Bejaoui v. City of N.Y.

Decision Date31 March 2015
Docket Number13-CV-5667 (NGG) (RML)
PartiesMONDHER BEJAOUI, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Police Officers "JOHN and JANE DOE" 1 through 10 of the NYPD's 60th, 62nd, and 68th Precincts, KAWSAR MANSY, SARA MANSY, MOHAMMED MANSY, and SABEENA MADNI, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Mondher Bejaoui ("Plaintiff" or "Bejaoui") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York (the "City"), several unknown officers of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), and civilians Kawsar Mansy, Sara Mansy, Mohammed Mansy, and Sabeena Mandi.1 (See Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff seeks compensation for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, arising out of several arrests and his prosecution in New York State court between December 2006 and October 2010. (See id. ¶ 24.) The City of New York filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) on both substantive and procedural grounds, both on its behalf and on behalf of the unknown officers (collectively, the "Defendants"). (See Mot. to Dismiss ("Mot.") (Dkt. 7) at 2.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. Sometime in late Fall 2006, Plaintiff, who ran an accounting business based in Brooklyn, New York, fired one of his employees, Kawsar Mansy, for allegedly stealing money from the business. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) On December 4, 2006, Plaintiff received a call from the NYPD's 62nd Precinct requesting that he come to the police station. (Id. ¶ 9.) When Plaintiff arrived at the station, he was immediately arrested and charged with (1) harassment in the second degree, and (2) aggravated harassment in the second degree for making phone calls to his former employee, requesting that she return the money. (Id.) After Plaintiff had been processed, on December 5, 2006, he was brought before a Kings County Criminal Court Judge, who released Plaintiff on his own recognizance. (Id.)

On June 7, 2007, Plaintiff made an appearance in Kings County Criminal Court in connection with the December 4, 2006, arrest and charges. (Id. ¶ 11.) While he was in the courthouse, Plaintiff was arrested by an NYPD officer, who handcuffed him and brought him to the 60th Precinct. (Id.) There, Plaintiff was charged with two additional counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree for violating an order of protection2 by placing phone calls to Sara Mansy, his former employee's sister, requesting that she tell her sister to drop the charges against him. (Id.) Plaintiff was processed and released on his own recognizance that same day. (Id.)

On July 3, 2007, officers from the NYPD's 68th Precinct came to Plaintiff's home and arrested him again for violating the order of protection by calling Mohammed Mansy, his former employee's father. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff was taken to the 68th Precinct and charged with: (1) twocounts of criminal contempt in the first degree; (2) two counts of criminal contempt in the second degree; (3) tampering with a witness in the third degree; and (4) harassment in the second degree. (Id.) Plaintiff was then taken to Kings County Central Booking, where he was remanded on a bail package set at $25,000. (Id.) Unable to make bail, Plaintiff was detained at Riker's Island Correctional Facility. (Id.) On or about July 10, 2007, Plaintiff was taken to Kings County Criminal Court, where bail was dropped, and Plaintiff was released from custody. (Id. ¶ 13.) Nonetheless, these charges were subsequently consolidated with the prior charges into a single indictment, which issued against Plaintiff on August 1, 2007. (Id. ¶ 15.)

On May 15, 2008, Plaintiff appeared in Kings County Supreme Court in connection with the August 1, 2007, indictment. (Id. ¶ 16.) At that appearance, Plaintiff was remanded into custody on allegations that he had again contacted Kawsar Mansy, in violation of the order of protection. (Id.) Unable to make bail, which was set at $50,000, Plaintiff was again remanded to custody at Riker's Island, where he was held for over two years. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.)

On July 29, 2010, Plaintiff was taken into custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC") in Manhattan in connection with mail fraud charges based on unrelated conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) His transfer notwithstanding, Plaintiff continued to make appearances in Kings County Supreme Court, during which he alleges the prosecution repeatedly announced it was not ready for trial, indicating on one occasion that the complaining witness was getting married, and on another, that the complaining witness was sick. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 22.) Plaintiff's state law charges were ultimately dismissed on October 12, 2010, but Plaintiff remained in federal custody until September 19, 2013.3 (Id. ¶¶ 17, 20-22.)

