Bell v. Bank of Abbeville
| Decision Date | 24 June 1946 |
| Docket Number | 15853. |
| Citation | 38 S.E.2d 641,208 S.C. 490 |
| Parties | BELL v. BANK OF ABBEVILLE. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Nicholson & Nicholson, of Greenwood, and Ralph J. Syfan, of Abbeville, for appellant.
J. M. Nickles and J. Moore Mars, both of Abbeville for respondent.
The defendant is a banking institution, incorporated under the laws of the state of South Carolina, with its principal place of business at Abbeville. The amended complaint contains three separately stated causes of action, based upon slander.
In the first cause of action, it is alleged that J. M. Mars was president of the bank, J. A. Verchot was vice president and a director, and T. A. Sherard was cashier. The plaintiff was employed as teller. That on June 22, 1945, about 7 o'clock p. m., Sherard telephoned the plaintiff requesting his presence at the bank. Upon his arrival Sherard, after making certain malicious charges against the plaintiff, telephoned Mr. Mars and Mr. Verchot, who were awaiting the call. The immediately came to the bank whereupon, in the presence of Mars and Verchot, Sherard made the following alleged malicious, false, and defamatory statements of and concerning the plaintiff:
'I have been marking money in the stamp box and $2.00 were taken out of the box.' 'A colored woman left an envelope with $26.00 in it on the table and when it was handed in to you you put it aside, and when she came back for it you counted out $16.00 to her.' 'Something happened here the other day about Homer Wilson's boy and $1.08.' 'There was a one dollar bill in the exchange box and when we checked up there was only sixty cents in it.' 'The said T. A. Sherard further stated, 'I don't see but one thing to do. I think it is best for him (meaning the plaintiff) to quit. I have told him to take a vacation and come back and resign and say it is on account of his health.''
The second cause of action alleges that Sherard maliciously uttered substantially the same false and defamatory statements hereinabove set forth concerning the plaintiff, to one J. S. Morse.
The third cause of action is identical with the second, differing from it only in that the publication is alleged to have been made to one W. H. White.
The defendant demurred to the complaint upon various grounds. The circuit court sustained the demurrer as to the plaintiff's first cause of action in part, and overruled all other grounds. Both parties have appealed.
Under the first ground of demurrer, the defendant contends that the amended complaint shows on its face that all matters mentioned in each of the three causes of action were privileged, were spoken on privileged occasions to privileged persons, and therefore as a matter of law are not actionable. On the other hand, the plaintiff claims that if the occasion was privileged, the communication was made in malice, was false and actuated by ill will, and hence exceeded the privilege.
Privileged communications or publications are of two kinds: 1, Absolute; 2, Conditional or qualified. When the communication is absolutely privileged, no action will lie for its publication, no matter what the circumstances under which it is published. When qualified, however, the plaintiff may recover if he shows that it was actuated by malice.
In determining whether or not the communication was qualifiedly privileged, regard must be had to the occasion and to the relationship of the parties. When one has an interest in the subject matter of a communication, and the person (or persons) to whom it is made has a corresponding interest, every communication honestly made, in order to protect such common interest, is privileged by reason of the occasion. The statement, however, must be such as the occasion warrants, and must be made in good faith to protect the interests of the one who makes it and the persons to whom it is addressed. Smith v. Youmans, 3 Hill 85, 21 S.C.L. 43; Switzer v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 119 S.C. 237, 112 S.E. 110, 26 A.L.R. 819; Bosdell v. Dixie Stores Co., 168 S.C. 520, 167 S.E. 834. The case of Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S.C. 5, 7 S.E.2d 517, relied upon by the bank, is not applicable because decided upon an entirely different state of facts.
On the face of the amended complaint, the alleged defamatory statements appear to have been made upon a privileged occasion. But whether or not the privilege was exceeded is an issue to be met upon the trial of the case, in which the burden will be upon the plaintiff to show express or actual malice. This question cannot be decided upon a demurrer to the complaint. The defendant cannot get the benefit of the defense of qualified privilege without setting it up as an affirmative defense. Rivers v. Florence Printing Co., 141 S.C. 364, 139 S.E. 781.
The protection of privilege extends generally to remarks made in the...
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...246 S.C. 192, 199-200, 143 S.E.2d 367; Rogers v. Florence Printing Company, 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 495, 38 S.E.2d 641. In South Carolina, actual malice can include a departure by reporters and publishers from "responsible standards of investig......
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