Beecher v. State

• Decision Date: 07 October 1971
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 846
• Citation: 288 Ala. 1,256 So.2d 154
• Parties: Johnny Daniel BEECHER v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 154

256 So.2d 154

288 Ala. 1

Johnny Daniel BEECHER v. STATE of Alabama.

7 Div. 846.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 7, 1971.

After Remandment Dec. 9, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1972.

J. Allen Lee, and Joe M. Dawson, Scottsboro, for appellant.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM.

On June 15, 1964, Johnny Daniel Beecher, a convict, who may hereinafter be referred to as 'defendant,' 'appellant,' or 'Beecher,' escaped from a road crew in Jackson County while the crew of convicts was building a fence near the right-of-way of a highway. The place from which the defendant escaped was about eight-tenths of a mile from the home of Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Chisenall who lived in the Fabius community. Mrs. Chisenall's body was found the next day, some distance from her home, in shallow hole covered with dirt and leaves. Her feet and hands were tied. She was gagged and blindfolded. Expert testimony and other evidence revealed that she met her death by manual strangulation and that she had been raped.

While fleeing from Tennessee police officers near South Pittsburg, Tennessee (which is located near the State line which separates Jackson County, Alabama and the State of Tennessee), Beecher was shot in the leg by a rifle bullet and arrested during the early morning of June 17, 1964. He was carried to a hospital in South Pittsburg and given first aid treatment. Evidence depicted his condition when he arrived at the hospital as being in a great amount of pain, he having sustained a gunshot wound in his leg which shattered his tibia. He was given injections of morphine, one intravenously and one intramuscularly.

His leg was not set at the Tennessee hospital, but splinted so he could be transported by ambulance to Kilby Prison Hospital near Montgomery where he received treatment for his leg that day. Later his leg was amputated.

On July 29, 1964, the Grand Jury of Jackson County, Alabama returned an indictment against the defendant. He was tried on a count charging him with the first degree murder of Martha Jane Chisenall, found guilty, and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court affirmed that judgment on October 6, 1966. Beecher v. State, 280 Ala. 283, 193 So.2d 505.

Thereafter, defendant filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a petition for certiorari to review the opinion and judgment rendered by this Court. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and on October 23, 1967 reversed the decision of this Court. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35.

On January 18, 1968, defendant was again indicted by the Grand Jury of Jackson County, Alabama, for murder in the first degree of Martha Jane Chisenall.

On January 20, 1969, the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Alabama, heard testimony on the defendant's Motion for Change of Venue. The transcript of the evidence taken at said hearing indicates that the State, either before or at the time of the hearing, nolle prossed the original indictment pending against the defendant. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the Motion for Change of Venue, changing the situs of the trial to Cherokee County, Alabama, and scheduling arraignment for January 22, 1969, in the Circuit Court of Cherokee County, Alabama. Defendant was duly arraigned at the appointed time on the indictment of January 18, 1968, and entered pleas of 'Not Guilty' and 'Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.' Trial of the cause was set for February 4, 1969.

On February 4, 1969, immediately prior to the commencement of trial, the defendant filed motions seeking to have the court permit the examination of jurors individually, in groups of six, and in groups of twelve, respectively, outside the presence of the other jurors. The lower court granted the motion to examine the jurors individually, but not outside the presence of the other jurors; overruled the motion to examine the jurors in groups of six; and granted the motion to examine the jurors in groups of twelve.

At the conclusion of the trial of the cause on February 5, 1969, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and imposed the death penalty. Judgment and sentence on the same date were in accord with the verdict of the jury.

This appeal is perfected under the provisions of the automatic appeal statute applicable in cases where the death penalty is imposed. Section 382(1) et seq., Title 15, Recompiled Code 1958; Act No. 249, Gen. Acts 1943, p. 217.

The defendant was represented in the trial below by three court appointed attorneys. He is represented on this appeal by one of the same attorneys, as well as by an additional attorney who did not participate in the trial. All attorneys involved in the trial and this appeal were appointed by the trial court.

The defendant's contention in brief complains of alleged error on the part of the trial court in admitting into evidence the testimony of Dr. William L. Headrick, Jr., the physician who treated the defendant shortly after his apprehension in Tennessee, concerning inculpatory statements allegedly given by the defendant to Dr. Headrick at the time of said treatment. The defendant argues that the alleged confession was inadmissible because '* * * (1) the confession was given involuntarily; (2) the confession was given while the defendant was in the custody of the police or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities and was subjected to questioning without being advised of his constitutional rights as provided for in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and later United States Supreme Court cases.'

The rule is well-established that extrajudicial confessions are prima facie involuntary and inadmissible and the duty rests in the first instance on the trial judge to determine whether or not a confession is voluntary, and unless it so appears, it should not be admitted. Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840; and cases therein cited.

A confession is involuntary unless it is 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' Blackburn v. State of Alabama, (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242; Davis v. State of North Carolina, (1966) 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895. It is not the product of a rational intellect and a free will if the petitioner's will to resist confessing is overborne. Rogers v. Richmond, (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760. An accused's will can be overborne by pressures engendered by physical or psychological coercion (Rogers v. Richmond, supra) or insanity (Blackburn v. Alabama, supra). These principles were reiterated in the case of Townsend v. Sain, (1960) 372 U.S. 293, 307, 83 S.Ct. 745, 754, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States stated the following:

'Numerous decisions of this Court have established the standards governing the admissibility of confessions into evidence. If an individual's 'will was overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will,' his confession is inadmissible because coerced. These standards are applicable whether a confession is the product of physical intimidation or psychological pressure and, of course, are equally applicable to a drug-induced statement. * * *'

Notwithstanding these comments by the United States Supreme Court, we understand its holding in Townsend v. Sain, supra, to be limited to two propositions: Did Townsend's petition for habeas corpus Allege a deprivation of his constitutional rights? Was the District Court required to hold an evidentiary Hearing to determine these constitutional questions? Both questions were answered in the affirmative by the court. ^{1 and 2} It did not establish any novel standard relating to the admissibility of confessions.

Townsend's petition was based upon allegations: that At the police station he became ill from the withdrawal of narcotics and was administered Scopolamine (hyoscine) and phenobarbital, combined, by a Police physician; that the drug scopolamine has the properties of a 'truth serum,' and that the injection produces a physiological and psychological condition adversely affecting the mind and will; that this state removes one from reality, one is not able to see or feel properly, one loses one's ability to withstand interrogation, and produces a physiological and psychological state susceptible to interrogation resulting in confessions; and That the injection in this case caused him to confess. Townsend also alleged the police doctor Willfully suppressed this information and the identity of hyoscine and scopolamine. The respondents admitted that Townsend was entitled to relief if the allegations of his petition are taken to be true.

In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court, in Townsend, simply reiterated heretofore established standards governing the admissibility of confessions into evidence stating that if one's 'will was overborne' or if one's confession was not 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will,' one's confession is coerced and inadmissible. The opinion then concluded that these standards are as likewise applicable 'whether a confession is the product of physical intimidation or psychological pressure and, of course, are equally applicable to a druginduced statement.' (372 U.S. at page 307, 83 S.Ct. at page 754.)

Nevertheless, we do not see that the court, In its holding, has articulated any new, different, or unique standards relating to confessions except to say existing standards apply to drug-induced statements. So, we must judge the confession in the instant case by the existing standards of voluntariness.

This brings us to a consideration as to whether the statement Beecher made to Dr. Headrick meets these standards of voluntariness.

A hearing was conducted outside the presence of the jury on the question of the voluntariness of the confession given by defendant to Dr. Headrick at the...