Bedwell v. State
| Decision Date | 19 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 1184,1184 |
| Parties | John BEDWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 451. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Barbara Coyle Williams, Evansville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cheryl L. Greiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant John Bedwell was found guilty by a jury in the Vigo Superior Court of Class B felony conspiracy to commit arson for hire, Class C felony inducing an offense of arson and Class D felony theft. The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to thirteen years imprisonment for conspiracy, five years imprisonment for inducing an arson and two years imprisonment for theft. The sentences for inducing an arson and for theft were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for conspiracy. Appellant now directly appeals and raises the following two-part issue: whether the trial court committed fundamental error by (I) refusing to allow the testimony of Deputy Prosecutor James Walker and (II) by denying Appellant's several motions for mistrial. We note that Appellant has filed a defective brief on appeal because there is no section following the tables of contents and authorities entitled "Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" as required by Ind.R.App.P. 8.3(A)(2) and there is no verbatim statement of the trial court's judgment as required by Ind.R.App.P. 8.3(A)(4). We also note that both parties to this case have poorly presented issue II.
The facts adduced during trial show that on August 24, 1981, Appellant and his family left their home in Terre Haute and traveled to Cincinnati, Ohio. On August 27, Horatio Hensley, Appellant's step-father, went to Appellant's house with permission and discovered the house in shambles. Hensley called the police and filed a burglary report. The next day, Appellant's house burned down during the early morning hours. The insurance carrier protecting this property, the Hartford Insurance Company, subsequently commenced an investigation of this fire and concluded that it was an incendiary fire caused by the igniting of a liquid accelerant spread on the home's dining room floor. Notwithstanding the suspicious nature of the fire, the Hartford Company paid Appellant's claims for a burglary loss and a fire loss. Approximately one year later, in February, 1983, the Terre Haute Police Department uncovered information suggesting that John Norris and Mark Stephens had conspired to commit arson upon Appellant's direction and at his urging. Pursuant to plea agreements with the State, both Norris and Stephens testified against Appellant at Appellant's trial. In particular, Stephens testified that Appellant offered him money to burn his house down.
At the outset, we note that this Court has held:
Dixon v. State, (1984) Ind., 470 N.E.2d 728, 731, quoting Warriner v. State, (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 562, 563.
Appellant first claims that fundamental error was committed during Appellant's case-in-chief when the trial court refused to allow the testimony of Deputy Prosecutor James Walker regarding the plea agreement between the State and Mark Stephens. By the terms of Stephens' plea agreement entered into evidence and present in the record, the State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence for Stephens in exchange for his trial testimony against Appellant. Appellant's argument is that the State apparently created an "unlawful" agreement with Stephens because the State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence in contravention of Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-2(b) (Burns 1985). A suspended sentence would violate the statute since Stephens was convicted of class C felony burglary in 1981 and was on probation at the time of his participation in the instant offenses. We note that Ind.Code Secs. 35-50-2-2(a), (b) and (b)(1) were read to the jury as the trial court's final instruction 12. It is true that a trial judge is required to sentence convicted criminals within statutorily prescribed limits and any sentence which is contrary to, or violative of, the penalty mandated by the applicable statute is an illegal sentence. Niece v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 1081. Whether Stephens was properly sentenced, however, is not a material issue in Appellant's case. This is, after all, an appeal of Appellant's convictions and any challenge to the legality of the plea agreement between Stephens and the State must be made by Stephens in his own independent...
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