Domeneck v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 05 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18 Civ. 7419 (PGG) |
| Parties | LUIS R. DOMENECK, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; OFFICER S. RICHARDSON; and OFFICER A. AKHAQUE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
In this Section 1983 action, pro se Plaintiff Luis Domeneck alleges that Defendant - the City of New York (the "City")1 - violated his constitutional rights by seizing his vehicle without a warrant. Plaintiff brings claims for unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution, violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and cruel and usual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The City moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In a September 29, 2019 Order (Dkt. No. 27), this Court granted in part and denied in part the City's motion. The purpose of this opinion is to explain the Court's reasoning.
I. FACTS
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff - a resident of the Bronx - was driving his car in Manhattan on August 15, 2015. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 2) at 3, 5) While stopped at a red light, he "noticed a female . . . on the sidewalk" and "attempted to flirt with [her] . . . out of [his] passenger side window." (Id. at 5) At that point, "an unmarked vehicle with flashing lights appeared[,] and several men without uniforms flashed [their] badges, [and] asked for [Plaintiff's] license and registration." (Id.) One of the men asked Plaintiff if he owned the vehicle he was driving; Plaintiff replied that he did. (Id.) The men then ordered Plaintiff to exit the vehicle and sit on the curb. (Id.)
About an hour later, officers informed Plaintiff that his car would be seized. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is disabled and "cannot use public transportation due to [his] inability to use stairs or walk any significant distance [or] stand for long periods of time." (Id. at 5-6) He therefore had "no method of returning to [his] residence" after the police seized his vehicle. (Id.)
Attached to the Complaint is Harrell v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 3d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), a summary judgment opinion in a Section 1983 case. In Harrell, the plaintiffs were individuals whose vehicles were seized by the City without a warrant. Each vehicle was seized "because a Taxi and Limousine Commission ('TLC') inspector had probable cause to believe the vehicle was being operated as an unlicensed vehicle for hire in violation of N.Y. City Administrative Code § 19-506(b)(1)." Id. at 484. The Harrell plaintiffs claimed that "the City's . . . policy of seizing vehicles suspected of violating § 19-506(b)(1) without a warrant or pre-deprivation hearing[] violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution." Id. at 487. The Harrell court agreed with plaintiffs' argument, to the extent that Section 19-506(b)(1) is applied to first-time offenders. Id. at 488, 492, 496.
Finally, the Court takes judicial notice of the following: (1) on August 15, 2015 - the date of the incident at issue in this case - the City issued a summons to Plaintiff for allegedly violating Section 19-506(b)(1) (see Summons (Dkt. No. 19-1)); and (2) on August 17, 2015, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to violating Section 19-506(b)(1) before the TLC (see Guilty Plea and Stipulation (Dkt. No. 19-3)).3
The Complaint was filed on August 15, 2018. Reading Plaintiff's pro se Complaint liberally - as is required, see Wilder v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 175 F. Supp. 3d 82, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) - the Court understands Plaintiff to allege that the City seized his vehicle because he was suspected of violating Section 19-506(b)(1) and, in doing so, violated his rights under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 2) at 6)
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "In considering a motion to dismiss[,] . . . the court is to accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint," Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002)), and must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff" id. (citing Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2006)).
A complaint is inadequately pled "if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement,'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557), and does not provide factual allegations sufficient "to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle N.E. Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice [to establish entitlement to relief]." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A "pro se complaint . . . [is] interpret[ed] . . . to raise the 'strongest [claims] that [it] suggest[s].'" Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2002) . "However, although pro se filings are read liberally and must be interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,' a pro se complaint must still 'plead sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Wilder, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "the court need not accept as true 'conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of fact,'" Whitfield v. O'Connell, No. 09 Civ. 1925 (WHP), 2010 WL 1010060, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010) (quoting First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 771 (2d Cir. 1994)), and "'[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,'" even for purposes of a pro se complaint, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 19-506(b)(1). "In addition to or as an alternative to" the criminal violation described above, a violator of Section 19-506(b)(1) may also be liable for a civil penalty. Id. § 19-506(e)(1) (). Any civil penalty is imposed by the TLC after notice and a hearing. Id. § 19-506(e)(3).
If the owner of a vehicle is found liable for two or more violations of Section 19-506(b)(1) within a thirty-six month period, "the interest of such owner in any vehicle used in the commission of any such second or subsequent violation shall be subject to forfeiture upon notice and judicial determination." Id. § 19-506(h)(2). However, the vehicle of a first-time violator of § 19-506(b)(1) is not subject to forfeiture to the City. Id.
Section 19-506 provides TLC officers and police officers with the authority to seize vehicles used in the commission of a Section 19-506(b)(1) violation:
Any [TLC officer] and any police officer may seize any vehicle which he or she has probable cause to believe is operated or offered to be operated without a vehicle license in violation of paragraph one of subdivision b of this section . . . . Therefore, either the commission or an administrative tribunal of the commission at a proceeding commenced in accordance with subdivision e of this section, or the criminal court, as provided in this section, shall determine whether a vehicle seized pursuant to this subdivision was operated or offered to be operated inviolation of any such subdivision. The commission shall have the power to promulgate regulations concerning the seizure and release of vehicles and may provide in such regulations for reasonable fees for the removal and storage of such vehicles. Unless the charge of violating subdivision b . . . of this section is dismissed, no vehicle seized pursuant to this subdivision shall be released until all fees for removal and storage and the applicable fine or civil penalty have been paid or a bond has been posted in a form and amount satisfactory to the commission, except as is otherwise provided for vehicles subject to forfeiture pursuant to paragraph two of this subdivision.
Accordingly, Section 19-506(h)(1) authorizes the City to seize any vehicle if there is...
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