Beebe v. Randall

Citation23 N.E.2d 142,304 Mass. 207
PartiesBEEBE v. RANDALL (two cases).
Decision Date27 October 1939
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Berkshire County; Broadhurst, Judge.

Actions by Richard W. Beebe and by Susie A. Beebe against Meta B. Randall for damages resulting from an automobile collision. The jury returned verdict for the plaintiffs. The defendant's motions for directed verdict in each case were denied and defendant excepted.

Exceptions overruled.

J. N. Alberti, of North Adams, for plaintiffs.

M. B. Warner, of Pittsfield, for defendant.

COX, Justice.

The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, husband and wife, for damages sustained when the automobile that was being operated by Mrs. Beebe, with her husband sitting beside her on the front seat, collided with an automobile operated by the defendant. The collision occurred in this Commonwealth on August 17, 1936, at about 7:45 o'clock in the evening, ‘Eastern Daylight Time,’ on the three-lane concrete road between Pittsfield and Albany. It was daylight and the surface of the road was dry. From the point of collision there is an unobstructed view easterly along the highway toward Pittsfield for about 800 feet, and to the west for about 500 feet. There is a motorists' camp on the northerly side of the road adjoining the place where the collision occurred, a narrow entrance to which is ‘just westerly’ of the approach and parking space in front of the camp restaurant. The plaintiffs were travelling west, toward Albany, on their right hand lane and collided with the defendant's automobile as it was entering this lane. The jury could have found that when the Beebe automobile, travelling at a speed of approximately 35 miles an hour, was about 150 feet from the point of collision, the defendant, who was travellingtoward Pittsfield, turned from the south, or eastbound lane, and, proceeding at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees, entered the middle lane, where she continued on in a straight line ‘as though it [the defendant's automobile] were going right on toward Pittsfield a distance of four times its own length,’ and then turned into the westbound lane when the Beebe automobile was within 20 to 25 feet. When Mrs. Beebe saw the defendant turn from the eastbound lane into the middle lane she ‘slowed down’ her automobile and, when the defendant turned into the westbound lane, Mrs. Beebe applied her brakes and turned to her left ‘apparently to try to avoid the Randall car.’ The collision occurred when the defendant's automobile was partly in the middle and partly in the westbound lanes, so that the automobiles ‘substantially blocked’ the latter lane, with the defendant's automobile 3 feet from the northerly edge of the concrete. There were no other automobiles on the road within the range of vision at the moment of collision. After the collision the defendant stated that she did not know how it happened except that she was making a left turn to go into the camp grounds; that she did not know where the Beebe automobile had come from, and that she did not see it prior to the moment of the collision. She testified that the Beebe automobile was about 50 feet away from her when she started to go into the westbound lane. The defendant duly filed a motion in each case for a directed verdict, whereupon the trial judge asked her counsel to state his grounds for the motions. Counsel replied, ‘The grounds are that upon the evidence, which as far as I can recall was undisputed, the plaintiff Beebe, driving the car, was negligent in failing to apply the brakes or avoid the collision by going to the left in a three lane road; that the plaintiff Beebe, Susie, had the last clear chance to avoid the accident and negligently failed to avoid the accident.’ The motions were denied and the defendant excepted.

The only issue in the cases is whether verdicts should have been ordered for the defendant upon the grounds stated. Guidi v. Town of Great Barrington, 272 Mass. 577, 579, 172 N.E. 916. See Parrot v. Mexican Central Railway Co., 207 Mass. 184, 190, 93 N.E. 590, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 261; Krasnow v. Krasnow, 253 Mass. 528, 149 N.E. 321;Anderson v. Beacon Oil Co., 281 Mass. 108, 111, 183 N.E. 152, and cases cited.

It could not have been ruled rightly that the defendant had sustained the burden of proving that Mrs. Beebe was contributorily negligent. Ordinarily where a collision occurs between travellers upon a highway, the issues of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff and of negligence of the defendant are for the jury. White v. Calcutt, 269 Mass. 252, 255, 168 N.E. 815;Minnehan v. Hiland, 278 Mass. 518, 522, 180 N.E. 295. The defendant contends, however, that there was contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Beebe upon her own testimony, by which, it is contended, she is bound. Mrs. Beebe testified that she applied her brakes and turned left when the defendant started to turn into the westbound lane, and that she tried to...

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2 cases
  • Hodgerney v. Baker
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1949
    ...and of negligence on the part of the defendant are for the jury. Simonson v. Angel, 256 Mass. 256, 152 N.E. 52;Beebe v. Randall, 304 Mass. 207, 209-210, 23 N.E.2d 142. Defendant's exceptions overruled. Plaintiff's exceptions ...
  • Brightman v. Blanchette
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 2, 1941
    ...of collisions at other places upon a highway. Pease v. Lenssen, 286 Mass. 207, 208, 190 N.E. 18, and cases cited. Beebe v. Randall, 304 Mass. 207, 209, 210, 23 N.E.2d 142, and cases cited. From the permissible findings already narrated, we are of opinion that the case at bar comes within th......

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