Belk's Dept. Store v. Guilford County
| Decision Date | 08 January 1943 |
| Docket Number | 675. |
| Parties | BELK'S DEPT. STORE, INC., v. GUILFORD COUNTY et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
The plaintiff, a corporation under the laws of this State, is the owner of a lot and building thereon at the southeast corner of the intersection of South Elm Street and East Market Street, in the City of Greensboro, Guilford County. The property was listed for taxation as of January 1 1941, and appraised or valued for the purpose of tax assessment in regular course by the authorities established by law for that purpose.
In the County of Guilford a Revaluation Board of Assessors had been established by statute applicable to that County, Chapter 86, Public-Local Laws of 1941, which, in the order of procedure provided, first undertook the appraisal of the property and made separate findings as to the value of the lot and the value of the building thereupon, and finding the total value of the property therefrom. The value of the land was fixed at $271,190 and a "tax value" of $230,511.50 resulted by reason of a rule, uniformly applied, that for taxing purposes 85% of the real value should be observed. The record does not disclose the total valuation of land and building together.
The plaintiff, contending that the valuation was excessive, filed a complaint before the Guilford County Board of Equalization and Review, a board created under authority of the above cited statute, Chap. 86, Public-Local Laws of 1941, requesting a reduction of the valuation set on the land alone, not complaining of the value placed on the building. This complaint was filed December 16, 1941. The plaintiff was represented at the hearing, which resulted in a reduction of $6,825, which it appears was to correct an error as to the frontage of the lot on Elm Street. Contending that the valuation was still excessive, plaintiff appealed from this board to the Board of County Commissioners of Guilford County, sitting as a Board of Equalization and Review. Machinery Act of 1939, c. 310, Sec. 1105, et seq., Michie's Code of 1939, Sec. 7971(160) et seq. The appeal was heard on April 16, 1942, and on June 15, 1942, the Board denied any further reduction of the valuation. Appeal was then taken to the State Board of Assessment (q.v., Michie's Code of 1939, Secs. 7971 (106)-7971(110), Machinery Act of 1939, Secs. 200-204), where plaintiff was given a hearing on July 29, 1942, as a result of which the valuation theretofore made was confirmed.
It is alleged in the petition that no oral testimony had been taken on the hearings; but that petitioner has filed statement of its contentions, "together with a tabulation of the figures involved," and that at the hearing before the State Board of Assessment, it introduced a "certificate of valuation" made by the Greensboro Real Estate Board, in which the value of petitioner's land was placed at $222,264. The petition recites various evidential matters in support of the merits of its contention that the value placed on the land is excessive.
As bearing on the right to the writ, plaintiff points out in the petition that there is no provision in the Machinery Act for an appeal from an adverse decision of the State Board of Assessment and avers that it is advised and believes that in such case access to the courts may be had by certiorari. The prayer of the petition is for a writ of certiorari to the State Board of Assessment to bring up the cause for a hearing in the Superior Court.
The defendants moved to dismiss the petition, assigning as grounds: 1--That plaintiffs paid taxes voluntarily for the year 1941 on the property as valued; 2--that petitioner's only remedy by way of attack on the assessment was to pay the taxes and sue for recovery; 3--for that petitioner seeks a review of a finding of fact by the State Board of Assessment without alleging any error of law, want of evidence to sustain the finding of fact, or any allegation of want of jurisdiction in the State Board of Assessment, and without any allegation that the valuation fixed on petitioner's property by the State Board of Assessment was not equalized with the valuation of other property in the county; and 4, that the petition discloses no ground entitling the petitioner to a writ of certiorari or a jury trial to determine the facts in the matter.
Upon the hearing Judge Olive, holding the August 1942 term of Guilford Superior Court, overruled the motion to dismiss the petition, and ordered that the writ be issued as prayed for by plaintiff. From this order defendants appealed, assigning error.
D. Newton Farnell, Jr., H.C. Wilson, and B.L. Fentress, all of Greensboro, for defendants-appellants.
York & Boyd, of Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellee.
