Bell v. Barefield

• Decision Date: 09 May 1929
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 438.
• Citation: 122 So. 318,219 Ala. 319
• Parties: BELL v. BAREFIELD.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

122 So. 318

219 Ala. 319

BELL v. BAREFIELD.

4 Div. 438.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 9, 1929

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dale County; J. S. Williams, Judge.

Bill in equity by Robert Lee Barefield, a non compos mentis, suing by his next friend, W. S. Barefield, against J. Z. Bell. From a decree for complainant, respondent appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Chas O. Stokes, of Ozark, for appellant.

Sollie & Sollie, of Ozark, for appellee.

BROWN J. (after stating the facts as above).

The court, in ordering the sale of the lands for division among the joint owners, proceeded on the theory that the deed from Edward Barefield and wife to Dora Brown and Robert L Barefield reserved a life estate in the grantors with vested remainder in the grantees. There is nothing in this conveyance, so far as appears, imposing any duty on the life tenant to preserve the property or insure it for the benefit of the remaindermen, and there is nothing in the conveyance made by Nancy Jane Barefield and her children, other than the complainant, to Dora Brown that imposed such duty, unless it can be said that the recital in the deed with reference to the support of the widow and the complainant had that effect.

We think it clear from the circumstances under which the conveyance was made, and its purpose, that this recital merely imposed a personal obligation on the grantee therein and was not such as to impress the land conveyed with a trust for the support of Nancy Jane and Robert. The legal effect of this deed was to convey merely the life estate then held by Nancy Jane Barefield, and in no way affected the interest of Robert.

By the subsequent conveyance by Dora Brown and her husband to Bell, he acquired the life estate of Nancy Jane and a one-half interest in the remainder.

When Bell insured the property, as the evidence shows, he insured for his own benefit and not for the joint benefit of himself and the complainant.

The general rule, sustained by the great weight of authority, is, in the absence of anything in the instrument creating the estate, or of agreement to that effect, between the parties, no duty rests upon the one or the other to insure for the benefit of a remainderman or his cotenant, and insurance taken by one with an insurable interest in the property, who pays the premiums thereon out of his own funds, is a personal indemnity to the insured. Harrison v. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288, 44 N.E. 222, 33 L. R. A. 239, 55 Am. St. Rep. 404; Spalding v. Miller, 103 Ky. 405, 45 S.W. 462; Sawyer v. Adams, 140 A.D. 756, 126 N.Y.S. 128; Addis v. Addis, 60 Hun, 581, 14 N.Y.S. 657; Thompson v. Gearheart, 137 Va. 427, 119 S.E. 67, 35 A. L. R. 36, and note, 40-42; 17 R. C. L. 642, § 32; 26 C.J. 436, § 584. Our cases seem to be in accord with this view. Miles v. Miles, 211 Ala. 26, 99 So. 187; Ridley & Wife v. Ennis & Wife, 70 Ala. 463; Shadgett v. Phillips & Crew Co., 131 Ala. 478, 31 So. 20, 56 L. R. A. 461, 90 Am. St. Rep. 95

.

Sampson & Wife v. Grogan, 21 R.I. 174, 42 A. 712, 44 L. R. A. 711, is cited as an authority for holding that Bell is chargeable, as trustee for the use of the complainant, for one-half of the insurance collected. That was an action by the remainderman to recover from the administrator of the life tenant the value of a dwelling destroyed by fire while in the possession of the tenant as such and insured by her against loss by fire, and the question decided was presented on demurrer to the complaint. In the course of the opinion it is stated: "If a policy is issued to a life tenant for the full value of the fee, and this amount is recovered by him, he certainly ought to be held to be a trustee for the remainderman as to the excess of the amount received over the value of his life interest"-citing Welsh v. London Assur. Corp., 151 Pa. 607, 25 A. 142, 31 Am. St. Rep. 786. (Italics supplied.) The opinion, however, concludes: "In the case at bar however, the declaration does not allege that the policy covered anything more...