Cruz v. Jordan

Decision Date28 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98 CIV. 0363(AKH).,98 CIV. 0363(AKH).
Citation80 F.Supp.2d 109
PartiesFelix CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Barry JORDAN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Daniel Haym Weiner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York, NY, for Felix Cruz.

Felix Cruz, Stormville, NY, pro se.

Valerie Singleton, Dennis C. Vacco, Atty General of the State of NY, New York, NY, for Barry Jordan.

Dennis C. Vacco, Atty General of the State of NY, New York, NY, for Green Haven C.F.

Valerie Singleton, Atty General of the State of NY, New York, NY, for C.O. M. Prusak, A.D. Miller, Ms. Fish-Gerald, Dr. Selwin, Dr. Mamis, C.O. M. Coryers.

OPINION

HELLERSTEIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Felix Cruz brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages for injuries he suffered due to defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) to dismiss the action on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).1

I grant defendants' motion to the extent of ordering this action stayed to permit exhaustion of "such administrative remedies as are available." Id. I hold that an action alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs is an action "brought with respect to prison conditions," requiring exhaustion and that New York State provides administrative remedies that are available to prevent, stop and mitigate deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners. The administrative procedures still available to plaintiff also provide a fair and reliable forum in which to determine facts and responsibilities. Accordingly, I direct the State to provide an administrative hearing to determine, among other issues and to the extent feasible: (1) the cause of plaintiff's injuries and the aggravations thereof; (2) the past and present conditions of plaintiff's confinement in relation to his medical claims; (3) whether those conditions were and are reasonable in light of plaintiff's injuries and whether such conditions caused any delay or limitations in the healing process reasonably to be expected; and (4) any steps that remain available to ameliorate plaintiff's condition. I hold further that the hearings shall be on the record, permit the participation of counsel, and be concluded and transmitted to this Court within a period of 60 days, or such enlarged period as may be requested on good cause shown.

I. Defendants' Alleged Misconduct: The Complaint

For purposes of this motion, the following facts alleged in the Complaint are presumed to be true. Plaintiff is an inmate in New York State's Green Haven Correctional Facility in Stormville, New York ("Green Haven"). On August 22, 1996, New York State prison officials transported plaintiff from Green Haven to Vassar Brothers Hospital in Poughkeepsie, New York, where plaintiff underwent surgery to repair a rupture in his abdominal wall and to remove a cyst. Plaintiff claims that the performing doctor failed to close his surgical wound prior to releasing him for his return to Green Haven (Compl. at 8),2 and that this and the allegations that follow reflected deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs.

At Green Haven, plaintiff alleges, the doctors in its medical center failed to examine his surgical wound, put him directly in his cell where, later that evening after the anesthetic plaintiff received wore off, he found that his wound was open and bleeding profusely. (Compl. at 4-5). Plaintiff cried for help, but no one responded; the prison officials, plaintiff alleges, were indifferent to his calls. Plaintiff alleges that he fell unconscious, and was not discovered until morning, in a pool of his blood. He was brought back to the Green Haven medical center when, plaintiff alleges, a nurse on duty observed that the incision on his body showed no "sign of being stitched." (Compl. at 6).

Plaintiff required additional care, including additional surgery and hospitalization, requiring a stay of 357 days in Green Haven's medical center. Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to walk of his own power, required a walker or wheelchair, and fell twice suffering injury to his back. Again, plaintiff alleges, defendants ignored his pleas for help, and exacerbated his condition by forcing him to sleep on the floor of his cell for nearly two weeks without bed or bedding. (Compl. at 13).

On August 25, 1997, plaintiff filed a grievance for the denial of a bed and bedding. (Compl. at 15). Three days later, on August 28, 1997, plaintiff was transferred to another cell where he received proper bedding. (Id.). Plaintiff did not file a grievance concerning his claims of medical indifference.

II. The Relevant Constitutional Standard

Title 42, section 1983, provides that "[e]very person who, under color of [law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. ..." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, although imprisoned for having committed a crime, remains entitled to constitutional protections, among them the protection against "cruel and unusual punishments" guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Deliberate indifference by prison officials to serious medical needs of prisoners can violate the Eighth Amendment, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), "whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care...." Id. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285.

At the same time, however, the Court recognized that not every denial of medical needs rises to the level of a Constitutional violation: "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. In order to state a claim under section 1983, a prisoner must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend `evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eight Amendment." Id. Objectively, the claim must be "sufficiently serious;" subjectively, the claim requires proof that an official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1154, 115 S.Ct. 1108, 130 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1995).

III. The PLRA — The Governing Statute and its Legislative History
A. The Statute

Section 1997e(a) of title 42 was enacted in 1996, and provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim of medical indifference is "brought with respect to prison conditions" and that plaintiff's failure to exhaust "such administrative remedies as are available" requires dismissal of his case. Plaintiff argues that section 1997e(a) does not apply because a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs is not a claim "brought with respect to prison conditions" and because the remedy of monetary damages is not "available" in Green Haven's grievance procedures.

B. The Legislative History

The PLRA, as initially introduced in the House and the Senate, was part of two omnibus criminal law reform measures — the Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1995 in the House, and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995 in the Senate. See Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & William H. Manz, A Legislative History of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, Docs. No. 32 & 33 (1997) ("PLRA Legislative History").3 The bills were intended to address numerous issues raised in then-recent political campaigns relating to crime, law enforcement and prisoners, and included proposals to change habeas corpus, criminal sentencing, the exclusionary rule, and other law enforcement programs. Ultimately, the PLRA was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 n. 8 (11th Cir.1998); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1265 n. 2 (10th Cir.1997).

The legislative history giving rise to the PLRA is relatively sparse. See Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional Facility, 28 F.Supp.2d 884, 891 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (Mukasey, J.) (noting that legislative history is "relatively meager"). Floor debates are perhaps the best source. See Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1325 n. 8; Garrett, 127 F.3d at 1265 n. 2; see also Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir.1999) (relying upon statements of Senators Dole and Kyl). The legislative history that exists is scattered among all the other measures that were part of the omnibus legislation, and mostly relates to funding, consent decree and habeas corpus issues. See, e.g., PLRA Legislative History, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, July 27, 1995, Statement of Senator Spencer Abraham, Doc. 55, at 101-02 (noting that hearings covered "several diverse, unrelated to some extent topics").4

The legislative history concerning the PLRA indicates that Congress was primarily concerned about the rising number of lawsuits filed by prisoners...

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