Plaintiff contends that while he was incarcerated, he developed a nerve problem that was never treated, which resulted in the loss of the use of his legs and confined him to a wheelchair.4 (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also alleges that as a consequence of his multiple arrests and lengthy imprisonment, he suffered and continues to suffer serious physical and emotional injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.) Beyond these physical and emotional injuries, Plaintiff further maintains that while he was detained at MCC, he was ruled to be mentally incompetent to stand trial with respect to his federal charges "from December 2010 to September of 2012." (Id. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiff, "this information goes to toll plaintiff['s] time to file the within action, as well as the fact that he was ultimately released from incarceration on September 19, 2013." (Id.)

B. Additional Facts Offered by Defendants

Defendants attach to the motion certain additional documents that Plaintiff did not explicitly include in the Complaint, but which Defendants contend supplement the relevant facts alleged by Plaintiff.5 (See Mot. at 3-4.) Of particular relevance here is the additional information about Plaintiff's federal criminal prosecution, United States v. Bejaoui, No. 10-CR-553 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y.), before U.S. District Judge Sidney H. Stein in the Southern District ofNew York. On October 6, 2011—while Plaintiff was apparently in federal custody in Devens, Massachusetts—Judge Stein found that Plaintiff was mentally incompetent to stand trial in that case, and committed Plaintiff to hospitalization or treatment in a medical facility. (See Oct. 7, 2011, Order, Bejaoui, No. 10-CR-553 (Modafferi Decl., Ex. F (Dkt. 8-6)).) Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to a federal medical center in Butner, North Carolina, for the purpose of determining whether he was likely to be restored to competency. (Oct. 3, 2012, Hr'g Tr. at 3:14-17, Bejaoui, No. 10-CR-553 (Modafferi Decl., Ex. G (Dkt. 8-7)).) But in March 2012, two forensic psychiatrists examined Plaintiff and determined that he was in fact competent to stand trial, and that he had been "malingering, that is, intentionally displaying or exaggerating symptoms of mental illness." (Id. at 3:17-22.) On August 13 and 14, 2012, after Plaintiff had been examined by his own psychiatric expert, Judge Stein conducted a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) to determine Plaintiff's competency to stand trial. (Id. at 4:8-12.) On October 3, 2012, Judge Stein found by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff was competent to stand trial, could understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, and had the ability to assist properly in his defense.6 (Id. at 2:16-19, 16:6-9.)

C. Procedural History

On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against Defendants alleging that these arrests and his detention in state custody violated his rights under the federalConstitution and New York State common law. (See generally Compl.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Plaintiff asserts federal causes of action for false arrest (see id. ¶¶ 30-32 (First Cause of Action)), malicious prosecution (id. ¶¶ 36-38 (Third Cause of Action)), violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right (id. ¶¶ 39-41 (Fourth Cause of Action)), and municipal liability (id. ¶¶ 45-47 (Sixth Cause of Action)). Plaintiff also alleges state law claims of false arrest (id. ¶¶ 33-35 (Second Cause of Action)), malicious prosecution (id. ¶¶ 42-44 (Fifth Cause of Action)), and negligence (id. ¶¶ 48-50 (Seventh Cause of Action)).

On April 30, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. at 2.) It their motion, Defendants argue that each of Plaintiff's claims is barred on statute of limitations grounds, and that Plaintiff's state law claims are further barred as a result of Plaintiff's failure to comply with state law notice-of-claim requirements. (Id. at 2, 13-14.) Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's federal and state claims against the unnamed officers as well as the municipality must be dismissed on substantive grounds insofar as they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 2.) As the court noted above, Defendants also attach certain documents to the motion that Plaintiff did not include in his Complaint.7 Defendants contend that the court may consider these in deciding their motion to dismiss. (Id. at 5-7.) In the alternative, Defendants ask that the court convert the motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d). (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion on June 26, 2014. (Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. ("Opp'n") (Dkt. 10).) In response to Defendants' claims on statute of limitations grounds, Plaintiff argues, among other things, that he is entitled to statutory tolling for some of his...

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    ...extrinsic to the complaint if they are "appropriate subjects for judicial notice." Bejaoui v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 5667 (NGG) (RML), 2015 WL 1529633, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015). A district court "may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:......

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