Beechley v. Beechley
| Decision Date | 12 July 1906 |
| Citation | 108 N.W. 762,134 Iowa 75 |
| Parties | LOUISA C. BEECHLEY, v. NATHANIEL K. BEECHLEY, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Rehearing denied, Thursday, April 11, 1907.
Appeal from Linn District Court.-- HON. J. H. PRESTON, Judge.
SUIT in equity to set aside a deed to land. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. Reversed.
Reversed.
Dawley Hubbard & Wheeler and Lewis Heins, for appellant.
Chas W. Kepler & Son, for appellee.
OPINION
The plaintiff is the widow of Jesse Beechley, having been his third wife. The defendant is the oldest son of said Jesse Beechley by his first wife. The second wife of Jesse Beechley was a sister of the plaintiff, and died in the latter part of December, 1889. At the time of her death and for many years prior thereto, Jesse Beechley owned about six hundred and sixty-five acres of land, including the land in controversy herein, four hundred and fifty acres. A deed to this four hundred and fifty acres of land was executed and delivered by said Jesse Beechley to the defendant December 17, 1890. About two weeks after the death of his second wife, Mr. Beechley asked the plaintiff to become the third Mrs. Beechley, but she refused to do so, and they did not meet again, nor was there any correspondence between them until in August, 1891, at which time Mr. Beechley again made the plaintiff an offer of marriage, which was accepted, and followed by a marriage on the 8th day of September, 1891. At the time of their marriage, the plaintiff was about sixty-six years old and Mr. Beechley nearly seventy. In the spring of 1890, and again in July, 1891, Mr. Beechley proposed marriage to another widow, and was both times rejected. Not until after the plaintiff and his father had been married, did the defendant have any information or intimation that his father contemplated another marriage. At the time he executed and delivered to the defendant the deed in question, Mr. Beechley still had two hundred and fifteen acres of land left, which was occupied as a homestead by himself and the plaintiff until 1893, when it was deeded by Mr. Beechley to a son by his second wife, the plaintiff's sister, in pursuance of a promise made to her before her death; the plaintiff voluntarily joining in the conveyance thereof. When the land in question was conveyed to the defendant, it was encumbered by a mortgage that he assumed and which, at the time of the trial below, amounted to nearly $ 13,000. At the time of this conveyance the grantor also owed other debts amounting to $ 3,000 or $ 4,000, so that his total liabilities at that time were somewhere from $ 15,000 to $ 16,000. Before conveying the two hundred and fifteen acres of land, Mr. Beechley had provided a large amount of material for the erection of a new house thereon, and after the conveyance he rebought this material from his grantee, moved it on to the four hundred and fifty-acre tract that he had conveyed to the defendant, and in 1894 built thereon a new house which he and the plaintiff occupied until his death early in 1904, and which the plaintiff still occupies. The defendant's deed was not recorded until after his father's death because of the grantor's request, made at the time of its execution and delivery, that it be not sooner recorded. The record shows that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the deed to the defendant until it was recorded, and it may fairly be said that, at the time of the marriage, the plaintiff supposed that her husband owned the four hundred and fifty acres in controversy as well as the other two hundred and fifteen acres. The plaintiff bases her right to relief on allegations of fraud in the conveyance to the defendant, and on an estoppel which will be hereinafter more fully noticed.
We are clearly of the opinion that fraud cannot be predicated on the facts disclosed. As we have already shown, there was no engagement nor any negotiations therefor until eight months after the conveyance was made. It is true that the grantor had theretofore proposed marriage to the plaintiff, and some months after her refusal to marry him he had proposed to another and had been rejected; and it may be said perhaps, that he had not entirely abandoned the thought of another marriage if he could find a willing woman; while, on the other hand, three rejections within a year would ordinarily be entirely sufficient to cool the "Douglas' blood" were age, alone, insufficient therefor. Aside from the proposals which we have mentioned and the fact of his subsequent marriage to the plaintiff, there is nothing in the record tending to show that, at the time of this conveyance, the grantor contemplated another marriage, and if he did not, there can be no fraud therein. Even if he then had a fixed purpose to marry as soon as he could find someone who was willing to become his wife, no negotiations or engagement therefor were then pending, and, under the rule of our own cases, the conveyance was not fraudulent as to the plaintiff. In Gainor v. Gainor, 26 Iowa 337, the conveyance sought to be set aside was made seven months before the marriage, and four months before negotiations therefor began. We held it utterly impossible that the conveyance could have been intended as a fraud, and said: "A voluntary settlement or conveyance of property by a wife or husband prior to marriage, will be held fraudulent as to the marital rights of the one to whom she or he may afterward be joined in matrimony, only when made in contemplation of marriage, and pending a treaty of marriage between the parties. See, also, Hamilton v. Smith, 57 Iowa 15, 10 N.W. 276; Beere v. Beere, 79 Iowa 555, 44 N.W. 809.
The Gainor case undoubtedly states the rule announced in nearly all of the cases treating the subject. Indeed, we have found but one case among a great many which we have examined that holds that an antenuptial voluntary conveyance, if made with intent to defeat the marital rights of any person whom the grantor might subsequently marry, would be void as to such rights whether the person was then selected or not. Such is the rule adopted in Higgins v. Higgins, 219 Ill. 146 (76 N.E. 86). After full consideration of the question, we are of opinion that the rule is sound. If the intent to defraud actually exists, it is immaterial whether a particular person has already been selected against whom it will operate. So far then as Gainor v. Gainor limits the application of the rule in this class of cases to cases where negotiations or an engagement exist at the time of the conveyance, it must be and is overruled. If the conveyance is made in contemplation of marriage and with intent to deprive the spouse of the marital rights which she would otherwise acquire, it is enough to invalidate the conveyance so far as it affects such rights. But if there be no treaty of marriage at the time of the conveyance, it is, in our judgment, a strong circumstance tending to disprove fraud.
There is evidence tending to show actual misrepresentation by the grantor as to the amount of his property, but it is contended that the evidence is incompetent. We think the contention is correct, but do not deem the question at all controlling on this branch of the case. In some of the earlier cases it was thought that a distinction should be made between silence or failure to disclose the true situation, and actual misrepresentation as to property. The later decisions however, and the weight of authority in this country, at least, hold that the ignorance of the spouse of a settlement or conveyance pending a treaty of marriage is fatal thereto, though no actual misrepresentation or deceit appear. Chandler et al. v. Hollingsworth et al., 3 Del.Ch. 99, and cases cited. This is an exhaustive and leading case on the subject, and contains a review of...
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