Beets v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 91,416.,91,416.
• Citation: 995 P.2d 1071,1999 OK 15
• Parties: Jerri Lynn BEETS, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Travelers Insurance Company and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

995 P.2d 1071

1999 OK 15

Jerri Lynn BEETS, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Travelers Insurance Company and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 91,416.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

March 2, 1999.

Rehearing Denied January 11, 2000.

As Corrected January 10, 11, and January 13, 2000.

Michael R. Green, Tulsa, For Petitioner.

Rebecca Harvey, Brigid F. Kennedy, Oklahoma City, For Respondents.

¶ 1 KAUGER, J

¶ 2 The dispositive issue presented on certiorari¹ is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted an untimely filed medical report. Under the facts presented, the untimely filed medical report was properly admitted into evidence.

¶ 3 FACTS

¶ 4 While working for the respondent, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (the employer), the petitioner, Jerri Lynn Beets (the claimant) injured her back on December 24, 1994. Subsequently, the claimant filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court, and on November 15, 1996, the court awarded her temporary total disability benefits, and medical treatment.

¶ 5 The claimant had back surgery in May of 1997. On February 23, 1998, Dr. Mayoza, the treating physician, evaluated the claimant for a determination of permanent partial impairment. She delivered Dr. Mayoza's report to her employer on March 3, 1998, and filed a form 9 in the Workers' Compensation Court. On April 30, 1998, Dr. Farrar evaluated the claimant on behalf of the employer. On May 1, 1998, Metropolitan received Dr. Farrar's report, and sent it to the claimant the same day. She filed a written objection to the employer's medical report on May 6, 1998, stating that she did not receive the report until May 2, 1998.

¶ 6 The cause was presented for trial on May 7, 1998, the claimant submitted, without objection, the report of Dr. Mayoza which stated her lumbar spine was 49% permanently partially impaired, and that she had a 5% permanent partial impairment to her left hip. The employer offered Dr. Farrar's report which reflected that the claimant had a "16% impairment to the body as a whole as contributed by the lumbar spine." The claimant objected to the employer's medical report, asserting that it was not exchanged twenty days prior to trial as required by 85 O.S.1991, Ch. 4 App. Rule 19.² The judge overruled her objections, and offered the claimant the opportunity to reset the trial date to allow the full twenty days required by Rule 19.³ The claimant declined the offer and the trial judge admitted Dr. Farrar's report into evidence.

¶ 7 On June 3, 1998, the trial judge entered an award for permanent partial disability, finding that the petitioner was 17% permanently partially disabled to the lower back and 1% permanent partially disabled to the hip or a total of 18% impairment to the body as a whole. The claimant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals vacated and remanded, finding that the Workers' Compensation Court erred when it admitted the doctor's report into evidence. The employer petitioned for certiorari. Certiorari is granted, the Court of Civil Appeals opinion is vacated, and the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 8 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE MEDICAL REPORT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 19 OF THE RULES FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT.

¶ 9 The employer relies on our decision in Gaines v. Sun Refinery & Marketing, 1990 OK 33, 790 P.2d 1073,⁴ to support its argument that the untimely medical report was properly admitted into evidence by the trial judge. The claimant counters that: 1) Gaines is inapplicable here because it involved objections to the content of a medical report under Rule 20,⁵ rather than the issue of untimeliness pursuant to Rule 19;⁶ and 2) several Court of Civil Appeals' opinions are conflicting regarding whether the trial court must make an express finding of good cause to exist before admitting an untimely medical report.⁷ Certiorari is granted to revisit Gaines and its underlying rationale, and to resolve any apparent conflict in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinions.⁸

¶ 10 While we agree that Gaines is not dispositive of this cause, we find that its rationale may be instructive here. Gaines involved a claimant who was seeking compensation for loss of pulmonary function. Three medical reports were submitted at trial — the claimant's report, the employer's report, and a report introduced by the court. The trial court, following the recommendations of the employer's report, found that the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The claimant appealed asserting that the employer's medical report did not substantially comply with Rule 20. On appeal, this Court found that none of the medical reports substantially complied with Rule 20. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded to allow competent evidence to be presented.

