Beecroft v. Great Northern Railway Company
| Decision Date | 14 July 1916 |
| Docket Number | 19,849 - (188) |
| Citation | 158 N.W. 800,134 Minn. 86 |
| Parties | JOHN T. BEECROFT v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Lyon county to recover $25,000 for personal injury to plaintiff while in the employ of defendant as freight brakeman. The case was tried before Olsen, J., who at the close of the testimony denied defendant's motion to direct a verdict for defendant, and a jury which returned a verdict for $9,000. Defendant's motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial was granted. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Evidence -- speed of railway train -- incompetent witness.
1. Any person of ordinary intelligence who can say that he is able to form an estimate as to the speed of a train, and that he saw it in motion with reasonable opportunity to observe its speed, is competent to give an opinion as to its speed. But a witness who did not see or hear the train until it was upon him is not competent to give evidence as to its speed, and his opinion if given is without probative force.
Railway -- keeping lookout on footboard of engine -- negligence.
2. An engine with water tank attached was backing through a switching yard. There was a foot board across the front of the engine and one across the rear of the tank. Two men were stationed, one on each end, of the engine foot board so that one could look ahead, on each side of the engine. Held negligence could not be predicated on the failure to keep another man on the foot board of the tank.
Railway -- running engine through switching yard without ringing bell.
3. In the absence of some custom, or of the presence of persons on or near the track ahead, it is not negligence to run an engine through a switching yard without ringing a bell.
Tom Davis and Ernest A. Michel, for appellant.
M. L Countryman and A. L. Janes, for respondent.
Plaintiff was a switchman in the Willmar yard of defendant. On the afternoon of January 27, 1915, he was called to take a run out on a freight train. He went down into the yards to his caboose which stood on a side track, attended to some work there and went out again, leaving the caboose at the westerly end. As he left the caboose he stepped toward the lead track, which was about 8 to 12 feet from the caboose. While crossing the lead track he came in contact with a switch engine of defendant which was backing through the yards from east to west. Plaintiff sued for damages. On the first trial he recovered a verdict. The trial court set this verdict aside and granted a new trial. On the second trial plaintiff again had a verdict. The trial court set this aside and ordered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
The question in the case is, was defendant entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
1. One claim of negligence is that the engine was operated at an excessive rate of speed. The evidence of witnesses for defendant is that the engine was going at from four to six miles an hour, admittedly not an excessive rate of speed. The only evidence of excessive speed is that of the plaintiff himself, who says that the speed was from 18 to 25 miles an hour. No doubt plaintiff was competent to give an opinion as to the speed of a train. To render one competent to give such evidence no expert training is required. Any person of ordinary intelligence who can say that he is able to form an estimate as to the speed of a train, and that he saw it in motion, so that he had reasonable opportunity to observe its speed, can give such an opinion. See Wolfe v. Ives, 83 Conn. 174, 76 A. 526, 19 Ann. Cas. 752; Yahachi Shimoda v. Bundy, 24 Cal.App. 675, 142 P. 109. But in order to render any witness competent to give such evidence he must have had reasonable opportunity to observe the movement of the train. This the plaintiff according to his own evidence, did not have. He said: Manifestly the witness had no opportunity to judge the speed of the train, and his testimony is wholly lacking in probative force on...
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