Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Kansas Human Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 10 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 69,210,69,210
• Citation: 254 Kan. 270,864 P.2d 1148
• Parties: BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and Beech Acceptance Corporation, Inc., Appellees, v. The KANSAS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1148

864 P.2d 1148

254 Kan. 270

BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and Beech Acceptance Corporation Inc., Appellees, v. The KANSAS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant.

No. 69,210.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 10, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In an action under the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act (K.S.A. 44-1111 et seq.), the burden of proof is on the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent is guilty of a discriminatory practice. Initially, the complainant must present a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of going forward with the evidence then shifts to respondent who may discharge this burden by evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for respondent's conduct. Once the respondent discharges this duty, the complainant must continue with the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by respondent were merely a pretext for discrimination.

2. A prima facie case of age employment discrimination may be established by circumstantial evidence proving that: (1) an individual is a member of a protected group; (2) adverse employment action was taken against the individual, e.g., discharge, demotion, or failure to hire; (3) the individual was replaced by a person outside the protected group; and (4) the individual was qualified for the position.

3. When a district court reviews the proceedings of the Kansas Human Rights Commission, the duty of the district court is to conduct an independent and thorough examination of the record and make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law.

4. Where the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law in a trial de novo arising from a Kansas Human Rights Commission proceeding, the function of an appellate court is to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law.

5. A negative finding that a party did not carry its requisite burden of proof will not be disturbed on appeal absent proof of an arbitrary disregard of undisputed evidence or some extrinsic consideration such as bias, passion, or prejudice.

6. In consolidated actions under the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act (K.S.A. 44-1111 et seq.), the record is examined and it is held: There is substantial competent evidence to support the findings of the trial court, and they, therefore, will not be disturbed on appeal.

Judy Fowler, of Kansas Human Rights Com'n, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Terry L. Mann, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Swartz, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.

McFARLAND, Justice:

This action arises under the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act (K.S.A. 44-1111 et seq.). The Kansas Human Rights Commission (Commission) held that Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) and Beech Acceptance Corporation, Inc., (BACI) had violated the act in their respective terminations of Richard E. Noakes, Smith G. Laramore, and Edwin R. Hill. Beech and BACI then filed a petition for judicial review thereof in the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 44-1011(b), where the matter was heard in a bench trial de novo. The district court held in favor of the respective defendants and vacated the Commission's final order. The Commission appeals from the district court's judgment.

The four issues raised on appeal are as follows:

I. Whether the district court erred in finding that Richard E. Noakes failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

II. Whether the district court erred in finding that Smith G. Laramore failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

III. Whether the district court erred in finding that, if a prima facie case was established, Smith G. Laramore failed to prove that the reasons given by Beech for his termination were mere pretexts for discrimination.

IV. Whether the district court erred in finding that Edwin R. Hill failed to prove that the reasons given by Beech for his termination were mere pretexts for discrimination.

K.S.A. 44-1113(a)(1), at the times pertinent herein, provided:

"(a) It is an unlawful employment practice based on age to engage in any of the following acts in any manner which would limit, deprive or tend to deprive any person of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the person's status as an employee or applicant for employment:

(1) For an employer, because of the age of a person, to refuse to hire or employ the person, to bar or discharge the person from employment or to otherwise discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment; to limit, segregate, separate, classify or make any distinction in regards to employees because of age; or to follow any employment procedure or practice which, in fact, results in discrimination, segregation or separation because of age without a valid business motive." (Emphasis supplied.)

The italicized portion of the statute was deleted in the 1988 legislative amendments to the statute, but there is no claim the amendment is material to the action herein.

At all pertinent times herein, K.S.A. 44-1112(a) contained the following definition:

"(a) 'Age' means an age of 40 or more years but less than 70 years."

Thus, for the purposes of the action herein, the protected class involves persons aged 40 to 70 years.

In Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 231 Kan. 763, 648 P.2d 234 (1982), we discussed the burden of proof requirements in an employment discrimination action as follows:

"[Appellant] cites Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 101 S.Ct. 1089 [1093-95] (1981), a case dealing with Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. In the opinion Justice Powell wrote for a unanimous court:

" 'In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668] (1973), we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment. First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' Id., at 802 . Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 804 .

" 'The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25, n. 2 [99 S.Ct. 295, 296, n 2, 58 L.Ed.2d 216] (1978); id., at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting)....

" 'The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.... The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: It eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, and n. 44 [97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, and n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396] (1977).... Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.

" 'The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra [439 U.S.], at 25 . It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions.

" 'The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she had been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-805 .'

"We note the federal court was careful in Burdine to point out that the ultimate burden of persuading the trier...