Beegle v. Restaurant Management, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-1305.,93-CV-1305.
• Citation: 679 A.2d 480
• Parties: Vincenza Vittoria BEEGLE, Appellant, v. RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

679 A.2d 480

Vincenza Vittoria BEEGLE, Appellant, v. RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 93-CV-1305.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 10, 1995.

Decided June 27, 1996.

Glenn H. Carlson, Washington, DC, for appellant.

Randell Hunt Norton, Washington, DC, for appellee.

Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, FERREN, Associate Judge, and GALLAGHER, Senior Judge.

WAGNER, Chief Judge.

While working at a restaurant owned by SPL, Inc. (SPL), appellant, Vincenza Vittoria Beegle, sustained severe burns when a co-worker, Michael Trihias, lit a chafing dish which exploded. Ms. Beegle filed a complaint for damages in the trial court alleging negligence against appellee, Billy's, Inc. (Billy's) and others.¹ The trial court granted summary judgment for Billy's, concluding that the undisputed evidence showed that Michael Trihias was employed by SPL, not by Billy's as Beegle contended; therefore, Beegle's exclusive remedy for work-related injuries against SPL and its agents and employees would be under the Workers' Compensation statute. See D.C.Code § 36-304(b) (1993). Beegle argues on appeal that the claim is not barred against Billy's because, at the relevant time, Billy's was an independent contractor engaged by SPL under a written agreement which provided for Billy's to exercise complete control over SPL's restaurant operation, including any employees. Billy's contends that absent evidence that Trihias was employed by Billy's, the latter's status as an agent or independent contractor is irrelevant. The central issue for determination in this case is whether the negligence of a restaurant employee, who allegedly is controlled and supervised by an independent contractor that operates the restaurant, can serve as the basis for a negligence claim against the independent contractor, even though the plaintiff has recovered worker's compensation from the restaurant owner. We hold that it can; therefore, we must reverse summary judgment for the alleged independent contractor.

Assuming for purposes of the summary judgment motion that Billy's was performing various functions under a contract with SPL, the trial court framed the issue as whether the allegedly negligent employee can have simultaneously two employers such that an injured co-worker who receives worker's compensation from one can recover in tort against the other. The trial court answered the question in the negative and granted the motion. The court framed the issue too narrowly to consider fully the relationships of the parties and whether Billy's was an independent contractor which exercised, or had the right to exercise, control over the claimed negligent acts underlying Beegle's claim in order that Billy's could be liable independently. We conclude that on this record, a material issue of disputed fact exists as to whether Billy's had authority to control the entire operations of the restaurant, including Trihias in the performance of his work, such that Billy's can be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Billy's.

I.

Briefly summarized, the facts pertinent to this appeal are these. On November 4, 1989, appellant Beegle, a hostess/maitre d' at Madeo Restaurant, sustained severe burns when a portable burner exploded in the restaurant. Beegle alleged in her complaint that the explosion was caused by the negligence of Paul Loukas, the principal owner and manager of all of the named corporate defendants, including Billy's, and Michael Trihias, an employee of one of the defendants. According to the complaint, at Loukas' direction, Trihias poured lighter fluid over Sterno cooking units and ignited them, causing the explosion and fire which resulted in Beegle's injuries. Beegle claimed that the procurement and use of lighter fluid were negligent because contrary to express warnings on the apparatus and the laws and regulations of the District of Columbia.

It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, both Beegle and Trihias received wage statements from SPL. Loukas was the sole shareholder, president and treasurer of SPL. Loukas was also the sole shareholder and president of Billy's. SPL and Billy's entered into a one-year contract on December 10, 1988, with an effective date of January 1, 1989, which obligated Billy's "to manage SPL, Inc.'s day-to-day operations." The contract, which Loukas executed as president of SPL and as president of Billy's, further provided:

Authority and Duties. S.P.L. grants to manager Billy's, authority to supervise, manage and direct the operations and business of S.P.L. to order, direct and superintend all repairs and decorations, to make disbursements therefor; to hire and fire employees and to pay the salaries or wages thereof; to enter into contracts on behalf of S.P.L. with respect to its day-to-day operations; to keep, record, and maintain financial books and records; to make all purchases; and generally, to do and perform all acts and things incident to such management and to make all disbursements in connection therewith.

