Beler v. Milford Board of Education, No. CV-05-4002886S (CT 6/23/2005)
| Decision Date | 23 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-05-4002886S,CV-05-4002886S |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph Beler, III v. Milford Board of Education et al. Opinion No.: 89273 |
In a single-count complaint containing eight paragraphs, the plaintiff Joseph Beler III (Beler) sought to bring claims against the defendants Milford Board of Education (board) and Gregory Firn (Firn) for defamation, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants have moved to strike the complaint in its entirety.
"[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 667, 748 A.2d 834 (2000); see also Practice Book §10-39. "For the purpose of ruling upon a motion to strike, the facts alleged in a complaint, though not the legal conclusions it may contain, are deemed to be admitted." (Citation omitted.) Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Association, Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 476, 823 A.2d 1202 (2003). The court is required to read the allegations of the complaint broadly. Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 629, 804 A.2d 180 (2002). The court must deny the motion to strike if the facts fairly provable under the allegations of the complaint support a cause of action, but must grant it if they do not. See Doe v. Yale University, supra, 252 Conn. 667; Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992).
The complaint alleges the following facts: On or before December 7, 2004, Beler was a teacher in Milford, employed by the board, as well as an assistant football coach at Jonathan Law High School. On December 7, 2004, an agent of the board, believed to be Firn, the Superintendent of Schools, stated to one Brian McCready, a reporter for the New Haven Register newspaper, that Beler "would be removed from his position as Assistant Football Coach because of the appearance of 'infighting' among coaches as to who was in charge and a lack of performance or improvement in the team's play, as well as a lack of performance by players, mental mistakes by players, and penalties against players for unsportsmanlike conduct." (¶4.) On December 8, 2004, these statements were published in the Register.
The defendants assert that the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to support a cause of action for defamation. "A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 84, 856 A.2d 372 (2004).
Beler concedes, as he must, that as a public school teacher and coach he is considered a "public figure" for purposes of his defamation claim. Consequently, he must prove not only the four elements of a prima facie case of defamation, but also that the "falsehood was published with actual malice . . . [that is] with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 580, 606 A.2d 693 (1992). The complaint fails to allege this essential element. See Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 29, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). Even if Beler's thin complaint can be generously read to satisfy the four elements of a prima facie case of defamation, despite its failure to directly attribute any specific statements to the defendant Firn, there are simply no facts alleged from which it can be implied that the statements were made with actual malice. Actual malice requires proof that the statements were actually false or evidence of a "purposeful avoidance of the truth." Abdelsayed v. Narumanchi, 39 Conn.App. 778, 781, 668 A.2d 378 (1995), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 915, 676 A.2d 397, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 868, 136 L.Ed.2d 120, 117 S.Ct. 180 (1996). "Reckless disregard for falsity of statements has been equated with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity; or a reckless publication made despite an awareness of its probable falsity; or the entertainment of serious doubts as to truth of the publication." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. K.N.D. Corp., 7 Conn.App. 418, 424, 509 A.2d 533 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 205 Conn. 8, 529 A.2d 1292 (1987). Beler's failure to allege facts to establish that the statements published to McCready were false or that Firn had an awareness of their probable falsity or entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements is fatal to his claim of defamation. Cf., Rice v. Meriden Housing Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, docket no. 479556 (Skolnick, J., March 21, 2004); Herring v. Raddings Signs, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, docket no. 427523 (Alander, J., Feb. 9, 2000). (Both cases struck false light invasion of privacy claims for failure to allege the requisite actual malice.)
The defendants next assert that the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The Supreme Court recognized the tort of invasion of privacy in Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 126-28, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982), and adopted the four categories of liability set forth in 3 Restatement (Second), Torts §652A. Although he did not allege the specific ground of invasion of privacy in his complaint, Beler asserts in his memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike that his privacy was invaded by the disclosure of private personnel information. This claim falls under the provisions of §652D of the Restatement.1 "Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a tort action for the invasion of personal privacy as being triggered by public disclosure of any matter that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perkins v. FOIC, 228 Conn. 158, 172, 635 A.2d 783 (1993).
As Perkins recognized, these two elements must be alleged to establish a §652D cause of action for invasion of privacy. Id. The complaint does not contain these allegations. Moreover, although the court is required to read the factual allegations of the complaint broadly and draw reasonable implications from the facts alleged, the court is not "obligated to read into pleadings factual allegations that simply are not there or to substitute a cognizable legal theory that the facts, as pleaded, might conceivably support for the noncognizable theory that was actually pleaded." Pane v. Danbury, 267 Conn. 667, 677, 841 A.2d 684 (2004). The facts alleged here—that Beler was facing removal from his assistant coach position because of infighting among coaches and poor play and sportsmanship on the part of the players—are not highly offensive and they involve a matter of legitimate public concern. It is clear that "public employees are properly subject to increased scrutiny regarding matters that affect their job performance as a result of the public nature of their employment." Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Div. v. FOIC, 256 Conn. 764, 778, 775 A.2d 981 (2001). There is no invasion of privacy when the subject matter disclosed is of legitimate public concern.
Finally, the defendants assert that the complaint is insufficient to allege a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. "If the 'conduct' underlying the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a defamatory publication concerning a public figure, the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant acted with the...
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