United States v. Gray
Decision Date | 24 November 1970 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4128. |
Citation | 319 F. Supp. 871 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. James E. GRAY, d/b/a Gray's Motel. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty. R. I. and Joseph C. Johnston, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. R. I., Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.
Kenneth M. Beaver, Providence, R. I., for defendant.
An action to enforce the provisions of Title II, Public Accommodations, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.) was instituted by the United States pursuant to 42 U. S.C. § 2000a-5, against defendant motel owner, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against Negroes in admission to and use of the facilities of defendant's motel. Having reached and decided the merits of this case previously (315 F.Supp. 13 (D.R.I.1970)), I have before me for disposition only the question of the propriety of an award of counsel fees to the prevailing party — here, the defendant.
Authority for such award is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b):
"In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter Title II, Public Accommodations, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person."
Defendant prevailed here and seeks recovery against the United States for the $15,000 fee submitted to him by his attorney.
At the hearing upon this question, the defendant's position was that the statutory intent was to make whole the prevailing party, within the limitations of a "reasonable fee." While conceding liability for a reasonable fee, the government argued that the fee requested here was excessive, but offered no guidance to the court in reaching any other determination, presumably in part because of the professional sensitivity of one attorney toward the fee practice of another.
It seems that the precise question presented here is one of first impression. The most helpful authority, however, is that provided by Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam), which was a private action under Title II, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). Reversing the Circuit Court holding that counsel fees should be awarded to the prevailing party under § 2000a-3(b) only where defenses had been interposed for delay or in bad faith, the Court noted:
In the instant case, in which the United States is the party plaintiff, the policy expressed in Newman, of encouraging private enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, is inapplicable, since the Attorney General presumably needs no incentive to bring an action to enjoin racial discrimination. Rather the policy behind the award of counsel fees in § 2000a-5 cases, as substantiated by the legislative history of the Act, is that of discouraging the government from bringing meritless cases. Typical of the expressed Congressional intent with respect to the award of attorney's fees under § 2000a-3(b)1 is the following remark by Senator Lausche during debate prior to passage:
Senator Pastore agreed:
"The purpose of this provision * * * is to discourage frivolous suits * * *."
In Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F.Supp. 472 (N.D.Miss.1965), an individual action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), the court denied attorney's fees where the prevailing party had incurred no obligation to pay, but explained the Congressional policy behind the award of counsel fees in Civil Rights Act cases:
I adopt the Bell reasoning in this regard.
Since my prior opinion already found the government's case meritless, defendant here clearly falls within the ambit of the policy supporting recovery of counsel fees in a suit brought by the Attorney General.1a Thus, the government having correctly conceded that this is a proper case for recovery of counsel fees under § 2000a-3(b), the exact amount thereof remains to be determined.
As a starting point, the defendant's counsel, a member of the Rhode Island Bar for twenty-five years, has presented a bill for $15,000 as a fee for 229¾ hours expended in the preparation and trial of the case plus $14.60 for transportation and telephone calls. He contends he relied on the minimum fee schedule published by the Rhode Island Bar Association. I find no separate allocation for such appropriate items as the novelty of the case,2 his experience in the legal community, and defendant's possible injury from an adverse result. Defendant's counsel presented the expert testimony of two long-time members of the Rhode Island Bar who offered their opinions that a $15,000 fee for this case was not unreasonable, in light of these factors, which they considered appropriate for inclusion in a fee charge. Their opinions in turn were based in part upon the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Rhode Island Bar Association, Canon 12 of which provides, in pertinent part:
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association requires an attorney to take these same factors into consideration when setting a fee for services rendered to a private client. Canon 2 of that Code provides in part as follows:
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