Beekman v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 14 June 1899
• Parties: Beekman v. Richardson, Administrator, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

51 S.W. 689

150 Mo. 430

Beekman v. Richardson, Administrator, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

June 14, 1899

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. John M. Wood Judge.

Reversed.

J. A Henderson and J. G. & Wm. F. Woerner for appellant.

(1) Where the publication of the notice to creditors is in due form, a claim against an estate must be exhibited and filed within two years from the grant of letters, or it is barred unless it comes within one of the saving clauses of the statute. The law is very strict in requiring creditors to comply with these statutes of non-claim. Ignorance of Spore's death on the part of claimants was no excuse. Woerner on Admin., sec. 402; Richardson v. Harrison, 36 Mo. 96; Nelson v. Haeberle, 26 Mo.App. 1; Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U.S. 451; Price v. McCause, 30 Mo.App. 627; Bank v. Burgin, 73 Mo.App. 108. (2) A claim based on a judgment obtained in decedent's lifetime forms no exception to the above rule. A transcript of such judgment must be exhibited and filed for classification within the two years, though of course the merits of the original judgment can not be questioned. R. S. 1889, sec. 190. If filed and presented for classification in the first year it goes into the fourth class; if within the second year in the sixth class. R. S. 1889, sec. 183. And if not within that time it is barred altogether, like any other demand. Woerner on Admin., sec. 397; Wernse v. McPike, 100 Mo. 486; McGinnis v. Loring, 126 Mo. 411. (3) The coverture of Mary Beekman did not excuse the failure to file the claim and have it classified within the two years. She was represented by her trustee, the legal owner thereof, in whose name the judgment, upon which the claim is based, stood, and still stands, and who was the proper party to have acted. The neglect of the trustee to do anything until the claim was barred, has the effect of barring the claim likewise against his cestui que trust. Marsh v. Dooley, 52 Cal. 232; Ewing v. Shanahan, 113 Mo. 197; Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U.S. 569. (4) The creditor had the opportunity to present this demand against the estate at any time within the statutory period of two years, and having neglected to do so, the bar is complete, and protects not only the personal representative but also the heirs, distributees and legatees. The fact that claimant is a creditor who has lost her right at law to participate in the assets as against other creditors, works no preference in equity in her favor over the beneficiaries who take as heirs and distributees. The sound theory of our administration law relegates all these matters to the probate court under plain statutory provisions, and a court of equity will not interfere to help out belated creditors who failed to comply with the law. Titterington v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 593; Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 Mo. 274; Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U.S. 449; Woerner on Admin., sec. 577.

J. M. Holmes for respondent.

(1) The statutory bar of two years applies only to "demands," which require "allowance" by the probate court. R. S. 1889, sec. 184. (2) The claim in suit being a judgment, there was no occasion to present it to the probate court for allowance. The probate court could do no more with it than to classify it. Carondelet v. Desnoyer, 27 Mo. 36; Gibson v. Naughton, 61 Mo. 418; Wernse v. McPike, 100 Mo. 480; Stephens v. Bernays, 119 Mo. 143. (3) No time is limited by the statute within which a judgment should be presented for classification. Hence it may be presented at any time prior to distribution, and the delay affects nothing except the classification to which it may be entitled.

OPINION

ROBINSON, J.

This is a suit in equity by plaintiff against the public administrator of the city of St. Louis having in charge the estate of James Spore, deceased, whereby it is sought to have the surplus in the hands of the administrator belonging to the estate of the decedent, after the payment of all classified and allowed claims against said estate, applied to the satisfaction of a judgment rendered in favor of Robert W Parcels as trustee for the use of plaintiff and her husband against the said James Spore during his lifetime, which said judgment it is alleged had not been presented for classification and allowance within two years after administration had been taken out on said estate, for the reason that plaintiff and her trustee were ignorant of the fact of the death of said Spore or that he was possessed of any estate whatever until within just a few days before the institution of the present suit. Plaintiff in her petition alleges that all other creditors of said estate had been paid in full; that her judgment was of record and that the defendant administrator had notice of it and was about to make final settlement without intending to pay it, and closed with the prayer for "an order and decree against the said public administrator, so in charge of the estate of the said James Spore, requiring and directing him to schedule said judgment on behalf of the plaintiff as an allowed claim in judgment against the estate of the said James Spore and that he be ordered and directed to pay to the plaintiff upon said judgment such dividend as the said judgment may be entitled to in the final settlement and distribution of the estate and for such other and further order and decree as the circumstances of the case may require." For answer to plaintiff's petition defendant filed a general denial, and also alleged that due notice to creditors was published by him as administrator, and set up the plea of the special statute of limitation for two years, or non-claim. At the trial it was admitted that the public administrator took charge of the estate of said James Spore on March 16th, 1893; that he duly caused to be published the statutory notice to creditors within a few days thereafter and continued the publication for the full time required by law, and that the notice was in due form and valid; that no steps of any kind had been taken before the filing of this suit on June 7th, 1895 (more than two years and three months after publication of notice) to have the claim of plaintiff based on said judgment presented for classification in the probate court, or to bring it to the attention of the administrator; also that final settlement had been advertised and an order of distribution made, but that the latter order had been appealed from, and was then pending in ...