Bell ex rel. Bell v. Casper

• Citation: 282 Va. 203,717 S.E.2d 783
• Decision Date: 16 September 2011
• Docket Number: 101012.,Record Nos. 101004
• Parties: Abigail R. BELL, by her next friend, Lisa BELL v. Jordan Rebekah Lynn CASPER, by her Next Friend, Esther M. CHURCH, et al.Jordan Rebekah Lynn Casper, by her Next Friend, Esther M. Church v. Clayton Devoy Lynn, et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

282 Va. 203

717 S.E.2d 783

Abigail R. BELL, by her next friend, Lisa BELL

v.Jordan Rebekah Lynn CASPER, by her Next Friend, Esther M. CHURCH, et al.Jordan Rebekah Lynn Casper, by her Next Friend, Esther M. Church

v.Clayton Devoy Lynn, et al.

Record Nos. 101004

101012.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Sept. 16, 2011.

Christopher W. McDonald (McDonald, Sutton & DuVal, Richmond, on briefs), for appellant.

William H. Hurd (Russell V. Palmore, Jr.; Brent M. Timberlake; Nicholas R. Klaiber; Troutman Sanders, Richmond, on brief), for appellee Lena Rhelda Sanders-Howerton.

No brief filed on behalf of appellee Jordan Rebekah Lynn Casper.No brief filed on behalf of appellee Clayton Devoy Lynn.No brief filed on behalf of appellee Abigail Lynn Bell.Neil Kuchinsky; Melvin E. Yeamans, Jr. (Kuchinsky & Yeamans, Colonial Heights, on briefs), for appellant.

Present: KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN, MILLETTE, and MIMS, JJ., and CARRICO and LACY, S.JJ.

Opinion by Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.

In these appeals arising out of two cases consolidated in the Circuit Court of Henrico County (the “trial court”), we consider whether the trial court erred when it held that the provisions of Code § 55–401 et seq. (Virginia's “Slayer Statute”), in effect on the date of the decedent's death, govern the distribution of the decedent's estate in this case.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below ¹

Sometime between June 29 and July 11, 2005, Collette Lynn Lockard (“Lockard”) was shot and killed by her only child, Clayton Devoy Lynn (“Lynn”) in Henrico County. On the date of her death, Lockard was survived by Lynn, Lynn's daughters, Abigail R. Lynn Bell (“Bell”) and Jordan Rebekah Lynn Casper ² (“Casper”), and her mother, Lena Rhelda Sanders–Howerton (“Lockard's mother”). Lockard's will identified Lynn as the sole beneficiary of her estate, and identified no further beneficiaries in the event that Lynn predeceased Lockard. However, in June 2009, Lynn pled guilty and subsequently was convicted of second degree murder for killing Lockard.

Thereafter, Bell, a minor child, brought an action by her mother and next friend, Lisa Bell, seeking declaratory judgment that Lynn, her biological father, be declared a “slayer” for purposes of the Slayer Statute and that she and Casper be declared the sole heirs of Lockard's estate. Casper, also a minor child, filed her own declaratory judgment action by her next friend, Esther M. Church, seeking identical relief. The two actions were consolidated for trial by order of the trial court in October 2009.

Code §§ 55–401 through –415 ³ prevent Lynn, as Lockard's “slayer,” from receiving any property or benefit from Lockard's estate and the parties do not contend otherwise. Specifically, Code §§ 55–401 and –402 prohibit a “slayer,” or one “who is convicted of the murder” of the decedent, from acquiring “any property or ... any benefits as the result of the death of the decedent.” The parties disagree, however, regarding who stands to inherit Lockard's estate.

Former Code § 55–402 (2003), in effect at the time of Lockard's death provided that “[n]either the slayer nor any person claiming through him

shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefits as the result of the death of the decedent.” (Emphasis added.) However, the General Assembly amended the Slayer Statute in 2008, after Lockard's death but prior to Lynn's conviction of her murder, to provide that “[a]n heir or distributee who establishes his kinship to the decedent by way of his kinship to a slayer shall be deemed to be claiming from the decedent and not through the slayer.” Code § 55–403 (emphasis added).

Bell and Casper argued that the 2008 version of the Slayer Statute governs the distribution of Lockard's estate because the Slayer Statute only applies once someone is determined to be a “slayer” as a result of his conviction of the murder of the decedent. Accordingly, Bell and Casper argued that they are the rightful beneficiaries of Lockard's estate because, under the 2008 version of the Slayer Statute, they may take directly from Lockard, and not through Lockard's “slayer,” Lynn. To the contrary, Lockard's mother argued that the version of the Slayer Statute in effect at the time of Lockard's death governs the distribution of Lockard's estate in this case and, as a result she is the rightful beneficiary of Lockard's estate, according to the laws of intestate succession in effect at the time of Lockard's death.

