Behnke v. Geib

• Decision Date: 02 January 1959
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 8643.
• Citation: 169 F. Supp. 647
• Parties: John F. BEHNKE, to his own use and to the use of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, a body corporate of the State of Connecticut, Plaintiff, v. Courtney W. GEIB and Edith G. Geib, and Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, Edith G. Geib, Administratrix of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, Richard M. Matthews, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, and John Doe, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

169 F. Supp. 647

John F. BEHNKE, to his own use and to the use of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, a body corporate of the State of Connecticut, Plaintiff, v. Courtney W. GEIB and Edith G. Geib, and Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, Edith G. Geib, Administratrix of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, Richard M. Matthews, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, and John Doe, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 8643.

United States District Court District of Maryland.

January 2, 1959.

H. Ross Black, Jr., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Paul M. Higinbothom and Paul R. Kach, Baltimore, Md., for defendant Richard M. Matthews.

C. Ferdinand Sybert, Ellicott City, and David Kauffman, for A. P. McAllister, Register of Wills for Dorchester County.

R. DORSEY WATKINS, District Judge.

Plaintiff,¹ a nonresident of Maryland, brought suit in this court on the last day of the three-year period prescribed by statute as the period of limitations for actions on the case (Article 57, section 1 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, 1957 Edition) to recover for personal injuries sustained as the result of a motor vehicle accident occurring in New Jersey and allegedly caused by the negligence of Courtney W. Geib. Although Courtney W. Geib died one month prior to the instituting of the action, he was named as a defendant as were among others,² the "Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased"; "Richard M. Matthews, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased"; and "John Doe, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased". The record indicates that Mr. Matthews, an attorney, upon being served with summons in the above entitled matter sent a copy of the complaint to the insurer of the decedent, to which counsel for the insurer responded by letter³ to Mr. Matthews, in part, as follows:

"* * * I have been informed by the Attorney General of the State of Maryland, representing the Register of Wills of Dorchester County, that as of today no Administrator or other personal representative of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib has been appointed, nor have any letters been issued on said Estate.

"On behalf of the Globe Indemnity Company I hereby notify you that I am filing today in the U. S. District Court a copy of the enclosed Motion to Dismiss this case. The Globe Indemnity Company has taken this action with full reservation of all their rights under the terms and conditions of the policy issued to Courtney W. Geib."

The motion filed designated Mr. Matthews as the movant, the insurer's counsel as counsel for Mr. Matthews, and sought dismissal of the complaint and every count thereof as against the last three defendants named above; that is, the estate, Matthews as administrator, and John Doe as administrator. The ground for the motion was that as no suit can be filed against, or service obtained upon, the estate of a decedent as such but rather the filing and the service of process must await the appointment of a personal representative for the estate; since it appeared on the face of the complaint in the instant case that no such personal representative had been appointed, the complaint should be dismissed as to the said defendants.⁴

The complaint alleges that upon learning of Courtney W. Geib's death, the plaintiff through Richard M. Matthews made application to the Orphans' Court for Dorchester County and to the Register of Wills of that county for the granting of Letters of Administration to the said Richard M. Matthews on behalf of the plaintiff as a creditor of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, whereupon the Register of Wills issued the notice required by statute (Article 93, section 36 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, 1957 Edition) to defendant, Edith G. Geib,⁵ advising her that letters would be granted to Mr. Matthews in the absence of objection, to which notice Mrs. Geib responded by objecting to Mr. Matthews' application and adding that it was her intention to apply for Letters of Administration but that she would do so at her convenience,⁶ and as a consequence, the Orphans' Court not having acted to grant letters to anyone, the instant suit was brought against the defendants as heretofore named in an effort to prevent the running of the statute of limitations and consequent barring of the action.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiff offered in evidence certified copies of the original papers on file in the Orphans' Court⁷ which show that approximately nineteen days after the present suit was instituted and two days prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the widow was informed that the Orphans' Court would in twenty days consider the application of Mr. Matthews for letters and that if she or someone in her behalf desired to administer the estate an application and bond should be filed prior to that date. By telegram her objections, previously orally presented to the court, were reiterated "including the fact that the only personal property of the deceased consists of a nineteen fifty Buick sedan the average current blue book value of which is three hundred and thirty five dollars and which would be exempted by funeral expenses alone. At the present time the estate has no creditors whatsoever and it is urged that in the premises there is no reason for the court to exercise its discretion to grant Letters of Administration to anyone." At the appointed time which was approximately one month and one week after the institution of the instant suit, upon considering the application of Mr. Matthews, the Orphans' Court granted him Letters of Administration upon the estate of the decedent.

