Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional Facility, 96 Civ. 7677(MBM).

• Citation: 28 F.Supp.2d 884
• Decision Date: 10 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96 Civ. 7677(MBM).,96 Civ. 7677(MBM).
• Parties: William T. BEESON, Plaintiff, v. FISHKILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Sgt. Jones, C.O. Griffin and Physician's Assistant McCombe, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

28 F.Supp.2d 884

William T. BEESON, Plaintiff, v. FISHKILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Sgt. Jones, C.O. Griffin and Physician's Assistant McCombe, Defendants.

No. 96 Civ. 7677(MBM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

December 10, 1998.

William T. Beeson, New York City, pro se.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General for the State of New York, John P. Barry, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, New York City, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

MUKASEY, District Judge.

William Beeson, plaintiff pro se, sues Fishkill Correctional Facility ("Fishkill"), Sergeant George Jones, Physician's Assistant Robert McCombe, and Corrections Officers Steven Wentzel, Thomas O'Brien and D. Griffin, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), for violating his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I.

Except where otherwise indicated, the following facts are taken from plaintiff's complaint and assumed to be true: At all relevant times, plaintiff was an inmate at Fishkill. On the night of September 27, 1995, Jones, without provocation, interrupted plaintiff's peaceful prayer session by handcuffing and twisting his arms "to the point of almost breaking [them] in a sadistic fashion." (Compl. at 2.)¹ Jones also frightened plaintiff with numerous threats and false accusations. (Id.)

Jones, Wentzel and two unidentified officers then dragged plaintiff to a supervisor's office. (Id.) On the way there, plaintiff cried out for the officers to stop beating him. (Id.) The officers responded to this plea by "violently smash[ing plaintiff] up against a wall" and "assault[ing,] beat[ing] and punch[ing]" him in the back and sides. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that "[m]y arms were twisted even harder as I screamed for someone to help me. I was told to shut my mouth or I would be further beaten." (Id.) One of the unidentified officers smashed plaintiff into a metal locker and twisted his arms and thumb to the point of almost breaking them. (Id.)

Two unidentified corrections officers then escorted plaintiff to a Special Housing Unit. On the way there, they punched, hit and threatened plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) The officers then led plaintiff to a "torture room" where they ordered him "to strip in a sadistic fashion." (Id.) A female nurse then briefly examined him. Although plaintiff does not mention in his complaint that McCombe was also there, defendants assume that McCombe was present to help the nurse examine plaintiff. For the purposes of this motion, I too will so assume. Plaintiff claims that the nurse was unable to do a thorough job because the officers in the room prevented him from communicating with her. (Id.) The officers and nurse then exited the room, leaving plaintiff inside without any clothes. (Id.)

Thirty minutes later, O'Brien, Griffin and a third unidentified officer entered the room and directed plaintiff to lie on his stomach. The officers then vandalized and destroyed plaintiff's property, and O'Brien insulted plaintiff's religious beliefs. (Id. at 4.) The officers then confiscated plaintiff's legal papers and religious materials, and locked him in a cell. (Id.)

Plaintiff was brought before a disciplinary hearing board the next day, which found him guilty of creating a disturbance and refusing a direct order. (Defs. Notice of Mot.Ex. B.) Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed this decision, arguing that the disciplinary sentence he received was too severe. (Id.) Plaintiff also filed two grievances requesting the return of his legal papers and religious items. (Id. Ex. A.) He later withdrew those grievances before any official action was taken. (Id.)

Plaintiff commenced this action in October 1996. He filed an amended complaint on December 9, 1996, alleging assault, denial of adequate medical care, infliction of mental and emotional injury, destruction of personal property and deprivation of religious rights. He seeks $25 million and an order requiring Fishkill to fire all the individual defendants. Defendants now move to dismiss under Rule 12(c).

II.

Defendants first argue that New York State's Eleventh Amendment immunity prevents plaintiff from suing them in a federal court. I agree, but with respect to Fishkill only. The Supreme Court has held that a state cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless it has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has passed legislation legitimately overriding that immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). As a state agency, Fishkill is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 28 n. 1 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that the Department of Corrections has immunity); Proctor v. Vadlamudi, 992 F.Supp. 156, 158-59 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a state correctional facility has immunity); DeWitt v. Fenton, No. 90 Civ. 4935, 1991 WL 17869, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.5, 1991) (same). Accordingly, because New York State has not waived its immunity, see Gayle v. Keane, No. 94 Civ. 7583, 1998 WL 187862, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.21, 1998), and Congress has not otherwise taken it away, Fishkill is immune from suit in this court.

The individual defendants argue that they too are completely immune from federal action because they are being sued in their official capacities. I disagree. Although state actors sued in their official capacity have Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, those sued in their individual capacity do not. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). As the Supreme Court has observed, "[S]tate officials, sued in their individual capacities, are not `persons' within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the `official' nature of their acts." Id.

Here, the complaint is silent as to the capacity in which defendants are being sued. This silence should not be held against plaintiff, however. The Second Circuit has ruled that a "complaint's failure to specify that claims against state officials are asserted against them in their individual capacity does not justify an outright dismissal" on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Oliver Schools, Inc. v. Foley, 930 F.2d 248, 252 (2d Cir.1991). As the Supreme Court noted in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), "[i]n many cases, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both. The course of proceedings in such cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, early dismissal of a plaintiff's claim is inappropriate unless it appears "`beyond doubt'" that he can prove no set of facts that would justify holding a state actor liable in his individual capacity. Foley, 930 F.2d at 252 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). This rule is of particular relevance in a case where the plaintiff proceeds pro se. See Mitchell v. Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332, 338 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that a court must liberally read a pro se plaintiff's pleadings).

Here, drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff, I cannot say as a matter of law that his complaint will not support a claim against defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, although the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the individual defendants to the extent they were acting in their official capacities, it does not bar suit against them to the extent plaintiff is seeking to hold them liable in their individual capacities.

III.

The individual defendants next argue that plaintiff's action is barred because he is seeking to use § 1983 to attack the findings made at his disciplinary hearing. They rely on Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), which held that a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 action challenging the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing if that action necessarily implies the invalidity of the disciplinary sentence imposed. See id. at 1589.

Defendants' reliance on Edwards is misplaced. Plaintiff does not dispute the constitutionality of the disciplinary procedures or the findings of the disciplinary hearing. Rather, he claims that defendants violated his civil rights by assaulting him and destroying his property in the events leading up to the disciplinary hearing. Some of plaintiff's assertions may eventually be barred by collateral estoppel, see Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.1998) ("`[W]hen a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate ...," federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.'") (quoting University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986)), but that is a matter to await development of the record. Plaintiff's action is not barred by Edwards.

IV.

Defendants argue also that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because he has not exhausted his available administrative remedies, as he is allegedly required to do under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e et seq. (West.Supp.1998). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id. § 1997e(a).

The PLRA mandates complete administrative review of all...