Upon the parties' respective pleadings, memoranda of law and argument of counsel, the trial court held that Lockard's mother is the sole and rightful heir to Lockard's estate. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Lockard's death governs the distribution of her estate, and “[a]lthough the conviction of murder designates the killer to be the ‘Slayer,’ it logically follows that he is determined to be the ‘Slayer’ at the time of the killing.” Accordingly, the trial court held that, because Bell and Casper could only inherit from Lockard through Lynn, according to the 2005 version of the Slayer Statute, “the statutory scheme of intestate succession—as modified by the 2005 ‘Slayer Statute’—precludes them from taking anything ... from [Lockard's] Estate.” Therefore, the trial court held that “the estate passes to the next living person who is neither the Slayer nor making a claim through the Slayer—in this case, [Lockard's mother].” Bell and Casper timely filed their notices of appeal and we granted appeals on the following assignments of error:

For Bell, Record No. 101004:

1. The trial court committed reversible error in finding that Clayton Lynn is determined to be the “Slayer” as of the time of the killing in 2005 in contradiction to the express language of the Virginia Slayer Statutes and thereupon ruling that Ms. Sanders–Howerton is the sole and rightful heir to the estate of the decedent and that the petitioners herein have no valid rights or claims with respect to the decedent's estate.

2. The trial court committed reversible error in finding that the provisions of the Virginia Slayer Statutes (Virginia Code Ann. § 55–401 et seq.) in effect on the date of the decedent's death in 2005 control the rights of the parties in these proceedings and thereupon ruling that Ms. Sanders–Howerton is the sole and rightful heir to the estate of the decedent and that the petitioners herein have no valid rights or claims with respect to the decedent's estate.

3. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the Virginia Slayer Statutes, § 55–401 et seq., with the Virginia Anti–Corruption of Blood Statute, § 55–4.

For Casper, Record No. 101012:

1. The trial court erred in finding that the 2005 Virginia Slayer Act governs the distribution of the decedent's estate, given that the Act has always defined a slayer in plain language as anyone who is convicted or judicially determined to have committed certain acts resulting in the death of the decedent, and the statute was not triggered until June 2009 when the decedent's murderer pleaded guilty to her homicide.

2. The trial court erred by not reconciling the inherent conflict between the Anti–Corruption of Blood Statute, Virginia Code § 55–4, and the Virginia Slayer Act in favor of the minor children.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Whether the version of the Slayer Statute in effect at the time of Lockard's death in 2005, or the amended 2008 version in effect at the time of Lynn's conviction, is applicable to the facts of this case is a question of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, it “ ‘presents a pure question of law and is ... subject to de novo review by this Court.’ ” Warrington v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008)).

As with any question of statutory interpretation, our primary objective is “ ‘to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent,’ ” as expressed by the language used in the statute. Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 706 S.E.2d 879, 882 (2011) (quoting Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010)). Additionally, “ ‘[w]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549, 708 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007)).

B. Virginia's Slayer Statute

This Court previously has discussed the purposes of the Slayer Statute, including the General Assembly's “legislative recognition of a broad public policy against the acquisition of property rights by murder,” a policy which is in complete agreement with the “common law maxim of ancient vintage, viz., that no person should be permitted to profit by his own wrong.” Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 235–36, 269 S.E.2d 787, 788–89 (1980). See Code § 55–414. Irrespective of which version of the Slayer Statute applies, Lynn, as Lockard's “slayer,” is prohibited from receiving any property or benefit from Lockard's estate.

Because Lockard's will identified Lynn as the sole beneficiary of her estate, and identified no further beneficiaries in the event that Lynn predeceased Lockard, Lockard's will lapsed. The laws of intestate succession in effect at the time of Lockard's death in 2005 govern the distribution of her estate. See McGehee v. Edwards, 268 Va. 15, 20, 597 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2004); McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 457, 69 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1952); Mott v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 190 Va. 1006, 1011, 59 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1950). See also Schilling v. Schilling, 280 Va. 146, 150, 695 S.E.2d 181, 183 (2010). The determinative issue in this case is whether the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Lockard's death in 2005 or the version in effect on the date of Lynn's conviction in 2008 controls. If the version in...