Belch v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 September 1918
• Docket Number: 281.
• Citation: 96 S.E. 640,176 N.C. 22
• Parties: BELCH v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

96 S.E. 640

176 N.C. 22

BELCH v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO.

No. 281.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

September 11, 1918

Appeal from Superior Court, New Hanover County; Devin, Judge.

Action by R.I. Belch against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The trial having been entered upon and the jury impaneled, it appeared from the averments in plaintiff's complaint, as amended, and the admissions on the argument, that in August 1913, plaintiff, an employé of the defendant, a railroad company engaged at the time as a common carrier of interstate commerce, received serious physical injuries attributable to the negligence of defendant's officers, agents, etc that soon thereafter, and within two years of the occurrence plaintiff instituted an action to recover for said injuries in the superior court of Roberson county, in said state, and same pended in said court till the trial was entered upon and in said trial there was judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff; that within one year from said nonsuit, and more than two years of the occurrence, plaintiff instituted the present action to recover for same injury, and defendant having, among other things, pleaded the two-year time in bar of recovery, on motion, the court entered judgment dismissing the action in form as follows:

"This cause having been called for trial, and the trial having been started, and the jury having been impaneled, and upon reading the pleadings the counsel for the defendant made a motion to dismiss the action because, upon the complaint as amended, it appeared that this action was not brought within two years, as required by the act of Congress, and the court being of the opinion that the action was not brought within two years, as required by the act of Congress, and that the local state statute allowing the plaintiff to bring a new action within one year after a nonsuit had no application, and that therefore the defendant's motion should be allowed: It is therefore, on motion of the counsel for the defendant, ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff's action be and the same is hereby dismissed, and that the defendant go without day, without recovering any costs, as the suit is brought in forma pauperis."

From this judgment plaintiff appealed.

E. K. Bryan and J. Felton Head, both of Wilmington, for appellant.

John D. Bellamy & Son, of Wilmington, for appellee.

HOKE J.

The federal Employers' Liability Act--Fed. Stat. Anno. 1909 Supp. p. 584 (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8657-8665])--was designed and intended to regulate suits for physical injuries or death of employés of railroads while engaged as common carriers of interstate commerce, wrongfully caused by the negligence of the officers, agents, or employés of such carriers, or by reason of "negligence on their cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other equipment" and section 6 of said act provides, among other things:

"That no action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued," etc.

In authoritative decisions construing the statute it is held that the same affords the controlling and exclusive rule of liability in suits of this character, and that this position is effective and "as comprehensive of those instances in which it excludes liability as of those in which liability is imposed." Erie R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 37 S.Ct. 556, 61 L.Ed. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662; N.Y. Central v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 37 S.Ct. 546, 61 L.Ed. 1045, L. R. A. 1918C, 439, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139; St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Hesterly Adm'r, 228 U.S. 702, 33 S.Ct. 703, 57 L.Ed. 1031; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44. In Erie R. R. v. Winfield, supra, as reported in Anno. Cases, 1918B, at page 662, a very satisfactory syllabus of the decision appears in the first headnote as follows:

"Congress intended the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65, c. 149, Fed. St. Ann. 1909 Supp. p. 584), regulating the liability of an interstate railway carrier in case of the injury or death of an employé when employed in interstate commerce, to be as comprehensive of those instances in which it excludes liability--i. e., where there is no causal negligence for which the carrier is responsible--as of those in which liability is imposed, and in both classes such act is paramount to, and exclusive of, state regulation."

And in N.Y. Central R. R. v. Winfield, Reporter's Edition, it is said:

"The liabilities and obligations of interstate railroad carriers to make compensation for personal injuries suffered by their employés while engaged in interstate commerce are regulated both inclusively and exclusively by the federal Employers' Liability Act; and, Congress having thus fully covered the subject, no room exists for state regulation, even in respect of injuries occurring without fault" as to which the federal statute makes no provision.

The law in question contains such essential modifications of the common-law actions of negligence that all suits coming under its provisions should be properly regarded as statutory in character (Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U.S 285, 15 S.Ct. 877, 39 L.Ed. 983; Morrison v. Baltimore & Ohio, 40 App. D. C. 391, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1026); and, this being true, the cases on the subject fully justify the interpretation that this period of two years, fixed upon by section 6, is not in strictness a statute of limitations affecting only the remedy, but is a statutory condition of liability affecting the claimant's right of action. And, as the correct deduction from this position, it has been expressly held that the provision very generally appearing in the state statute of limitations, to the effect that an action otherwise barred may be maintained if commenced within twelve months after nonsuit, has no application to cases coming...