Beightol v. Beightol

• Decision Date: 03 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 8712DC645,8712DC645
• Citation: 367 S.E.2d 347,90 N.C.App. 58
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ward David BEIGHTOL v. Kathryn Lee BEIGHTOL.

Page 347

367 S.E.2d 347

90 N.C.App. 58

Ward David BEIGHTOL v. Kathryn Lee BEIGHTOL.

No. 8712DC645.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 3, 1988.

Reid, Lewis & Deese by Ronny W. Deese, Fayetteville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Harris, Sweeny & Mitchell by Ronnie M. Mitchell, Fayetteville, for defendant-appellee.

JOHNSON, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Ward David Beightol, and defendant-appellee, Kathryn Lee Beightol were married on 28 December 1976, separated on 1 July 1985, and were divorced on 30 September 1986. Two children were born of this union.

In his action for absolute divorce based upon one year's separation, plaintiff requested equitable distribution of the parties' real and personal property. The equitable distribution claim was severed from the divorce hearing at plaintiff's request. On 5 February 1987, the equitable distribution claim came on for hearing and the order from which plaintiff now appeals was entered on 23 February 1987.

The substance of this appeal concerns the finding that defendant had a marital interest in plaintiff's separately-titled property, the valuation attached to the parties' marital property, and the unequal division of the parties' marital property.

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in finding that defendant had a marital interest in plaintiff's separately-titled property, because such a finding was not supported by competent evidence. We cannot agree. The two separately-titled properties to which plaintiff refers are a Florida condominium and unimproved Texas ranch land which shall be discussed in turn.

The distribution of marital property is vested in the discretion of the trial courts and the exercise of that discretion will not be upset absent clear abuse. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985). In order to reverse the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion, we must find that the decision was unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a competent inquiry. Id. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833. Accordingly, the findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by any competent evidence from the record. Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C.App. 548, 315 S.E.2d 772 (1984).

Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we find that evidence was adduced at the hearing to the effect that in 1972 approximately four years prior to the marriage, plaintiff purchased a condominium at New Smyrna Beach, Florida, for $28,000.00. The condominium was used as rental property and had a fair market value of $70,000.00 and an outstanding mortgage of $14,000.00 at the time when the couple separated.

Further evidence was introduced in the form of testimony by defendant, who testified that she handled all communications with the manager of the condominium complex, made the monthly mortgage payments on the unit, as well as the monthly utility bills, and helped to maintain the unit by conducting a thorough "spring cleaning" on it at least once every two years. Defendant further stated that on at least one occasion, she put up mirror tiles, painted a part of the interior, and dyed the carpeting. She also testified that furnishings and appliances which were placed into the unit as they were needed, were purchased with marital funds, and that the monthly utility bills and mortgage payments noted above, were also paid with marital funds.

Similarly, plaintiff has conceded in his brief that defendant's "personal efforts" with respect to the condominium included writing checks for the mortgage payments, as she was the financial manager for the couple, providing redecoration ideas and advice, cleaning the condominium, and on one occasion, painting a part of the interior and visiting the property once every two years. He refers to her investment as a "de minimus" homemaker contribution which a "dutiful spouse would have done anyway."

We agree with the trial court's ruling that defendant's contributions were much more substantial than plaintiff suggests, and find no rule of law which even intimates that a non-titled spouse should be penalized and not allowed a return on his or her investment because the efforts expended were characteristic of those which a caring and loving spouse would have performed in any event.

Our Courts have consistently recognized the interest acquired by a non-titled spouse in separately-owned property which increases in value due to the personal efforts of the non-titled spouse. See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C.App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985) (which states that the phrase of G.S. 50-20(b)(2) that "[t]he increase in value of separate property shall be considered separate property" applies only to increased values attributable to external economic influences such as inflation, namely, passive appreciation).

Plaintiff, by this appeal, does not contest these rules but instead contends that defendant is not entitled to have the appreciation in the properties' value classified as marital property merely because her contributions consisted of those functions which a homemaker performs and are therefore valueless. We see no difference between the contributions made by the defendant in the case sub judice, and those made by the non-titled spouse in Lawrence v. Lawrence, 75 N.C.App. 592, 331 S.E.2d 186, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 541, 335 S.E.2d 18 (1985), where plaintiff, husband, expended physical labor in making various repairs, alterations and additions to the separately-owned property and thus enhanced its value. The Court stated that "[i]t is clear the marital estate invested substantial labor and funds in improving the real property, therefore the marital estate is entitled to a proportionate return of its investment." Id. at 595, 331 S.E.2d at 188. Quite similarly in Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C.App. 159, 176, 344 S.E.2d 100, 112 (1986), this Court again recognized the marital characteristic of appreciation which results from "funds, talent or labor that [are] contributed by the marital community,...."

In reaching its decision, that the condominium's increase in value attributable to the marital estate, or active appreciation, was $20,000, the trial court considered the following factors:

(a) The overall increase in value during the fifteen years of ownership.

(b) The increase in value during the nine years of marriage.

(c) The mortgage and other payments made with marital funds.

(d) The improvements made to the marital property with marital funds.

(e) The efforts of both parties in the improvement of the property.

(f) The nature of the increase, whether active or passive.

We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court, and hold that the evidence of record supports both the finding that defendant had a marital interest in the separately-titled property, as well as the valuation accorded the interest.

The court applied essentially the same factors as those noted above in evaluating the interest which defendant acquired in the separately-titled Texas ranch land, and included as a factor, the profit realized as stated on the 1985 tax return. The court found as a fact the following:

[t]hat in January of 1976, and prior to the marriage, Plaintiff, with his brother and father, purchased unimproved ranch land near Thorndale, Texas, his one-third share of the purchase price being $22,000.00 with the Plaintiff making a down payment of $10,000.00; that during the marriage the Plaintiff used marital funds to pay his share of the...