Begin v. Begin

• Decision Date: 18 May 1906
• Citation: 107 N.W. 149,98 Minn. 122
• Parties: BEGIN v. BEGIN (two cases.)
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

98 Minn. 122

107 N.W. 149

BEGIN

v.BEGIN (two cases.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 18, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Andrew Holt, Judge.

Action by Rose D. Begin against Romain Begin. Verdict for plaintiff. From so much of an order as conditionally granted a new trial on the first cause of action, plaintiff appeals, and from so much of an order as denied a motion for a new trial as to the second and third causes of action, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

This is an action by a mother against her son to recover, first a balance of annuity; second, the value of the use of certain rooms on the ground of constructive eviction therefrom; and, third, for the value of services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff had a verdict on each cause of action. The trial court by its order conditionally granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the first cause of action, but denied it as to the other two. Evidence considered, and held that it sustains the order of the court as to all of the causes of action. Hall & Kolliner, for Rose D. Begin.

John R. Van Derlip, for Romain Begin.

START, C. J.

On August 22, 1900, Louis Begin, the husband of the plaintiff and the father of the defendant, died testate. He gave to the defendant by his will the residue of his estate, which included his homestead farm subject to certain provisions for the support of the plaintiff during her life. They were, so far as here material, to the effect, that the plaintiff should have, during her life, the use of any three rooms in the house on the homestead she might choose, to be kept warm, clean, and comfortable for her by the defendant, who was required to furnish her with proper meals, good clothes, medical and religious attendance, and give to her the best care to be expected from a good and devoted son, but if she at any time was not satisfied with the defendant in the respects stated, she should receive at her election the sum of $300 a year, besides the use of the rooms, if she chose to occupy them, to be paid to her in quarterly installments of $75 in advance. This action was brought upon three causes of action. The first was to recover the annuity from the death of the testator to the commencement of the action; the second was to recover for the use of the three rooms of which she alleged she had been deprived; and the third was to recover the value of services rendered by her to the defendant. The complaint alleged two other causes of action which are not here material. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $1,575, which was apportioned, as appears from their answers to special questions submitted to them, as follows: On the first cause of action, $850; on the second one, $140; and, on the third one, $585. Thereupon the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on each of the several causes of action. The trial court made its order granting a new trial as to the first cause of action unless the plaintiff filed her written consent to a reduction of the verdict in the sum of $320, and denying absolutely the defendant's motion as to the second and third causes of action. The plaintiff appealed from so much of the order as conditionally granted a new trial of the first cause of action, and the defendant appealed from so much of the order as denied his motion as to the second and third causes of action.

1. The first question to be considered is whether the trial court erred in granting conditionally the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the first cause of action. It appears from the memorandum of the court that the new trial was granted on the ground that there was no evidence in the case to justify a verdict for the plaintiff on the first cause of action in any sum in excess of $530. It is clear from the terms of the will that the plaintiff was not entitled to the annuity of $300 a year until such time as she elected to surrender the other alternative benefits stipulated in the will and accept the annuity and the use of the three rooms in lieu of them. She was entitled to such benefits and the use of the rooms or to the annuity and the use of the rooms as she might elect, but not to both the benefits and the annuity. The trial court was of the opinion, as stated in its memorandum, that ‘it conclusively appears that the plaintiff revoked her first written demand for annuity, and that no final election to take the same in lieu of the other provisions of the will was made till April 17, 1903, when the first installment was paid.’ The jury specifically found that the plaintiff did not revoke her first request for the payment of the annuity made November 20, 1901. We...