The contract provided that SPL would pay Billy's compensation of $42,000 per annum for the term of the agreement. Loukas did not receive a salary from SPL during the year in which the accident occurred. Loukas drew his salary from Billy's.²

In response to Beegle's complaint, Billy's and the other named defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, on the ground that Beegle's claim was barred under the exclusive remedy provisions of the D.C. Workers' Compensation Act. D.C.Code § 36-304(b). The trial court twice granted Beegle's motions for limited discovery for the purpose of (1) deposing Loukas to determine whether Trihias was employed by SPL, and (2) propounding an interrogatory to Billy's to determine whether it had employed Trihias or paid him any money during the period relevant to Beegle's complaint. The trial court denied Beegle's motion to depose Trihias in an effort to discover more about the management agreement, the relationship between Billy's and SPL, and Trihias' relationship to both corporations. In the motion for further discovery, Beegle argued that Trihias was Billy's employee and that both Trihias and Loukas were acting as agents of Billy's, which had authority under the contract to manage the restaurant. In a motion to reconsider, Beegle contended that Billy's, which had a duty under the management agreement, was not shielded by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. The trial court denied the motion for further discovery and for reconsideration.

Assuming that Billy's performed the management functions under the terms of its contract, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment because it determined that Trihias was employed by SPL, as evidenced by the fact that SPL paid Trihias' wages, and concluded as a matter of law that Trihias could not have simultaneously two employers for purposes of applying the workers' compensation law. In making its ruling, the trial court stated:

I believe under Henderson v. Charles E. Smith Management, 567 A.2d 59 (D.C. 1989), the very case which Beegle cites that I have to find that ... the employer of Trihias was SPL, that you cannot sue SPL. The mere fact that Billy's, Inc. may have had a managerial role and may have had some supervisory responsibility for Mr. Trihias without some proposition, legal authority to say you can have two employers simultaneously for purposes of liability, there is nothing here other than a respondeat superior claim.

Therefore, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. In a motion for reconsideration, Beegle contended that Billy's was a separate legal entity which had a duty to Beegle, independent of the employer's (SPL's) duty, as established by the management agreement. Beegle also argued that there was a factual dispute concerning whether Trihias was employed by both SPL and Billy's. The trial court denied Beegle's motion for rehearing and reconsideration.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court applies the same standard of review as the trial court in ruling on the motion. Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 626 (D.C.1990); Thompson v. Shoe World, Inc., 569 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C.1990). This court undertakes an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beckman, 579 A.2d at 626-27; Dodek v. CF 16 Corp., 537 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C.1988). We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving any doubt as to the existence of disputed facts against the moving party. Beckman, 579 A.2d at 627 (citation omitted). The party opposing summary judgment must show that the claimed factual dispute is material and requires the factfinder to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial. Id. at 626 (citations omitted); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979). We examine first the controlling legal principles and the facts of record in order to determine whether summary judgment was granted properly.

II.

The Workers' Compensation statute for the District of Columbia, which imposes liability on employers for an employee's job-related injury arising out of, and in the course of, employment, constitutes the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer, other employees, officers, directors, or agents of the employer. D.C.Code § 36-304(a) (1993); Henderson v. Charles E. Smith Management, 567 A.2d 59, 61 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). Beegle does not dispute that she is limited to her workers' compensation claim against any of these persons or entities. Nor does she challenge that both she and the alleged negligent co-worker, Trihias, were paid wages by her employer, SPL.³ Beegle argues that Billy's was not an agent of SPL within the meaning of the workers'...