Beedy v. Finney

• Decision Date: 28 October 1902
• Parties: BEEDY v. FINNEY ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

118 Iowa 276

91 N.W. 1069

BEEDY

v.FINNEY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 28, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Allamakee county; L. E. Fellows, Judge.

Action to quiet title to 3 1/2 lots in Postville. Decree was entered declaring plaintiff and each of the defendants owner of an undivided one-fourth thereof. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed.F. S. Burling, for appellant.

H. H. Stillwell, for appellees.

LADD, C. J.

The lots in. controversy were owned by N. J. Beedy, who, on the 11th day of November, 1880, conveyed them to his wife. The only consideration was love and affection. The deed recited that the grantor does “hereby sell and convey unto the said Lucy H. Beedy” the property described, and that “it is understood and agreed that the above conveyance is to be good and valid during the life of said Lucy H. Beedy, the grantee, but at her death the property, or the value thereof, to revert to the heirs of said Lucy H. and N. J. Beedy.” Then follow the usual covenants of seizure and title. The defendants are children of the grantor by a former marriage, but had attained their majority, and were not living with him, when the conveyance was executed. He was then 53 years of age, and the grantee 40, and they had been married several years. The plaintiff was born May 30, 1881. N. J. Beedy occupied the premises as a homestead until his death, in January, 1891, and thereafter his wife, Lucy, continued such occupancy up to some time in 1897. She then leased the lots, reserving rooms in the house for the storage of the furniture, and took others in Fayette for a time, and later went to a sanitarium, where she died in August, 1899.

1. The main contention of appellant is that the granting clause conveyed an absolute title, and that the habendum is in conflict therewith, and, for this reason, void. But the former describes no definite estate. Doubtless, if standing alone, it would pass title, as under our statute a deed is to be construed as conveying “all the interest of the grantor therein unless a contrary intent can reasonably be inferred from the terms used” (section 2914, Code); and the use of the term “heirs,” or other technical words of inheritance, is no longer essential to the transfer of an estate in fee simple (section 2913, Code). But the use of such words may have so strong a bearing in determining the intention of the grantor as to preclude the validity of a subsequent restriction or limitation. Where, however, the premises purport to convey without qualification or description, there can be nothing inconsistent with it in the habendum declaring the character or quality of the thing transferred, for that is not elsewhere defined. The repugnancy, to defeat the habendum, must be such that the intention of the parties either cannot be ascertained from the whole instrument, or, if ascertained, cannot be carried into effect. If, from the entire instrument and attending circumstances, it appears that the grantor intended to enlarge, restrict, or even repugn the conveyancing clause, the habendum will control. It is then to be regarded as an addendum or proviso to the granting clause, which will control it even to the extent of destroying its effect. In short, the modern rule requires the consideration of the deed as a whole, and not in separate and distinct parts, as was formerly done, and the finding of repugnancy avoided whenever all the provisions of the instrument may, without ignoring the accepted canons of construction, be given force and carried into effect. Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 984, 18 Am. St. Rep. 404;Williams v. Bentley, 27 Pa. 294;Bodine's Adm'rs v. Authur, 91 Ky. 53, 14 S. W. 904, 34 Am. St. Rep. 162; 1 Jones, Real Prop. c. 20; Berridge v. Glassey (Pa.) 56 Am. Rep. 324, and note (s. c. 3 Atl. 583);Powers v. Hibbard (Mich.) 72 N. W. 339, 346;Doren v. Gillum, 136 Ind. 134, 35 N. E. 1101. In the last case the court said: “Words importing a greater estate than one for life in the first taker may, by force of context, be so limited as to give the first taker a life estate only, with a remainder over. Reeder v. Spearman, 6 Rich. Eq. 89;Gillam v. Caldwell, 11 Rich. Eq. 73. The estate may be limited in the habendum, although not mentioned in the premises of a deed, and without the use of the word ‘remainder.’ Wager v. Wager, 1 Serg. & R. 374;Wommack v. Whitmore, 58 Mo. 448. And the latter part of a deed has been allowed to control, and rendered what seemed to be a fee a life estate in the first taker. Prior v. Quackenbush, 29 Ind. 475.” Montgomery v. Sturdivant, 41 Cal. 290;Riggin v. Love, 72 Ill. 553;Baskett v. Sellars, 93 Ky. 2, 19 S. W. 9;Humphrey v. Foster, 13 Grat. 653; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 141. As already indicated, the fee did not pass, because, in the words of the statute, a contrary intent can reasonably be inferred from the terms used. Construing the premises and habendum together, as we are bound to do, their provisions are easily harmonized, and the conclusion reached that but a life estate was conveyed to the wife. The cases cited by appellant are not in point, as in all an absolute fee was passed by the granting clause. See Pierson v. Lane, 60 Iowa, 60, 14 N. W. 90;Case v. Dwire, 60 Iowa, 442, 15 N. W. 265;Teaney v. Mains (Iowa) 84 N. W. 953.

2. The conveyance, though of the homestead, was valid. Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa, 608, 34 N. W. 441. Section 2205 of the Code of 1873 expressly authorizes the conveyance of either the wife or husband to the other of his property; and section 1990, prohibiting a conveyance of the homestead by either without the other joining therein, evidently has no application to a transfer between husband and wife. The homestead character is not affected by conveyances between them. The section evidently relates to contracts with third persons, and is intended as a guard against its alienation without the concurrence of both husband and wife. Spoon v. Van Fossen, 53 Iowa, 494, 5 N. W. 624;Burkett v. Burkett (Cal.) 20 Pac. 715, 3 L. R. A. 781, 12 Am. St. Rep. 58.

3. The deed...