Belk v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 18 May 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 20692,20692 |
Parties | Ralph A. BELK, Respondent, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Hayes, Brunson & Gatlin, Rock Hill, for appellant.
Holler, Gregory & McKellar, Columbia, for respondent.
The respondent-insured, Ralph A. Belk (Belk), brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) had breached an insurance contract by denying Belk coverage thereunder. In addition, Belk sought a judgment against Nationwide in the amount of $5,000.00, representing the coverage to which he claimed he was entitled, and an award of attorney's fees pursuant to § 38-9-320, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976).
Belk was injured in an automobile collision while driving a 1971 Chevrolet pick-up truck. At the time of the accident, Belk was the named insured on two policies of automobile liability insurance written by Nationwide to cover his two vehicles. Policy No. 61B994963, referred to as "the first policy", insured his pick-up truck and provided for basic personal injury protection (PIP), as required by the statute, in the amount of $1,000.00, and optional additional personal injury protection (APIP) in the amount of $4,000.00. Policy No. 61B994833, referred to as "the second policy", insured his passenger automobile and provided for the required basic PIP coverage of $1,000.00 and optional APIP coverage of $4,000.00. Nationwide paid Belk $5,000.00 PIP and APIP coverage under the first policy, but denied liability under the second policy. In his complaint, Belk alleged that he had incurred medical expenses and lost wages in excess of $10,000.00, and that Nationwide had breached its contract by refusing to pay $5,000.00 under the second policy.
The lower court held that since Belk's damages exceeded the maximum policy limits of the two policies combined, he was entitled to recover full PIP benefits of $1,000.00, and APIP benefits of $4,000.00, under the second policy. The court further held that Nationwide's refusal to pay Belk the PIP and APIP coverage under the second policy was "without reasonable cause", and ordered Nationwide to pay Belk his attorney's fees in the amount of $1,666.66, pursuant to Code § 38-9-320 (1976). Nationwide appeals.
The basic question before us is whether Belk is entitled to collect either basic PIP benefits and/or APIP benefits under the second policy, after having collected $5,000.00 under the first policy.
Section 56-11-110 of the 1976 Code provides that all automobile liability insurance policies must provide minimum medical, hospital and disability benefits in the amount of $1,000.00. Section 56-11-120 mandates that the insurer must additionally make available the same coverage described in § 56-11-110 at alternative benefit levels of $1,500.00, $2,000.00, $2,500.00, or $5,000.00, which may be obtained at the option of the insured for an added premium. This coverage is statutorily required, and may not be circumscribed or contractually limited.
Nationwide maintains that Belk is statutorily precluded by § 56-11-150 from recovering PIP or APIP benefits under more than one insurance policy, and that the lower court erred in holding that Belk was entitled to any recovery under the second policy. Nationwide relies on subsection (a) of § 56-11-150, which states:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no person shall recover benefits under the coverages required in § 56-11-110 from more than one such policy of liability insurance or insurer on either a duplicate or supplemental basis." (Emphasis added.)
Belk submits that two premiums were paid and two coverages are proper. He argues that § 56-11-150 refers, at most, only to the basic PIP coverage required in § 56-11-110, and that § 56-11-150 should not be construed as prohibiting recovery of APIP benefits (§ 56-11-120) from more than one policy.
It is axiomatic that the primary function of the courts in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. See cases cited in S.C. Digest, Statutes, k181(1). It has been well stated that
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