United States v. Gray, Civ. A. No. 4128.
| Court | United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island |
| Writing for the Court | PETTINE |
| Citation | 319 F. Supp. 871 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. James E. GRAY, d/b/a Gray's Motel. |
| Decision Date | 24 November 1970 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4128. |
319 F. Supp. 871
UNITED STATES of America
v.
James E. GRAY, d/b/a Gray's Motel.
Civ. A. No. 4128.
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.
November 24, 1970.
Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty. R. I. and Joseph C. Johnston, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. R. I., Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.
Kenneth M. Beaver, Providence, R. I., for defendant.
OPINION
PETTINE, District Judge.
An action to enforce the provisions of Title II, Public Accommodations, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.) was instituted by the United States pursuant to 42 U. S.C. § 2000a-5, against defendant motel owner, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against Negroes in admission to and use of the facilities of defendant's motel. Having reached and decided the merits of this case previously (315 F.Supp. 13 (D.R.I.1970)), I have before me for disposition only the question of the propriety of an award of counsel fees to the prevailing party — here, the defendant.
Authority for such award is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b):
"In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter Title II, Public Accommodations, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person."
Defendant prevailed here and seeks recovery against the United States for the $15,000 fee submitted to him by his attorney.
At the hearing upon this question, the defendant's position was that the statutory intent was to make whole the prevailing party, within the limitations of a "reasonable fee." While conceding liability for a reasonable fee, the government argued that the fee requested here was excessive, but offered no guidance to the court in reaching any other determination, presumably in part because of the professional sensitivity of one attorney toward the fee practice of another.
It seems that the precise question presented here is one of first impression. The most helpful authority, however, is that provided by Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam), which was a private action under Title II, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). Reversing the Circuit Court holding that counsel fees should be awarded to the prevailing party under § 2000a-3(b) only where defenses had been interposed for delay or in bad faith, the Court noted:
"When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only. * * * If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees — not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II."
390 U.S. at 401-402, 88 S.Ct. at 966.
In the instant case, in which the United States is the party plaintiff, the policy expressed in Newman, of encouraging private enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, is inapplicable, since the Attorney General presumably needs no incentive to bring an action to enjoin racial discrimination. Rather the policy behind the award of counsel fees in § 2000a-5 cases, as substantiated by the legislative history of the Act, is that of discouraging the government from bringing meritless cases. Typical of the expressed Congressional intent with respect to the award of attorney's fees under § 2000a-3(b)1 is the following remark by Senator Lausche during debate prior to passage:
"That language was inserted in the bill to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation."
110 Cong.Rec. at 13189-90.
Senator Pastore agreed:
"The purpose of this provision * * * is to discourage frivolous suits * * *."
110 Cong.Rec. at 13720-21.
In Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F.Supp. 472 (N.D.Miss.1965), an individual action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), the court denied attorney's fees where the prevailing party had incurred no obligation
"The statute under examination here, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, expressly submits the awarding of attorney's fees to the discretion of the court, and permits such an award to the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant. * * * Congress is experienced in expressing its intention that a statutory award of attorney's fees is designed to encourage litigation and serve as punishment to an unsuccessful defendant. It did...
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Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, No. 74-1052
...(defendant's good faith in implementing decree); Wyatt v. Stickney 344 F.Supp. 387, 409-410 (M.D.Ala.1972), and United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp. 871 (D.R.I.1970) (reasonableness of fee). We mention one particular consideration. If an official is held in his official capacity, and if the p......
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Tatum v. Morton, Civ. A. No. 398-72.
...94 (N.D.Cal.1972), aff'd. 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). 15 Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F.Supp. 683 (D.Minn. 1971). 16 United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp. 871 17 Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F.Supp. 834 (W.D.Tex.1973). 18 Affidavit of James M. Johnstone, Esquire at 2. 19 A similar statement is made at 10......
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Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Va., No. 71-1774.
...2000e-5(k), 42 U.S.C. 44 See, Section 2000a-3(b), 42 U.S.C. 45 Section 2000c-7, 42 U.S.C.; and see, United States v. Gray (D.C.R.I.1970) 319 F.Supp. 871, 872-873. See, however, Note 57, 46 See, also Kahan v. Rosenstiel (3d Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 161, 166: "In the Mills opinion, Justice Harlan ......
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Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., Civ. A. No. 74-H-89.
...Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F.Supp. 1201 (E.D. La.1974) ($40/hour for pre-trial work; $50/hour during trial); United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp. 871, 875 (D.R.I.1970) ($35/hour for preparatory work; $50/hour at trial). Additionally, courts have stressed the importance of matching the comp......
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Tatum v. Morton, Civ. A. No. 398-72.
...94 (N.D.Cal.1972), aff'd. 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). 15 Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F.Supp. 683 (D.Minn. 1971). 16 United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp. 871 17 Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F.Supp. 834 (W.D.Tex.1973). 18 Affidavit of James M. Johnstone, Esquire at 2. 19 A similar statement is made at 10......
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Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, No. 74-1052
...(defendant's good faith in implementing decree); Wyatt v. Stickney 344 F.Supp. 387, 409-410 (M.D.Ala.1972), and United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp. 871 (D.R.I.1970) (reasonableness of fee). We mention one particular consideration. If an official is held in his official capacity, and if the p......
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Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Va., No. 71-1774.
...2000e-5(k), 42 U.S.C. 44 See, Section 2000a-3(b), 42 U.S.C. 45 Section 2000c-7, 42 U.S.C.; and see, United States v. Gray (D.C.R.I.1970) 319 F.Supp. 871, 872-873. See, however, Note 57, 46 See, also Kahan v. Rosenstiel (3d Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 161, 166: "In the Mills opinion, Justice Harlan ......
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Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., Civ. A. No. 74-H-89.
...Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F.Supp. 1201 (E.D. La.1974) ($40/hour for pre-trial work; $50/hour during trial); United States v. Gray, 319 F.Supp. 871, 875 (D.R.I.1970) ($35/hour for preparatory work; $50/hour at trial). Additionally, courts have stressed the importance of matching the comp......