Belanger v. Matteson

Decision Date29 October 1975
Docket NumberNo. 74-88-A,74-88-A
Citation115 R.I. 332,346 A.2d 124
Parties, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2003, 78 Lab.Cas. P 53,785 Richard A. BELANGER v. Arthur B. MATTESON et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court judgment vacating an arbitration award which had been granted under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the Warwick Teachers Union Local 915, AFT, AFL-CIO (Union) and the Warwick School Committee (School Committee).

The Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the teachers employed by the School Committee. Each year, as a result of negotiations between the Union and the School Committee a collective bargaining agreement is created which governs the conduct of the parties and those whom they represent for the coming year. The controversy in this case concerns, in part, the provisions of the contract which was in force from February 1, 1972 to January 31, 1973.

On June 22, 1972, the School Committee posted a notice of a vacancy for the position of Business Department Head at Warwick Veterans Memorial High School. The vacancy was a 'promotional position' within the terms of the contract, and the notice was posted in compliance with its terms. Four teachers applied for the position, including plaintiff and one of the named defendants, Arthur B. Matteson. The candidates were interviewed, and their credentials reviewed by a committee of school administrators composed of the Assistant Superintendent for Secondary Education, the Principal of Veterans Memorial High School, and the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel. This committee unanimously recommended the appointment of Belanger to the vacant position. Its recommendation was in turn reviewed by the superintendent, who concurred in its decision. Finally, the matter was put before the School Committee who voted to appoint Belanger to the post.

Upon learning that he had been unsuccessful in his bid for the promotion, Matteson met with Mr. Venditto, the Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Personnel to discuss his dissatisfaction. This was his right under art. V, sec. 4(d) of the agreement. He did not obtain satisfaction from this discussion, and thereafter wrote to his union representative and requested the Union to invoke on his behalf the grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement. The core of Matteson's grievance rested with his belief that the School Committee had violated the agreement by appointing Belanger. Article V, sec. 4(d) provides that, '(c)andidates shall be recommended on the basis of qualifications for the position. Where qualifications are considered equal, seniority in the Warwick School System shall prevail.' It is undisputed that Matteson has more seniority than Belanger. Throughout this controversy, Matteson and the Union have insisted that since Matteson was at least as equally qualified for the position as Belanger, the appointment should have been given to the senior person.

The School Committee appointed Belanger on August 1, 1972. On August 7, 1972, the Union filed a written notice of Matteson's grievance with the Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Personnel. The Assistant Superintendent met with Matteson and a union representative in early September. On October 11, 1972, he sent Matteson a letter notifying him that his decision was to retain Belanger in the post of department head. The Union followed the grievance procedures set forth in the agreement. It first placed Matteson's cause before the Superintendent and then went before the School Committee. Matteson, having had no success at the administrative level, requested the Union to take his complaint to arbitration. The Union met in executive committee and voted to initiate the arbitration.

A hearing was held on April 6, 1973 before three arbitrators, one selected by the School Committee, one by the Union, and the third chosen jointly by both sides from lists prepared by the American Arbitration Association.

The issue submitted to the arbitrators by both sides was: 'Has the Committee violated Article V, Section 4(b) of the collective bargaining agreement by not appointing Mr. Arthur Matteson as Business Department Head at Veterans Memorial High School? If so, what shall the remedy be?'

The arbitration hearing lasted from 10 a.m. to approximately 6:30 p.m. A number of witnesses were presented by the Union and the School Committee. Both Belanger and Matteson testified as to their qualifications. All witnesses were subject to cross-examination. Briefs in support of the respective positions were submitted and on August 16, 1973 the arbitrators rendered a decision. They ruled that Matteson was entitled to the appointment as head of the Business Department.

After a full year on the job, Belanger found himself deprived of his promotion and back in the classroom. He wrote to his principal and the Union and requested that a grievance be filed on his behalf as he wished to challenge this demotion.

The Union president responded that, although the Union would be happy to file a grievance for him alleging that the School Committee had not adequately represented or protected his interest in his former position as department head, it would not ask for his reinstatement in that position because: 'We (the Union) cannot, at this time, however, ask for a remedy which in effect would reverse a decision which was a result of a grievance filed by the Union. This would be illogical and inconsistent with our role as bargaining agent and our obligation under the contract. We have, after all, agreed to make binding arbitration the final step in our grievance procedure.'

Thereafter, Belanger instituted this litigation in the Superior Court. He named as defendants Matteson, the Union, the arbitrators, and the School Committee and asked the court to overturn the arbitrators' decision and reinstate him. His suit was based on 2 grounds: (1) that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction, and (2) that the Union breached its duty to fairly represent his interests when it decided to pursue Matteson's grievance.

The trial justice found that there existed a duty of fair representation which the Union had breached, and that the award was in excess of the arbitrators' power and thus void. He vacated the award, and reinstated Belanger. Matteson and the Union appealed. We will first consider the duty of fair representation facet of this appeal and then go on to discuss the finding that, the arbitrators had exceeded their power by usurping duties and responsibilities which the Legislature has committed to the school committees of the various municipalities and nobody else.

The question of the duty owed by a union to its members is one of first impression in this court. It has, however, been extensively litigated in other jurisdictions, most notably in the federal courts, in cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151, et seq. (1973), the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et set. (1973), and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (1972).

The first of what has become a long line of cases was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944). There, the Court held that the Railway Labor Act, in providing that an organization chosen by the majority of employees would be the exclusive representative of all the employees within its class, mandated a concomitant duty 'to act for and not against those whom it represents,' and 'to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts * * *.' Id. at 202, 203, 65 S.Ct. at 232, 89 L.Ed. at 183. This duty has also been found in unions governed by the NLRB. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048, 1057 (1953). By taking away the right of individual employees to further their interests individually or to organize into numerous small units to deal with their employer, Congress has given a union power and control over the working lives of each of its members. A corollary of such power is the duty to act for the benefit of its members.

Our Legislature has created a structure of labor regulations which parallels in many significant respects the federal scheme. Our focus here is G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-9.3-1 et seq. entitled Arbitration of School Teacher Disputes. Section 28-9.3-1 declares it to be the public policy of this state to grant public school teachers the right to organize, to be represented, and to bargain on a collective basis with school committees relevant to 'hours, salary, working conditions and other terms of professional employment.' Section 28-9.3-3 mandates that the school committee recognize the labor organization chosen by the teachers to be their 'sole and exclusive' bargaining agent. Thus, a labor organization representing teachers of this state has the same broad authority in the negotiation, administration, and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement as does a union regulated by federal law. We find ourselves in agreement with the persuasive logic of the Steele opinion and its progeny, and, therefore hereby recognize, as implicit in our Act, a statutory duty on the part of an exclusive bargaining agent to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all of those for whom it negotiates and contracts, not only those who are members, but all those who are part of the bargaining unit. 1

The union and its bargaining unit are necessarily composed of many individuals with diverse views and ofttimes conflicting employment demands. The whole purpose behind the creation of the...

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