Beebe v. Vaughn, Civ. A. No. 76-434.
| Decision Date | 27 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76-434. |
| Citation | 430 F. Supp. 1220 |
| Parties | Charles N. BEEBE, Petitioner, v. James VAUGHN, Director of Division of Adult Corrections and the State of Delaware, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
L. Vincent Ramunno, Wilmington, Del., for petitioner.
Francis A. Reardon, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, Del., for respondent.
This is a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which the petitioner, Charles Beebe, challenges his convictions for kidnapping, assault with intent to commit rape and assault and battery on the ground that those convictions were obtained in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter "IAD").1 Two questions are presented for this Court's determination. First, does this Court have jurisdiction in a habeas corpus action to hear a claim arising under the IAD in which both of the jurisdictions involved in the claim are states? If so, did petitioner's conviction violate the terms of the IAD?
On October 11, 1973, petitioner was indicted on the charges described above. At that time, he was incarcerated on other charges in the State of Maryland. A capias for his arrest was issued on October 26, 1973, and, thereafter, it was lodged against him as a detainer in Maryland. In February 1974, petitioner wrote to the "Clerk of the Circuit Court House", New Castle County, a non-existent official, informing the Court that he was incarcerated at the Maryland House of Corrections, Jessup, Maryland, and providing "notification to the Court for a fast and speedy trial". The letter was received by the Prothonotary of the Superior Court on February 11, 1974. On February 14, a judge of that court forwarded copies of the letter to the State Attorney General and to the Public Defender. On March 20, the State requested custody of petitioner. Before Maryland acted on that request, in April 1974, pursuant to a request from Mr. Beebe, the warden at Jessup sent to Delaware the official forms employed by the Maryland authorities on behalf of an inmate who is seeking final disposition of charges under the terms of the IAD.
In July, petitioner was transferred to Delaware for trial and, by a letter dated July 26, the deputy attorney general proposed to defense counsel a trial date of August 14. Defense counsel apparently did not respond to that proposal but, on August 13, after the jury panel in Superior Court had been excused for the day, she moved for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the 180 day period allowed to the State under the IAD for bringing the defendant to trial had elapsed. The court denied the motion and petitioner was tried and convicted on October 23.2
Beebe appealed his conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed and the court held that Beebe's February 11 letter did not commence the running of the IAD-mandated 180 day period for bringing the defendant to trial because he had not made his request for trial through the official who had custody of him as required by the IAD, 11 Del.C. § 2542(b).3
In this Court, petitioner acknowledges that his first request for trial did not strictly comply with the formal requirements of the IAD but he asserts that he complied with the spirit of the law and that that was sufficient to activate the statutory protections. For the reasons that appear below, I do not agree with petitioner and, accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is available to challenge custody only on the grounds that it is in violation of "the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." It cannot be relied on to challenge custody alleged to violate State law. The question presented here is whether a claim of illegal custody arising under the IAD, as participated in by two states, Maryland and Delaware, states a claim cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
This issue was explicitly left open by the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835-36 (3 Cir. 1975). Esola dealt with the question of federal jurisdiction in the context of a dispute under the IAD in which the United States, which also participates in the Agreement,4 and New Jersey were the jurisdictions alleged to have violated the terms of the IAD. Although the petitioner was attacking a New Jersey conviction, the Court found that the case presented a claim arising under the laws of the United States because the cooperation of the United States in relinquishing custody had been necessary to secure the conviction.
Judge Garth, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that every case raising a claim under the IAD presents a federal question appropriate for determination under Section 2254. He pointed out that the Compact Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, § 10, cl. 3, requires that any agreement between two or more states be approved by the Congress. Congress gave its consent for states to participate in compacts such as the IAD by the Act of June 6, 1934, 4 U.S.C. § 112. See 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News p. 4866. Relying on several Supreme Court interpretations of the Compact Clause,5 Judge Garth reasoned that such congressional approval transforms the IAD, as enacted by the various states individually, into a law of the United States and that construction of the agreement involves a "federal title, privilege or immunity". Esola, supra, at 841.
The Ninth Circuit, interpreting an interstate regional planning compact, reached a conclusion similar to Judge Garth's. In League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), the court held that "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 exists where a question of interpretation of an interstate compact is presented. Writing for the court, Judge Renfrew noted that the Supreme Court held in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, supra, that the interpretation of an interstate compact is a matter of federal law, not the law of the party states and, in Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28, 71 S.Ct. 557, 95 L.Ed. 713 (1951), that no state could be the ultimate arbiter of the law governing a sister state. He concluded that, "despite the legitimate and far-reaching interests of the party states," Id., at 523, n. 13, interpretation of the compact was a matter appropriate for "federal question" jurisdiction under Section 1331.
While the majority opinion in Esola...
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