Belcher Sugar Ref. Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1884
• Citation: 82 Mo. 121
• Parties: THE BELCHER SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE ST. LOUIS GRAIN ELEVATOR COMPANY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

82 Mo. 121

THE BELCHER SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, Appellant,

v.THE ST. LOUIS GRAIN ELEVATOR COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April Term, 1884.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

REVERSED.

Smith P. Gault for appellant.

The lease of the city to the defendant and defendant's proposed occupation of the premises are illegal, 1st, Because it is a diversion of the use in the property condemned, and a violation of the trust assumed by the city; 2nd, It is placing an additional burden upon the property, the fee thereof being in the plaintiff, not contemplated in the condemnation proceedings; 3rd, It being an additional burden, if the proposed warehouse is considered for public use, it is taking and damaging plaintiff's property without compensation, contrary to the common law, and section 21, article 2 of the constitution of Missouri; if considered for private use, it is in violation of section 20, same article; 4th, It is a violation of the city's implied contract made with the plaintiff, when it paid to the city the $2,350, as benefits to his property, that the city would hold the property strictly in accordance with the purposes expressed, and by which the company would be benefited, and that they would not be changed, so that those benefits would be destroyed; 5th, On all these questions the plaintiff, by reason of being adjoining and adjacent to this portion of the wharf, as well as the owner in fee of the premises, may invoke the power of a court of equity, and there obtain protection by injunction from the threatened wrong. Allen v. Jones, 48 Ind. 442; Inlay v. Railroad Co., 26 Conn. 255; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 492; Williams v. Plank Road Co., 21 Mo. 582; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363; Ill., etc., Canal Co., v. St. Louis, 2 Dill. C. C. 70, Pres. Soc. v. Railroad Co., 3 Hill 567; Louisville v. Louisville Rolling Mill Co., 3 Bush 416; Trenor v. Jackson, 46 How. Pr. 397; Thompson on Highways, p. 1; Board of Education v. Edson, 18 Ohio St. 225; Warren v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa 357; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. L. 202; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 31; Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange 1004.

Broadhead & Haeussler for respondent.

“The mode of using property dedicated for a wharf may change from time to time, as the wants of commerce, or of the public may require.” Illinois Canal Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dill. C. C. 91. If the conveniences of commerce require it, the city may use the wharf so as to accommodate those requirements, or it may authorize others to do so; and how long it may be so used, must necessarily depend upon the judgment and discretion of the State. But if this were not so, the wharf belongs to the city, and no one, therefore, but the State has the right to question its authority for using it as provided for in this case, or to ask the court to prohibit it. As to the authority of the State to vest the fee in the city, see Rexford v. Knight, 1 Kernan 308; Hayward v. The Mayor, 3 Selden 314; Ellis v. Railroad Co., 51 Mo. 202. As early as the act of December 18th, 1824, (see Rev. Code 1825, p. 763,) all recorded plats of towns and villages vested the fee simple title in the county of all property named or intended for public use; and the act of February 20th, 1865, was intended to pass the title of such property from the county to the city, and also to provide that the city should own all property thereafter condemned or dedicated for public use.

HENRY, J.

The plaintiff owned in the city of St. Louis all of city block No. 225, and nearly all of block 226. These blocks extend to the Mississippi river, and in 1867, in condemnation proceedings instituted by the city, a portion of the property was condemned for wharf purposes, and plaintiff was allowed $23,993 damages, and was assessed for benefits $2,350. The difference between the two amounts was paid to plaintiff, who subsequently acquired all that it owns of block 226, except thirty feet which it owned when the condemnation was had. In 1871 the city graded the wharf in front of these blocks, and in 1872 riprapped 350 feet of the wharf, but the work was destroyed by the high waters in 1873. On the 8th of August, 1879, the city leased to the defendant for twenty years, at an unusual rent of $300, all of the property condemned in front of block 226, 319 feet along the river by ninety feet deep.

The city charter then in force authorized the city: “To establish, open, vacate, alter, widen, extend, pave, and otherwise improve all wharves,” to erect docks and wharves and “to set aside or lease portions of the unpaved wharf for special purposes, such as the erection of sheds, elevators, and warehouses, * * and for any purpose tending to facilitate the trade of the city; but no permit to use any portion of the wharf or any lease of the same shall be granted for a term exceeding fifty years.”

The plaintiff is engaged in the business of refining sugar, and owns blocks of land west of those fronting on the river, on which are extensive buildings, used in its business. They receive annually 75,000 tons of sugar which is unloaded nearly one mile below their buildings, and this suit is to restrain defendant from erecting a large warehouse on the wharf, which will occupy all of said wharf in front of block 226. That portion of the wharf which was leased to defendant was leased to be used “for erecting and maintaining a shed, or warehouse for the storage and handling of grain, or other merchandise, in connection with the use of its elevator, and * * to lay railroad tracks on said portion of said wharf, and to connect the same with the tracks of any railroad having a right to lay and operate a track on the wharf or levee.” The plaintiff's bill was dismissed by the circuit court on the hearing of the cause, and on appeal to the court of appeals, the judgment was affirmed and plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Several important questions are discussed in the briefs of counsel, but there is a controlling question in the case which, in the view we take of it, renders it unnecessary to consider any other. It is conceded, and the authorities are all in accord on the subject, that, when private property is condemned, or dedicated, for one public use, it cannot be appropriated to another and different use. The doctrine is tersely stated in the case of Imlay v. Union Branch R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 255, as follows: “When land...