Beeler v. Van Cannon
Decision Date | 13 November 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-1634,84-1634 |
Parties | Carl E. BEELER, Appellant, v. Linda Kay VAN CANNON, Rex A. Bright, Michael Dean Mitchell, and Madison County, Iowa, Appellees. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Lewis H. Jordan of Webster, Jordan, Oliver & Walters, Winterset, for appellant.
Richard G. Blane II of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ.
We reject plaintiff's equal protection challenge to the legislature's choice of the effective date for Iowa Code section 668.4 (1985).
In Goetzman v. Wichern, we abolished the common law doctrine of contributory negligence and supplanted it with the doctrine of pure comparative negligence. 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982). In so doing we reserved for later case-by-case determination a number of collateral issues which, we thought, could "best be addressed and resolved in the context of concrete cases." Id.
We soon were called upon to resolve one of the more obvious examples of such a collateral issue. In Rozevink v. Faris, we held that the doctrine of joint and several liability had survived Goetzman and was "unaffected by our adoption of pure comparative negligence." 342 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 1983). Our resolution of the issue remained intact for a limited time, however, because the legislature soon reviewed it as a part of its reconsideration of the whole comparative fault concept. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1293 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 668 (1985)). One of the provisions in the legislative response to our Goetzman decision now appears as Iowa Code section 668.4. It provides:
In actions brought under this chapter, the rule of joint and several liability shall not apply to defendants who are found to bear less than fifty percent of the total fault assigned to all parties.
The question in this case is whether the statute applies so as to bar joint and several liability against such a defendant.
Plaintiff, Carl E. Beeler, was injured in a car accident in June 1981. In December 1981 he filed this lawsuit against four defendants. The suit was not tried until July 10, 1984. According to plaintiff, the severity of his physical and emotional injury delayed the trial. At trial plaintiff dismissed his action against defendant Bright and the court directed a verdict for defendant Mitchell. Defendant Van Cannon, on the first day of trial, confessed judgment in the amount of $503,225 and costs pursuant to Iowa rule of civil procedure 226. Madison County is therefore the only remaining defendant in this appeal.
The jury found plaintiff to have suffered $150,000 in damages. The jury further found plaintiff 12 1/2% negligent, Madison County 12 1/2% negligent and Van Cannon 75% negligent. Because of section 668.4, however, Madison County was not jointly and severally liable. Thus, plaintiff's judgment against the county was limited to $18,750 (12 1/2% of $150,000). Had joint and several liability applied, plaintiff could have collected $131,250 from Madison County (the entire judgment less plaintiff's comparative negligence). Plaintiff does not directly challenge section 668.4. 1 He does not dispute its effect as a bar to joint and several liability to defendants such as Madison County. Plaintiff's sole challenge is its effective date:
This Act, except for section 4, applies to all cases filed on or after July 1, 1984. Section 4 of this Act applies to all cases tried on or after July 1, 1984.
1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1293, § 15 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff's specific challenge is that section 15 of the Act, both on its face and as applied to him, violates the equal protection clauses of both the federal (14th Amendment) and Iowa (Article I, section 6) Constitutions. He argues:
[A] classification has been placed ... which allows plaintiffs who were injured prior to July 1, 1984, but because their injuries were less severe ... to go to trial prior to that date, an opportunity to collect all their damages, while those who were injured more severely and because of the nature, extent, and severity of their injuries, were unable to go to trial before July 1, 1984, are denied the right to collect their damages.
We see no reason to distinguish between the equal protection provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. For the purposes of this challenge the provisions are similar. See Stracke v. City of Council Bluffs, 341 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1983).
I.
On an equal protection challenge the first question is whether some fundamental right is involved. The answer determines the burden to be borne by the challenger. If no fundamental right is at issue the classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest [authority]. If a fundamental right is at issue the burden is quite different; the state must present a compelling interest which is served by the discrimination [authority].
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board, 368 N.W.2d 74, 84-85 (Iowa 1985).
Although plaintiff contends otherwise we find no claimed violation of a fundamental right. Plaintiff was not denied access to the courts. See Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 905 (Iowa 1973) ( ). The plaintiff here was and is in court. Involved is only the continued effectiveness of a common law principle which, though it impacts greatly on the amount of his recovery, does not determine whether he is in or out of court. We therefore apply the rational basis test.
This is the test most often applied. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 (1982) (). In applying this standard we are to determine if the classification or distinction drawn by the statute is reasonably related to some legitimate state interest. Stracke, 341 N.W.2d at 733-34. The party attacking the classification "has the heavy burden of proving the action unconstitutional, and must negate every reasonable basis upon which the action may be sustained." Id. at 734. There is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of any legislative enactment. Gleason v. City of Davenport, 275 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 1979). It is presumed the legislature intended the statute to comply with both the state and federal constitutions. Hewett Wholesale, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 487, 488 (Iowa 1984); Iowa Code § 4.4(1)(1985).
II. Plaintiff's rational basis argument is based...
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