Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A.

Decision Date07 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 1:13–cv–00367–JAW.,1:13–cv–00367–JAW.
Citation5 F.Supp.3d 121
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine
PartiesElizabeth BROWN, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Defendant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Rebecca S. Webber, Skelton, Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, ME, for Plaintiff.

Barbara V.G. Parker, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP, Patrick N. Strawbridge, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Boston, MA, Michael H. Bernstein, Sedgwick, LLP, New York, NY, Byrne J. Decker, Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.

At a party outside of work, one of Elizabeth Brown's male co-workers sexually assaulted her. Ms. Brown alleges that, fearful of returning to work with the coworker and suffering from physical and psychological after-effects of the assault, she tried to reach a workplace accommodation with her employer, Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), but BOA refused to make reasonable accommodations and later terminated her for absenteeism. Ms. Brown sued BOA and its employee benefits administrator, Aetna Life Insurance Company, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Maine Human Rights Act. She also alleges a violation of Maine's personnel files law. Before the Court is Aetna's Motion to Dismiss. Assuming the truth of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint survives dismissal.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In other words, [i]f a plaintiff's claims do not establish recognized legal theories for which relief may be granted, the court must dismiss the complaint.”Beebe v. Williams College, 430 F.Supp.2d 18, 20 (D.Mass.2006). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2009) (internal quotations omitted). If, after such a generous reading, the complaint supports a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” the complaint must survive dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). However, [w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

II. FACTSA. Procedural Posture

Ms. Brown filed her original Complaint in Maine Superior Court on September 6, 2013, but BOA removed the case to this Court on September 30, 2013 based on both the Court's diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1). Ms. Brown amended her Complaint on the same day, Am. Compl. (ECF No. 4), and served a summons on Aetna the following day. Summons (ECF No. 6) (Oct. 1, 2013).

Aetna moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint as against itself on November 7, 2013. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) ( Def.'s Mot.). Ms. Brown opposed the motion on November 24, 2013, Resp. to Aetna's Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) ( Pl.'s Opp'n ), and Aetna replied to her opposition on December 9, 2013. Reply Mem. in Further Support of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 26) ( Def.'s Reply ).

B. The Allegations of the Amended Complaint

The Court accepts the following facts from the Amended Complaint as true for the purpose of this motion:

1. Background

Beginning in 2009, BOA employed Ms. Brown as a “Collector” at its call center in Orono, Maine. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. On September 17, 2010, she was physically and sexually assaulted by a co-worker, a Mr. Clukey,1 at a social event on the University of Maine campus. As a result of the attack, Ms. Brown suffered panic attacks, difficulty sleeping, mood swings, and Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Id. ¶ 24.

2. Ms. Brown's Absence From Work

On September 20, 2010, Ms. Brown went in to work at the call center and advised her manager, Nicole Kelley–Sirois, what had happened. Id. ¶ 18. Ms. Kelley–Sirois asked Ms. Brown if she was okay,” and Brown said “no.” Id. Ms. Kelley–Sirois sent Ms. Brown home, told her to take a week off without pay, and told her that BOA would check in with her after they talked with Mr. Clukey. Id. On September 21, Ms. Kelley–Sirois called Ms. Brown and informed her that she had met with Mr. Clukey and told him to stay away from Ms. Brown, and not to speak to her. Id. ¶ 21. Ms. Brown, who did not feel safe working near Mr. Clukey, asked that he be moved to a more distant cubicle in the common room in which they worked. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. Ms. Kelley–Sirois refused that request, reiterating that she had directed Mr. Clukey and “all the fraternity brothers who worked there” to have no contact with Ms. Brown. Id. ¶ 21.

On September 22, Ms. Brown discussed a safety plan with a therapist at the University of Maine Safe Campus office. Id. ¶ 23. During that meeting, Ms. Brown and the therapist called BOA “Advice & Counsel,” (BOA Advice & Counsel), the BOA office responsible for accommodations for disabilities. Id. The person with whom Ms. Brown spoke “refused to continue the conversation with the therapist participating” and was “most concerned if [Ms.] Brown was pressing charges.” Id. BOA Advice & Counsel “would not set up a safety plan for [Ms.] Brown to allow her to return or discuss an accommodation.” Id.

