Beeghly v. Mack, 01SA18.

• Decision Date: 26 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01SA18.,01SA18.
• Parties: In re Peggy K. BEEGHLY, Plaintiff, v. Donald G. MACK and CLK Business-Investment Trust, Defendants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

20 P.3d 610

In re Peggy K. BEEGHLY, Plaintiff, v. Donald G. MACK and CLK Business-Investment Trust, Defendants.

No. 01SA18.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

March 26, 2001.

Kelley & Rich, P.C., Jeffrey R. Kelley, Charles H. Rich, III, Englewood, CO, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Fisher, Sweetbaum & Levin, P.C., Alan D. Sweetbaum, E. James Wilder, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Defendants.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this case, the Plaintiff, Peggy K. Beeghly (Beeghly), seeks to gain possession of certain property from the Defendant, Donald G. Mack (Mack), trustee of CLK Business-Investment Trust (Trust), also a Defendant in this action. Beeghly brought a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action in the trial court to obtain possession of the subject property. At the request of Mack and the Trust, we issued a rule to show cause, pursuant to C.A.R. 21, why a default judgment issued by the trial court should not be vacated. The trial court issued a default judgment and granted possession of the property to Beeghly because Mack and the Trust failed to post bond as ordered pursuant to section 13-40-114, 5 C.R.S. (2000), of the FED statute. We make the rule to show cause absolute.

I.

The facts of this case are contested by both parties. One of the issues in contention is ownership of property located at 9137 North Delbert Road, Parker, Colorado (the property). Beeghly, Mack, and the Trust all agree that on February 29, 2000, Beeghly closed on the property, and obtained a warranty deed from Michael J. Shidler (Shidler), who was then the trustee of the Trust,¹ after having obtained a loan in the amount of $632,000 from Washington Mutual. Mack contends that Beeghly also received $10,000 at the time of the closing. Mack argues that the transaction in which Beeghly obtained title to the property was really an equitable mortgage, and not a purchase. Mack alleges that this transaction was developed by Shidler, the trustee at the time, in order to prevent a foreclosure of the property, the Trust's sole asset. Mack contends that Beeghly merely agreed to refinance the property, and thus, is only the record owner, not the equitable owner. Beeghly, however, argues that this transaction was strictly a purchase of the property, and therefore, she is the lawful owner of the property.

In March 2000, Beeghly and Mack entered into a lease agreement for the property, where Mack agreed to pay a monthly rental amount of $3,994.67. This amount is the exact amount of Beeghly's monthly mortgage payments to Washington Mutual. For some time, Mack made the monthly rental payments directly to Washington Mutual. Sometime during the summer of 2000, a disagreement arose between Beeghly and Mack, whereby Mack stopped making monthly rental payments. Mack contends that in July 2000, Shidler resigned as trustee of the Trust, at which time Mack became the trustee. On November 27, 2000, Beeghly filed a complaint in unlawful detainer pursuant to sections 13-40-101 to XX-XX-XXX, 5 C.R.S. (2000), seeking possession of the property, back rent, late fees, costs, and attorney fees. On December 5, 2000, Mack filed an answer to the complaint, denying that Beeghly was the beneficial owner of the property. On December 7, 2000, the Trust filed a motion to intervene in the action, claiming that it was the rightful owner and thus, had an interest in the outcome of the litigation. On that same date, Mack and the Trust also filed an amended answer, asserting counter-claims such as quiet title, declaratory judgment, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, Mack and the Trust filed a motion to continue the trial of the issue of possession of the property.

On December 8, 2000, the trial court granted both the Trust's motion to intervene and the motion to continue the trial. The continuance was granted until January 12, 2001, conditioned upon the collective payment of a bond by Mack and the Trust, on or before December 12, 2000, in the amount of $20,000 in accordance with section 13-40-114. During settlement negotiations, the parties entered into a stipulation to extend the time for filing the bond to December 15, 2000. It does not, however, appear that this stipulation was ever approved by the trial court.