¶ 11 However, in Gaines, we also discussed what we would do in cases where only one report was found to be incompetent. Prior to Gaines, if only one report were found incompetent, the party opposing the admission of the report automatically received a judgment in its favor.⁹ In Gaines, we overruled the "jackpot" rule, and said:

"Such a rule favored the party who remained mostly silent at trial with regard to errors in the opponent's medical report. A reward for such silence is inconsistent with the norm now set forth by this Court which encourages parties to specifically object to errors in the doctor's report at the first opportunity. Rather than making a perfunctory objection at trial and raising specific objections for the first time on appeal, we seek to facilitate the trial court's review of the medical reports by encouraging meaningful opportunity to review and correct such errors before they reach the appellate stage."

¶ 12 The Gaines rationale: 1) avoids a windfall by either party; 2) develops competent evidence at the trial level; 3) allows all parties the opportunity to develop their case before the Workers' Compensation Court; and 4) provides a meaningful end to the litigation. A similar principle was applied over ten years earlier to untimely filed medical reports in Ed Wright Construction Co. v. McKey, 1979 OK 25, 591 P.2d 302. In Wright, we reviewed an award of the Workers' Compensation Court in which the exclusion of an untimely filed medical report was questioned. The petitioner sought a determination of permanent partial disability for a back injury that occurred during employment. At the hearing, the claimant introduced a medical report which found that claimant was 100% disabled for ordinary manual labor. The employer failed to present a medical report. The rule involved in Wright required that the parties be prepared to try the case on the trial date. Although the record disclosed nothing in relation to this failure, the trial court announced that the cause would remain pending for three weeks for the filing of the employer's medical report.

¶ 13 The Wright medical report was filed one week late, and the trial court entered an order awarding compensation of permanent total disability to the body as a whole resulting from the accidental injury. The order found that the employer's untimely medical report was not admissible in evidence because it was not filed in compliance with the trial court's order. We found that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the medical report.¹⁰ In doing so, this Court recognized three principles that apply in workers' compensation cases: 1) the trial court's discretion governs admissibility of belated medical evidence which does not comport with the plain requirements of Workers' Compensation rules governing the presentation of evidence; 2) strict pleading and practice rules are not applicable to workers' compensation cases; and 3) a fundamental requirement mandates that all parties shall have the opportunity to develop their case before the Workers' Compensation Court.

¶ 14 Six years after Wright, but four years prior to Gaines, we again addressed the question of an untimely medical report in Howard v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 1986 OK 45, 725 P.2d 1262. The Howard petitioner filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits based on cumulative trauma. Five days before the cumulative trauma hearing, the employer proffered a medical report which recommended that the employee not be compensated. In mid-hearing, the petitioner objected to the admission of the report pursuant to Rule 19. At that time, Rule 19 provided that if a medical report were untimely, a trial judge could either exclude the report or excuse in writing its tardy filing after an adversary hearing.¹¹ The trial judge declined to follow either course of action, and admitted the untimely medical report. Following the recommendation of the untimely medical report, trial judge denied the employee's claim for compensation.

¶ 15 Because the trial court declined to follow either of the two permissible courses of action, we found that the "trial judge committed prejudicial error in admitting an untimely medical report which constituted the only evidence supportive of the court's order denying compensation to the claimant." In Howard, regarding Rule 19, we also recognized that:

"Absent an agreement or waiver, evidence in a workers' compensation case must be taken according to the rules. The purpose and intent of Rule 19 is to permit each party adequate time to examine the other's evidence and to afford each the fundamental right to cross examine the other's medical experts. In the fair and orderly administration of Oklahoma's workers' compensation system there is no place for surprise or trickery in the presentation of vital medical evidence. It is basic that essential fairness in any litigation process cannot be arrived at without compliance with the rules of orderly procedure."

¶ 16 Rule 19 requires that the parties exchange medical reports twenty days prior to trial, unless good cause is shown to excuse the twenty day...