On September 27, Ms. Brown advised Ms. Kelley–Sirois that she would not yet return to work and would be applying for leave, since she did not feel safe and was mentally unable to return to work knowing that Mr. Clukey was still employed at her call center. Id. ¶ 26. Ms. Brown and Ms. Kelley–Sirois agreed that they would have a phone conversation every Friday to “discuss her status.” Id. During the September 27 telephone call, Ms. Brown informed Ms. Kelley–Sirois that her doctors thought she had depression, panic attacks, and extreme anxiety “when she thought about having to come back to work with [Mr.] Clukey right there.” Id. Ms. Kelley–Sirois requested medical records to support these statements, and Ms. Brown directed her doctor to supply those records to Ms. Kelley–Sirois. Id.

On October 1, Ms. Brown called Ms. Kelley–Sirois and told her that she was still seeing a counselor and a doctor for her injuries from the assault. Id. ¶ 27. She reported that she still felt unsafe returning to work with Mr. Clukey “being right next to her” and that she wanted him placed away from her in order for her to return to work.” Id. She informed Ms. Kelley–Sirois that her doctor had diagnosed her with situational depression and had identified symptoms of PTSD. Ms. Brown also told Ms. Kelley–Sirois that she had been physically injured in the attack and was taking medications for those injuries. Id.

On October 8 and 15, Ms. Brown left voicemail messages as part of her agreed weekly status calls. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. BOA did not return those calls. Id. Ms. Brown felt that this “sent a message to [Mr.] Clukey that what he had done was okay,” and she surmises that “there was no response by [BOA] to [her] request for an accommodation, or even an attempt to discuss an accommodation that would allow her to return to work.” Id. Ms. Brown again called and left messages, with no response from BOA, on October 22, November 5, November 12, November 19, December 3, and December 7, 2010. Id. ¶¶ 35–37, 39, 43, 46.

3. Ms. Brown's Claims for Leave and Short–Term Disability Benefits

BOA had authorized Aetna to handle disability and “FMLA” claims. Id. ¶ 34. 2 On October 15, Ms. Brown's doctor faxed “an FMLA form” to Aetna “for leave from work at [BOA].” Id. ¶ 33. Ms. Brown called BOA's agent Aetna on October 18 to find out what documentation she needed to provide to obtain short-term disability (STD) and FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 34.3 Aetna informed Ms. Brown that it needed medical records or counseling records stating why she was unable to perform her job. Id.4 Aetna denied Ms. Brown's claim for STD benefits and upheld its denial on appeal. Id.

The Amended Complaint alleges that, “according to [BOA],” Aetna called Ms. Brown on November 21, 23, and 24, leaving voicemails on the 21st and 23rd, but that Ms. Brown's phone records do not reflect these calls. Id. ¶¶ 40–42.

On December 8, Barbara Asquith, a Risk Operations Team Member at BOA, sent Ms. Brown a letter telling her that she needed to provide more medical information to Aetna to justify continuing leave. Id. ¶ 47. The next day, Ms. Brown called her doctor's office and asked them to fax “BOA/Aetna” more documentation to substantiate her leave. Id. On December 10, Ms. Brown called Aetna to discuss the December 8 letter. Id. ¶ 50. Aetna informed her that they needed further documentation on why Ms. Brown required more leave; Ms. Brown told them that she would send it, and asked them to “let her know if it was enough.” Id. After this exchange, Aetna did not respond to Ms. Brown to tell her that more information was needed. Id.

On February 7, 2011, Aetna emailed BOA, informing it that Ms. Brown “was being placed on a ‘LOA-closed’ status and directing [BOA] to take action within three days.” Id. ¶ 59.

4. Ms. Brown's Termination

On December 3, 2010, BOA manager Juanita Gilbert sent a message to Ms. Asquith and Ms. Kelley–Sirois asking if anyone had heard from Ms. Brown. Id. ¶ 44. The purpose of this inquiry was to determine if she could send out “the AWOL letter.” Id.5 Neither Ms. Asquith nor Ms. Kelley–Sirois indicated that Ms. Brown had been calling in; consequently, “the AWOL letter was sent out.” 6 Ms. Brown continued to call BOA for her weekly check-ins on December 10, 17, and 24; she left messages on each occasion, but never received a return call. Id. ¶¶ 51–54...

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