson County to implement its authority contemporaneously thereunder, or lose it altogether. The Act itself contains no such limiting language. True, Jefferson County did not implement the "occupational" aspect of the statute until 1987. Nevertheless, the authority to do so continued. 1
Finally, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that, in construing Act No. 406, this Court should defer to the county's alleged contemporaneous interpretation of the Act. Because we do not find the Act doubtful in its meaning, we need not resort to an alleged contemporaneous interpretation by the county.
Is Act No. 406 unconstitutional as violating limitations on local legislation as explained in Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 354 So.2d 808 (Ala.1978)?
According to plaintiffs, Act No. 406 violates the mandate of Peddycoart in two respects: (1) the general laws of Alabama have preempted the field of license and privilege taxation to prevent reliance upon local legislation, and thus Act No. 406 violates Section 105 of the Constitution; and (2) the population classification of Act No. 406 (500,000 or more), which makes it a "bracket bill," lacks a reasonable relationship with the statute's purpose.
Commenting upon Peddycoart in Freeman v. Purvis, 400 So.2d 389 (Ala.1981), this Court stated:
Act No. 406 was approved in 1967, well before the date of the Peddycoart decision of January 13, 1978, and, as a general law of local application, was validated by Amendment 389 even though it was not advertised under Section 106 of the Constitution of 1901.
Even under pre-Peddycoart standards, Act No. 406 must survive a...
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Jefferson County v. Acker, 93-M-0069-S
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