After settlement negotiations broke down, on or around January 10, 2001, Beeghly filed a motion for default judgment for possession based on the failure of Mack and the Trust to post the bond ordered by the trial court.² On January 11, 2001, the trial court held a telephone hearing on the motion for default judgment in which it allowed each party five minutes of argument. The trial court ultimately granted the motion for default judgment, holding that Beeghly was entitled to possession since Mack and the Trust failed to post the bond. The trial court also denied Mack's and the Trust's request for a stay of the possession order. Mack and the Trust then brought this C.A.R. 21 petition requesting that this court issue a rule to show cause why an order should not be issued vacating the trial court order granting the motion for default judgment.

II.

The forcible entry and detainer statutory scheme is designed to provide a quick mechanism for resolving possession disputes between landlords and tenants. See §§ 13-40-101 to XX-XX-XXX, 5 C.R.S. (2000); Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853, 856-57 (Colo. 1985). To this end, if either party requests a delay in trial longer than five days, the trial court may, in its discretion, and upon good cause shown, require either of the parties to give bond to the opposite party in the amount of damages that may be caused by the delay. § 13-40-114.³

In this case, the trial court granted a default judgment for possession to Beeghly because Mack and the Trust failed to post a bond pursuant to section 13-40-114, which the trial court ordered as a condition of granting the request for continuance. In our analysis of whether the trial court erred in granting the default judgment for possession for failure to comply with section 13-40-114, we must look to basic rules of statutory construction to determine whether the bond statute authorizes the action taken by the trial court. "A court's primary task in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative purpose underlying a statutory enactment." Woodsmall v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63, 67 (Colo.1990). In determining statutory purpose, we first look to the language used by the legislature and give words their commonly accepted and understood meaning. Id. When the language is clear and unambiguous, it may be presumed that the legislature meant what it clearly stated in the statute. Id.

The language of section 13-40-114 is clear. It specifically authorizes the trial court, within its discretion, to grant a request for continuance, and to order that such continuance be conditioned on the posting of a bond, with the amount of such bond to be determined by the trial court. § 13-40-114. It does not, however, authorize the trial court to issue a default judgment for failure to comply.

The inclusion of the bond provision in the FED statutory scheme evidences the legislature's recognition that even a brief delay in a trial for possession may damage the party entitled to possession. Butler, 704 P.2d at 857. The bond provision, therefore, serves the purpose of protecting a party who might suffer harm due to the opposing party's request for a delay in the proceedings. Thus, the purpose of the bond statute would not be served by allowing a default judgment to be issued for non-compliance. Instead, the remedy of an immediate trial for failure to post the bond would serve the statute's purpose, since an immediate trial on the merits would resolve the dispute between the parties, thus eliminating the need for payment to the opposing party of a sum that would compensate that party for a delayed trial.

As previously discussed, the FED scheme was meant to provide an expeditious resolution of possession issues involving landlord and tenant disputes. When a delay in the proceedings is requested, due either to the complexities of the situation or for other reasons, a continuance may be granted, conditioned upon the posting of a bond. If that bond is not posted when ordered by a court, the logical implication is that the trial will continue under the expedited schedule provided by the FED statutory scheme, not that the merits will be decided without a hearing.

The fact that the bond statute does not authorize default judgment is further evidenced by the legislature's failure to specifically include default provisions in section 13-40-114, and the legislature's inclusion of specific provisions for default judgment elsewhere within the FED statutory scheme. See § 13-40-111, 5 C.R.S. (2000). Specifically, the trial court may grant a default judgment where the named defendant fails to file an answer with the trial court within the time allowed for an appearance as specified in the summons. Id. Under the rule of interpretation expressio unius exclusio alterius, the inclusion of certain items implies the exclusion of others. Dill v. People, 94 Colo. 230, 235, 29 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1933). Therefore, because the legislature specifically included a default provision in section 13-40-111, but did not include such a provision in section 13-40-114, the legislature could not have intended to provide default judgment as a remedy for failure to post a bond. Instead, default judgment is specifically authorized under the FED statutory scheme only when the named defendant fails to file an answer pursuant to section 13-40-111.

Finally, the entry of a default judgment is the harshest of all sanctions, and should be imposed only in extreme circumstances. Nagy v. Dist. Court, 762 P.2d 158, 161 (Colo.1988). Here, the parties acknowledge that they were in the midst of settlement negotiations, and as such, agreed to an extension of time...