The plaintiff contends that the action of the State Board of Assessment in fixing the value of its property for purposes of taxation was a quasi-judicial act and, therefore, subject to court review, which may be had by certiorari, since the statute does not provide for an appeal to the court. Upon this theory, the propriety or necessity for review would be referred to the general power of the court to supervise inferior courts and tribunals with respect to judicial acts, and in this State the scope of such review would be controlled by the rules of the common law. But plaintiff is not content to rest its alleged right of review on this basis alone--probably because, where the practice obtains, review by certiorari on this principle is generally confined to errors of law--principally those affecting the jurisdiction of the board or the validity of the procedure--and does not include questions of fact or, to be specific, valuation of property for purposes of taxation. The plaintiff goes further than such a review would imply, and demands a de novo hearing in the superior court upon the merits, in which the value of the property may be fixed by a jury. Counsel for plaintiff in support of this demand call to our attention Article I, Sec. 19, of the Constitution, relating to trial by jury, and cite certain decisions of this court which they regard as having a favorable connotation: Dougan v. Arnold, 15 N.C. 99; Petty v. Jones, 23 N.C. 408; Lunceford v. McPherson, 48 N.C. 174; Hartsfield v. Jones, 49 N.C. 309; Walls v. Strickland, 174 N.C. 298, 93 S.E. 857.
It can readily be seen that where certiorari is used as a substitute for an appeal expressly provided in the law, which has been lost without the fault of the petitioner, the hearing in the court must necessarily be de novo, if the appeal provided is of that nature. It is otherwise when certiorari is used as at common law to bring up for review the action of inferior courts or tribunals upon the principle that the acts sought to be reviewed are judicial or quasi-judicial, or within the supervisory or "superintending" power of the court. 10 Am.Jur., Certiorari, S. 4; Hartsfield v. Jones, 49 N.C. 309, 310.
Rhyne v. Lipscombe, 122 N.C. 650, 29 S.E. 57, and Taylor v. Johnson, 171 N.C. 84, 87 S.E. 981, rest upon the principle that the Legislature in creating an inferior court, without express right of appeal, cannot thus destroy the constitutional authority of the superior court or by act of the Legislature create courts of equal dignity and jurisdiction, and that in the absence of a provision for an appeal from such court, certiorari will lie as a substitute therefor. There is no doubt that the function of such a writ would be the same as the appeal usually provided in connection with such courts and would, in proper instances, bring up the case for a trial de novo. That principle has not been extended to a review by certiorari of the action of administrative bodies. When not otherwise provided by statute, the review is within the scope of common law rules.
1. Certiorari will not lie to bring up for review the valuation of land fixed by the State Board of Assessment on appeal from the county commissioners acting as a board of equalization, where the proceeding was in accordance with the statute and no want of jurisdiction or abuse of power or discretion is charged, and only errors of judgment are involved.
The statute restoring the writ of certiorari subsequent to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides: "Writs of certiorari, recordari and supersedeas are authorized as heretofore in use." C.S. § 630. Its use here closely follows that of the common law; and our Reports disclose no instance in which it has been used for the purposes suggested by the appellee, and no case, which, in our judgment, serves as authority for such use.
The scope of review under the writ as used at common law has been thus defined: "According to the weight of authority, where the scope of the writ has not been narrowed by statute, its office extends to the review of all questions of jurisdiction, power, and authority of the inferior tribunal to do the action complained of, and all questions of irregularity in the proceedings, that is, of the question whether the inferior tribunal has kept within the boundaries prescribed by the express terms of the statute law or well-settled principles of the common law." 10 Am.Jur., p. 524, Sec. 3.
When certiorari is addressed to Boards of Assessment or Boards of Assessment and Equalization, where that practice is permitted, it is generally held that the power of review, as in other instances of its use under the common law, does not extend to questions of valuation, but only to jurisdictional or procedural irregularities or errors of law. State ex rel. American Exp. Co. v. State Board of Assessment and Equalization, 3 S.D. 338, 53 N.W. 192; People ex rel Onderdonk v. Supervisors of Queens County, 1 Hill, N.Y., 195; ...
To continue reading
Request your trial