Beebe v. Williams College

• Decision Date: 10 May 2006
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 05-30182-MAP.
• Citation: 430 F.Supp.2d 18
• Parties: Michele BEEBE, Plaintiff v. WILLIAMS COLLEGE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Page 18

430 F.Supp.2d 18

Michele BEEBE, Plaintiff v. WILLIAMS COLLEGE, Defendant.

C.A. No. 05-30182-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

May 10, 2006.

Thomas J. McCormick, Heisler, Feldman & McCormick PC, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.

Judith A. Malone, Patricia M. Higgins, Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket Nos. 12 & 04)

PONSOR, District Judge.

This is an action under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., as well as for breach of contract. Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss regarding the emotional distress damages under the FMLA and with regard to the breach of contract claim in its entirety. The motion was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman for report and recommendation.

On April 18, 2006, Magistrate Judge Neiman issued his Report and Recommendation to the effect that the motion should be allowed with regard to the FMLA emotional distress claim, and otherwise denied. No objection has been filed to this Report and Recommendation by either party.

Upon de novo review, the court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman dated April 18, 2006. The Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is ALLOWED with respect to the emotional distress damages claim set forth in Count I, and otherwise DENIED.

This case is hereby referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Neiman to conduct a pretrial scheduling conference.

It is So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Document No. 4)

NEIMAN, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

Michelle Beebe ("Plaintiff') brings this two-count action against Williams College ("Defendant") alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., as well as breach of contract for Defendant's failure to comply with policies outlined in an employee handbook. Among other remedies, Plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages for Defendant's alleged FMLA violations. Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs request for such damages and to dismiss as well Plaintiffs breach of contract claim in its entirety. Defendant does not now challenge the underlying FMLA claim

Defendant's motion has been referred to this court for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). As detailed below, the court will recommend that the motion to dismiss be allowed with respect to Plaintiff's request for emotional distress damages but denied with respect to her breach of contract claim.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted when a review of the complaint shows that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claims that would entitle her to relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Wagner v. Devine, 122 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.1997). The court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). If a plaintiffs claims do not establish recognized legal theories for which relief may be granted, the court must dismiss the complaint. See Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir.1988).

II. BACKGROUND

The following allegations come directly from Plaintiff's complaint and are stated in a light most favorable to her. See Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir.1992). To give a complete picture, however, the court has also considered the employee handbook, which both parties agree is incorporated into the complaint. See Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (noting that such documents may be properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant for nearly fifteen years before being fired on August 4, 2003. She had worked as a snack bar attendant and, later, as a custodian in the building and grounds department. (Complaint ¶¶ 6-7.) In the course of her employment, Plaintiff received a copy of Defendant's employee handbook which contained a copy of its family and medical leave policies. (Id. ¶ 38.)

On occasion between January of 2002 and July of 2003, Plaintiff took paid and unpaid leaves to care for her minor children's medical needs. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.) Whenever Plaintiff had to miss work to provide such care, she gave notice as required by Defendant's policies. (Id. ¶ 12.) On July 1, 2003, however, Plaintiff received a written warning for excessive use of unscheduled time-off, although the warning acknowledged that many of her absences were related to the care of her children. (Id. ¶ 15.)

On July 23, 2003, Plaintiff herself became ill and, but for one day, thereafter remained out of work until August 4, 2003. (See id. ¶¶ 16-25.) When Plaintiff returned to work, her supervisor informed her that she had been fired, handed her a final paycheck and gave her a letter indicating that her termination was the result of missing six days of work during the month of July. (Id. ¶¶ 26-28.)

Plaintiff filed an internal grievance with Defendant requesting reinstatement to her former position (or something comparable), but no offer of reinstatement was forthcoming. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff then filed this two-count lawsuit in which she alleges that Defendant violated the FMLA ("First Claim") and breached her employment "contract" ("Second Claim"). In conjunction with answering the complaint, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the emotional distress damages which Plaintiff seeks in her First Claim and to dismiss Plaintiffs Second Claim in its entirety.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant first argues that emotional distress damages are not permitted under the FMLA and, therefore, that such a remedy should be dismissed from Plaintiffs First Claim. As will be described, the court concurs with this assessment. The court, however, does not concur with Defendant's second argument, i.e., that the employee handbook does not constitute an enforceable contract as a matter of law. As an initial matter, however, the court will address a procedural issue regarding the timing of Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A. Posture of Defendant's Motion

In the court's estimation, it was technically improper for Defendant to answer the complaint and simultaneously move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Although Plaintiff has not argued the point, the court notes that Rule 12(b) motions should be filed "before pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (second sentence). In other words, "[i]f the defendant decides to assert a Rule 12(b) defense by motion, then he must do so before filing the answer." Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5C Federal Practice & Procedure § 1361 (2005) (citing, inter alia, Gerakaris v. Champagne, 913 F.Supp. 646, 650 (D.Mass.1996)). Nevertheless, Defendant's error in this regard is immaterial given that its Rule 12(b) defenses were, at least, mentioned in the answer. See id. (noting that while "[a] strict interpretation of the timing provision's language leads to the conclusion that the district judge must deny any Rule 12(b) motion made after a responsive pleading is interposed as being too late ..., federal courts have allowed untimely motions if the defense has been previously included in the answer") (citing cases). Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (providing avenue for defendant to seek judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed"). Accordingly, the court turns to the merits of Defendant's motion.

B. Emotional Distress Damages

The FMLA details the types of relief available to aggrieved employees. Specifically, an employer who violates the FMLA is liable "for damages equal to the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost" by the employee or, where there has been no tangible loss, "for actual monetary losses sustained ... as a direct result of the [FMLA] violation." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 845.400(c) (2006). The statute also provides that where an employer has acted in bad faith, an aggrieved employee may recover liquidated damages equal to the sum of the damages mentioned above, as well as equitable relief in the form of reinstatement or promotion. See 29 U.S.0 §§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), 2617(a)(1)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 845.400(c) (2006). Nowhere, however, does the FMLA mention damages for emotional distress.

Most courts which have considered the issue have held that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under the FMLA. See, e.g., Rogers v. AC Humko Corp., 56 F.Supp.2d 972, 979 (W.D.Tenn. 1999) ("This Court will join the long line of federal district courts holding that damages for emotional distress are not recoverable under the FMLA.") (citations omitted). The logic behind these holdings is clear: since the FMLA specifically lists the kinds of recovery available, all of which relate to actual monetary damages, the statute simply does not permit recovery for emotional distress. See Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1007 (6th Cir.2005). The Supreme Court too has noted—albeit not ruling on the specific question presented here—that "the cause of action under the FMLA is a restricted one: The damages recoverable are strictly defined and measured by actual monetary losses." Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 739-40, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)).

Plaintiff, nonetheless argues that the Eighth Circuit, at least, has allowed compensatory damages for "mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries" related to an FMLA claim. Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 496 (8th Cir.2002). Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit—in an opinion issued after Plaintiff filed her...