Bee v. City of Huntington
Citation | 171 S.E. 539,114 W.Va. 40 |
Decision Date | 19 September 1933 |
Docket Number | 7752. |
Parties | BEE v. CITY OF HUNTINGTON. EAKLE v. COUNTY COURT OF BRAXTON COUNTY et al. SNIDER v. MARTIN, Assessor, et al. |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted August 30, 1933.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 27, 1933.
On Second Application for Rehearing Nov. 14, 1933.
Syllabus by the Court.
Since constitutional amendment limiting assessments embraces levies for all purposes, including previous bonded debts, except where contract would be impaired, current requirements of existing contractual obligations must be provided for before levying for current governmental expenses (Const. art. 10, § 1, as amended [see Acts 1932, Ex. Sess., c. 9]).
Where current requirements for legally contracted indebtedness of governmental unit exceed amount leviable, levies may be extended to meet such obligations, notwithstanding constitutional amendment limiting assessments (Const. art 10, § 1, as amended [see Acts 1932, Ex. Sess., c. 9]).
1. The limitations on assessments prescribed by the constitutional amendment (chapter 9, Acts Extraordinary Session, 1932) adopted at the last general election, embrace levies for all purposes, including previous bonded debts, except in cases in which such limitations would necessarily result in the impairment of existing contractual indebtedness; and the various fiscal bodies of the state are therefore required to provide for the current requirements of existing contractual obligations before levying for current governmental expenses in order to prevent levies in excess of the limitations.
2. In the event of the current requirements for legally contracted indebtedness of a governmental unit exceeding the amount leviable within the limitations, the levies may be extended to meet such obligations, notwithstanding the amendment.
Separate suits by W. E. Bee against the City of Huntington, by O. O Eakle against County Court of Braxton County and others, and by Jess Snider against W. M. Martin, Assessor, and others, which were heard, respectively, on plaintiff's application for preliminary injunction, on plaintiff's application for appeal from adverse decree, and on plaintiff's application for injunction.
MAXWELL, President, dissenting in part.
W. E. Hines and Van B. Hall, both of Sutton, and Koontz, Hurlbutt & Revercomb and W. Elliott Nefflen, all of Charleston, for appellant Eakle.
James E. Cutlip, Pros. Atty., and G. G. Davis, both of Sutton, and Homer A. Holt, [1] Atty. Gen., for appellees County Court of Braxton County et al.
George S. Wallace, of Huntington, for plaintiff Bee.
Wm. C. Graham and Maxwell W. Flesher, both of Huntington, and Chas. Ritchie and Philip H. Hill, both of Charleston, for plaintiff Snider and defendant City of Huntington.
E. E. Winters, Jr., of Huntington, for defendants Martin et al.
The first of these cases is the suit of a taxpayer, in the city of Huntington, to enjoin the levying of municipal taxes, for the fiscal year 1933-34, in excess of the alleged maximum levies permitted under the constitutional amendment adopted at the general election of 1932, classifying property for taxation and limiting the respective levies in the several classifications. The bill has been presented to this court for a preliminary injunction (under chapter 53, article 5, § 5, Code 1931), following the refusal thereof by the Circuit court of Cabell county.
In the second case a taxpayer of the town of Sutton, Holly district, Braxton county, seeks like relief against the municipality, the county court of Braxton County, and others. This case is here upon application for an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Braxton county, denying relief upon final hearing on the bill, answer, and proof.
The third case is a suit by the owner of real estate, situate in Huntington, attacking the validity of the amendment in so far as it authorizes the classification of property for taxation to discharge prior governmental bonded indebtedness.
As the first and second cases involve the same questions, they will be considered together before discussing the third.
The amendment follows: Chapter 9, 1932 Extraordinary Session of the Legislature.
In Finlayson v. City of Shinnston, 168 S.E. 479, 480, this court, construing the amendment, held that the limitation of assessments therein prescribed embraces levies for all purposes, including previous governmental bonded debts, except in cases in which such limitation of levies would result in the impairment of existing legal obligations. Following this decision, the Legislature by an Act of March 11, 1933 (chapter 38, Acts 1933), relating to tax levies, authorized the various tax levying bodies to "impose the levy necessary for current expenses" to the extent of the maximum levies prescribed in the amendment, and to lay additional levies to "meet current requirements of now-existing indebtedness." The levying bodies sought to be enjoined have pursued this course by imposing the maximum levies for current expenses and additional levies to meet current requirements of existing indebtedness. It will thus be observed that the interpretation of the amendment by the Legislature is incompatible with the previous construction of this court in the Finlayson Case.
Plaintiffs contend that a levying body may not levy beyond the respective aggregates specified in the amendment without the special authorization, therein prescribed, from the qualified voters of the particular governmental unit.
Defendants insist that they may levy, in accordance with the statute, to the limit of such aggregates for current expenses of government, and, in addition thereto, taxes necessary to meet current requirements of existing indebtedness, or, at least, of indebtedness incurred prior to the amendment. They rely upon three grounds, which will be considered in the order named, as follows: (1) That the language of the amendment, in the light of other provisions of the Constitution, should be so construed; (2) that the maintenance of modern, orderly government is necessary for the preservation of property values and the collection of taxes to prevent the impairment of debts created prior to the amendment; and (3) that the essentials of government must be provided for regardless of the constitutional limitation.
The Attorney General has cited Mauney v. Board of Commissioners, 71 N.C. 486, French v. Board of Commissioners, 74 N.C. 692, and Clifton v. Wynne, 80 N.C. 145, as supporting the first ground. These cases involved the interpretation of the following constitutional declarations (Const. 1868, art. 5, §§ 1, 7):
(1) ...
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