Begley v. Vogler, 80-SC-116-DG
| Decision Date | 17 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-SC-116-DG,80-SC-116-DG |
| Citation | 612 S.W.2d 339 |
| Parties | James G. BEGLEY and Arthur E. Highnight, Movants, v. John F. VOGLER, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Edward F. Prichard, Jr., Frankfort, Bert T. Combs, Tarrant, Combs & Bullitt, Louisville, for movants.
Charles C. McConnell, Louisville, for respondent.
The issue presented for decision deals with the nature, the effect and the effective date of the mandate of appellate courts.
The road that the litigants traveled in arriving at this court must be mapped out. In January of 1970, the respondent's predecessor in title brought an action in the Muhlenberg Circuit Court against movants' predecessors in leasehold interest for the forfeiture of a coal lease. Monthly royalties were paid by the lessees during the litigation. In October of 1974, the trial judge entered a judgment terminating the lease, following which royalty payments were stopped.
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, and on August 12, 1977, that court reversed the trial court and, in an unpublished opinion, stated that the case "is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment dismissing the complaint." The mandate of the Court of Appeals was issued on January 27, 1978, following a denial of the motion for discretionary review by this court. The appropriate portion of the mandate provided: "It is therefore considered that said judgment be reversed, which is ordered to be certified to said court." The opinion of the court was incorporated by reference. The mandate was filed in the circuit court on February 3, 1978.
A judgment, complying with the mandate and the opinion, was not entered in the circuit court until May 23, 1978. During the nearly four-month period from the issuance of the mandate by the Court of Appeals and the entry of the judgment, no monthly royalties were paid by movants. On May 3, 1978, respondent, by letter, attempted to cancel the leases because of their failure to pay the royalties. On May 26, 1978, three days following the entry of the judgment in the circuit court, movants (who had prevailed in the Court of Appeals) tendered a check to respondent for four months' royalty payments, which was refused.
Respondent-lessor then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Muhlenberg Circuit Court seeking to terminate the lease because of the failure of the movants-lessees to make monthly payments during the period from the issuance of the mandate and the entry of the judgment. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the respondent, and movants appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the trial court, ruling, in effect, that its mandate controlled the rights of the parties on the date of the filing in the circuit court, and that the entry of the judgment did not affect the rights of the parties.
We are thus faced with the question of the effect of the mandate of an appellate court. Does it have the effect of a new judgment in the lower court, or is it an order from the appellate court to the lower court that a new judgment must be entered?
A mandate of the appellate court is the official mode of communicating its judgment to the inferior tribunal whose judgment has been reviewed. The mandate, or remittitur, or procedendo, as it is sometimes called, is not, in itself, a decree. It directs the return of the matter to the lower court, and on its issue or filing in the lower court, that court is reinvested with jurisdiction in the matter. We have described the mandate as the official directive of this court. Shely v. Votaw, Ky., 272 S.W.2d 462 (1954). When a case proceeds to a final determination by the issuance of a mandate, it is the duty of the court to whom it is addressed to render a judgment in accordance with the mandate, as explained by the opinion of the court. City of Lexington v. Garner, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 54 (1959).
This court promulgated certain procedural rules covering the issuance of mandates. The appropriate sections are as follows:
(1) Definition. The mandate is the work of the appellate court, issued by the clerk and directed to the court from which the appeal was taken, which makes effective the opinion disposing of the appeal.
(2) TIME FOR ISSUANCE.
(e) Upon issuance of the mandate the clerk shall forthwith send it to the court from which the appeal was taken and send a copy of it to each attorney of record. The clerk of the latter court shall forthwith file the mandate in the original...
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Wesselman v. Seabold, 86-5397
...was accepted, the appeals court had already issued its order denying the Commonwealth's motion for rehearing. Accord Begley v. Vogler, 612 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Ky.1981). IV. Finally, we must also reject the appellant's contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when he en......
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A.M. Capen's v. American Trading and Production, CIVIL NO. 94-1367(DRD).
...action must therefore be performed by the lower court, fully complying with the directive of the mandate from above. Begley v. Vogler, 612 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Ky., 1981). In the case at bar, the First Circuit Court's judgment or mandate, is more precise in this respect than its opinion. The ju......
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Hutson v. Com., No. 2005-CA-002289-MR.
...was filed in the court from which the appeal was taken, the lower court was reinvested with jurisdiction of the matter. Begley v. Vogler, 612 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Ky.1981). The pre-amended rule defined mandate as "the work of the appellate court, issued by the clerk and directed to the court fr......
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Chase Manhattan Bank v. PRINCIPAL FUNDING
...tack, opting to view remittitur as a mere revesting of jurisdiction with further action required by the trial court. Begley v. Vogler, 612 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Ky.1981); In re J.L.M., 234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377, 386 (1990). Still another court has suggested that an unqualified reversal by an ......