Although as a practical matter the problem of limitations lies behind the entire proceedings to date, the issue now before the court is not the applicable period of limitations nor when the period began to run nor whether the operation of the statute was suspended by the death of the alleged tortfeasor until the appointment of an administrator. Equally of no concern at the present stage of these proceedings is the validity of service⁸ of process except to the extent that the validity of service is dependent upon, or relates to, the question of one's capacity to be sued. The sole issue at this point is whether or not at the time of the bringing of this suit the estate of the decedent or John Doe or Mr. Matthews, as administrators of said estate, were all, or any one of them, legally recognized entities capable of being sued.

"The word estate means, in the testamentary law, such property that passes, upon death, to the personal representative of the decedent." Gradman v. Brown, 1944, 183 Md. 634, 640, 39 A.2d 808, 811. "The estate of a deceased person is not an entity known to the law, and is not a natural or an artificial person, but is merely a name indicating the sum total of assets and liabilities of a decedent." 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 3 e., p. 881. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint as against the estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased, is hereby granted.

"John Doe," originally the name of a fictitious plaintiff in an action of ejectment, is currently used to designate a party until his real name can be ascertained. 27 C.J.S. Doe, John, p. 1314 and pocket part. The court in the case of United States v. Doe, D.C.N.D.Cal. 1904, 127 F. 982 in discussing John Doe warrants and indictments points out that a warrant may be issued, and a defendant indicted, under a fictitious name provided the person to be arrested or indicted is otherwise so described as to be identifiable. Thus the complaint in the instant case can, as regards John Doe, be construed as a suit filed against the administrator of the estate of the decedent, said administrator not being named as an individual or in his individual capacity but being named in, and described by, his official or representative capacity. An administrator is an instrumentality established by law "for performing the acts necessary for the transfer of the effects left by the deceased to those who succeed to their ownership." 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 3 b, p. 880. An administrator is an artificial, not a natural person; an office; a legal entity capable of suing and being sued.⁹ The artificial person whose powers are exercised by the natural person is recognized by the law as separate and distinct from said natural person.

If at the time of the filing of this suit an administrator had in fact been appointed, the court would have had little difficulty in concluding that there was in existence a being capable of being sued, that the designation of that being as "John Doe, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased" sufficed to describe and identify said legal entity, and that, upon the plaintiff's ascertaining the name of the natural person duly authorized to exercise the power of the artificial person, an amendment to substitute his name for that of John Doe was proper and in no way constituted a substitution of a new sole defendant for an original sole defendant.¹⁰ However, the problem now posed is more difficult and requires a consideration of whether or not the filing of a suit against an administrator of an estate must await the qualification and appointment of such an administrator. The court can find no authority for the proposition that by use of a fictitious name an instrumentality or artificial person not yet in existence may be made amenable to suit. Accordingly the motion to dismiss the complaint as against "John Doe, Administrator of the Estate of Courtney W. Geib, deceased" must be granted.

Turning to the last defendant herein involved, the facts show that suit was instituted against Mr. Matthews at a time when his application for Letters of Administration was pending before the Orphans' Court; that the appointment of an administrator was delayed, supposedly until the period of limitations¹¹...