Belk v. People

• Decision Date: 16 June 1888
• Parties: BELK et al. v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

125 Ill. 584

17 N.E. 744

BELK et al.

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1888.

Error to circuit court, Jo Daviess county; WILLIAM BROWN, Judge.D. & T. J. Sheean & McHugh, for plaintiffs in error.

George Hunt, Atty. Gen., and W. W. Wagdin, State's Atty., for defendant in error.

SHOPE, J.

The plaintiffs in error, John Belk, John Hill, and George Williams with George Belk, were jointly indicted in the Jo Daviess circuit court for the murder of Ann Reed; the indictment charging, in the various counts, in varying forms, that the murder was committed by the defendants, by willfully, recklessly, negligently, wrongfully, and feloniously driving a team of horses, hitched to a wagon, upon and against a wagon in which the deceased was riding,-thereby causing the horses attached to the wagon in which she was so riding to run away, thereby throwing said Ann Reed upon the ground, whereby she received wounds and injuries from which she died the following day. A trial resulted in an acquittal of said George Belk, and a verdict of guilty of manslaughter as to plaintiffs in error, and fixing their punishment at confinement in the penitentiary at one year each. Motions for new trial and in arrest were severally overruled, and sentence pronounced by the court upon the verdict. The facts immediately connected with the killing of Mrs. Reed, in reference to which there is little or no controversy, are as follows; On the 5th day of July, 1886, a celebration of the 4th of July was held in a grove about a half-mile from the village of Elizabeth, in Jo Daviess county. The grove was a quarter of a mile from the public highway, and was reached through a lane about one rod wide and fifty rods long, extending from the road into the fields in which the grove was situated. This lane, ordinarily closed by gates at each end, was on this day thrown open and used by the public. About six rods from the gate nearest the grove was a hollow or depression crossing the lane, the descent into which by the road was quite steep, and at this point, owing to the unevenness of the surface of the land, a team could not be driven aside to permit another to pass. About 6 P. M. the deceased, with others, started homeward, through this lane, in a spring wagon or ‘hack,’ drawn by two horses, driven by her son Richard. About the same time plaintiffs in error, in company with George Belk, also started from the grove in a like vehicle, also drawn by two horses, driven by the defendant John Belk. At the time the latter entered the narrow lane the former was some six rods in advance, and in plain view. About the time of so entering the lane, the horses driven by Belk began to run, and ran into and against the wagon in which the deceased was riding, breaking the end-gate and the back of the seat. The collision occurred just as the forward conveyance was descending the declivity into the hollow mentioned. The result was that the horses attached to the vehicle in which Mrs. Reed was riding became unmanageable, and ran away, whereby she was thrown violently to the ground, and was injured so that she died the next day. Some question is made whether the collision was the proximate cause of the team running away; and of the injury and death of Mrs. Reed; but it is sufficient to say the evidence was sufficient upon which to base the finding of the jury in that respect, the question was submitted under proper instructions, and there is no ground for disturbing the verdict for that reason. There was direct causal connection between the collision and the death of the deceased. Between the acts of omission or commission of the defendants, by which, it is alleged, the collision occurred, and the jury of the deceased, there was not an interposition of a human will acting independently of the defendants, or any extraordinary natural phenomena, to break the causal connection. It may be fairly said that what followed the colliding of the defendants' team with the wagon in which the deceased was riding was the natural and probable effect of the collision, and the collision was in consequence of the manner in which the team of the defendants was controlled. It can make no difference whether the driver of the team after which the deceased was riding was guilty of negligence in not controlling or failing to control his team after the collision. It may be that persons standing by, or the driver, might, by the exercise of diligence and care, have checked the horses, and thereby prevented the final catastrophe; but because they did not do so, and were derelict in moral, or even legal, duty in that regard, will not release the defendants from the responsibility of their wrongful act or omission of their legal duty. If the driver, instead of being negligent, as is claimed, in controlling his team, had done some act contributing to the running away of his horses, or driven upon a bank, whereby the carriage had been overturned and the deceased thrown out, or the like, it might justly be said that it was the act of the driver, and not of the defendants, to which the death of the deceased was legally attributable. 1 Whart. Crim. Law, § 341 et seq.; Rosc. Crim. Ev. 700 et seq.

The case made by the evidence fairly presented the question for determination as to whether the collision was the result of the reckless and wanton failure of the plaintiffs in error, or some one or more of them, to control and manage the team of which they were in charge, or was the result of unavoidable mischance...