Bell v. Alamatt Motel, GC657.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. GC657.,GC657.
• Citation: 243 F. Supp. 472
• Parties: Lougine BELL et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALAMATT MOTEL et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

243 F. Supp. 472

Lougine BELL et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALAMATT MOTEL et al., Defendants.

No. GC657.

United States District Court N. D. Mississippi, Greenville Division.

June 15, 1965.

Henry M. Aronson, Carsie A. Hall, Jackson, Miss., Jack Greenberg, Melvyn Zarr, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Edward J. Bogen, Greenville, Miss., for defendant Lesters.

Philip Mansour, Greenville, Miss., for defendant Presswoods.

CLAYTON, District Judge.

This action was brought by seven Negro plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (§ 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), for injunctive relief against racially discriminatory practices by defendants, the owners and operators of a motel and restaurant, in violation of that statute. A preliminary injunction against such practices was issued by this court following a one day trial on 1 February, 1965, and this primary goal of the prayer of the complaint is not in issue now. The controversy now before the court arises from the concluding paragraph of the prayer which, inter alia, sought to have reasonable attorney's fees included in the costs awarded to plaintiffs against defendants.

On the issue of attorney's fees, one of plaintiffs' attorneys, Honorable Henry M. Aronson, testified concerning his training, experience, time spent in preparation in this case, etc. The following question by the court, and response by Mr. Aronson, appears in the transcript:

The Court: Let me ask you some questions. Have either of the plaintiffs who signed this retaining agreement been put to any expense with respect to attorneys' fees for representation in this case or for transportation of counsel in this case?

The Witness: No, your Honor.

The court then expressed the opinion that counsel fees were taxed for the benefit of the party and not his lawyer, and that they were taxable only to reimburse the party for fees incurred in the litigation. The court reasoned that plaintiffs had incurred no obligation for attorney's fees and thus were not entitled to an award of attorney's fees as one of the fruits of their successful action. However, since the claim for attorney's fees rested on the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court declined to rule at that time and instead directed counsel to submit briefs. These briefs are now before the court.

In relevant part, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:

42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3

* * * * * *

(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter Subchapter II. — Public Accommodations, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . ..

Plaintiffs' argument, in substance, is that this express authorization was intended by Congress as a punitive measure to deter owners of places of public accommodation from pursuing the racially discriminatory practices banned by the Act; that to require plaintiffs' attorneys to bear the expenses of an injunctive action necessitated by the owner's deliberate defiance of the Act encourages racial discrimination; that the statutory authorization for attorney's fees makes no distinction between a situation where plaintiffs themselves compensate their attorneys and the present situation where plaintiffs have not compensated their attorneys; and that the inability of plaintiffs to pay their attorneys should not result in the attorneys bearing the expense of the litigation. In short, plaintiffs argue that attorney's fees should be awarded for two reasons, viz., to punish the defendants and to reimburse the attorneys.

Since their origin, federal courts have had a general equitable power to award counsel fees in a proper case. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 57 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939). A general rule severely limiting such awards developed early, however, Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 3 Dall. 306, 1 L.Ed. 613 (U.S.1796), and exceptional circumstances were necessary to justify such an award. From time to time, statutory exceptions to this judicially developed policy were created, one of the most recent being the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, quoted above.

Examples of federal statutes granting authority for the award of attorney's fees are the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15; the communications act, 47 U.S.C. § 206; the copyright laws, 17 U.S.C. § 116; the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8 and 908(b); the Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1228; and the patent laws, 35 U.S.C. § 285. Generally, these and similar federal statutes fall into two groups: first, mandatory statutes providing that attorney's fees "shall" be awarded to the plaintiff if he should prevail; and, second, discretionary statutes providing that such fees "may" be awarded to the prevailing party, whether he be plaintiff or defendant. Statutes of the first type were apparently intended by Congress to encourage the bringing of suits and discourage defenses in the particular classes of litigation to which they apply. Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 292 (D.Mass.1943). The second group of statutes would seem to be intended to discourage either unmeritorious actions or defenses. Except for the statutory docket fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a), no federal statutes provide that attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff, or that they must be awarded to the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant. See, Annotation: Right to Counsel Fees In Federal Court, 8 L.Ed. 2d 894, 915.

The statute under examination here, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, expressly submits the awarding of attorney's fees to the discretion of the court, and permits such an award to the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, Congress is experienced in expressing its intention that a statutory award of attorney's fees is designed to encourage litigation and serve as punishment to an unsuccessful defendant. It did not do so in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but rather expressed a purpose to discourage unmeritorious litigation. A reasonable construction of the statute, under prevailing conditions and in view of the aims of this legislation, would be that Congress recognized that many of the prospective plaintiffs would be without funds to employ counsel for the vindication of their constitutional rights under the Act, and that in a proper case the court, in its discretion, might award attorney's fees to the plaintiff in alleviation of this burden. At the same time, it was recognized that unmeritorious complaints under the Act could produce as serious a burden on...