Bell v. Batesville White Lime Co., 4-9210

• Decision Date: 29 May 1950
• Docket Number: No. 4-9210,4-9210
• Citation: 217 Ark. 379,230 S.W.2d 643
• Parties: BELL et al. v. BATESVILLE WHITE LIME CO. et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 643

230 S.W.2d 643

217 Ark. 379

BELL et al. v. BATESVILLE WHITE LIME CO. et al.

No. 4-9210.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 29, 1950.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1950.

Chas. F. Cole, Batesville, for appellants.

Wright, Harrison, Lindsey & Upton, Little Rock, for appellees.

GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case in which Clint Bell's widow and children seek benefits upon the theory that Bell's death resulted from an accidental injury suffered in the course of his employment by the appellee. The Commission denied the claim upon the ground that the claimants had not met the burden of proof. The circuit court affirmed the Commission's order.

Bell had worked for the appellee for many years prior to April of 1945. In that month he became totally disabled as a result of heart trouble and filed a claim for compensation. The Commission rejected the claim, but on appeal we held that the injury was compensable because the dusty atmosphere in which Bell worked was a factor contributing to the onset of his disability. Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S.W.2d 31. Pursuant to that decision Bell received compensation payments until his death in August of 1948. The appellants then filed the present claim for death benefits.

It will be observed that Bell's death occurred a few months more than three years after the inception of his disability. The statute governing this case, which arose before the 1948 amendments to the Act, provides that if death does not occur within the first three years of the period for compensation payments 'it shall be presumed that such death did not result from the injury and no death benefits shall attach.' Ark.Stats.1947, § 81-1315(b). The Commission ruled that the statutory presumption is rebuttable, and we agree with that ruling. Had the legislature intended for the presumption to be a conclusive one it could easily have said so, or it could have said that in no case would death benefits attach unless the employee died within three years after the injury. Most presumptions are rebuttable, and we find nothing in the Compensation Act to indicate that this one is not.

The Commission held, however, that the claimants' evidence was not sufficiently strong to overcome the statutory presumption. As far as the cause of Bell's death is concerned, the evidence is undisputed. When Clint Bell was about fourteen years old he had rheumatic fever. This disease usually creates a weakened heart condition. A person having a rheumatic heart may lead a normal existence for years, but in most cases the heart condition eventually flares up and ultimately proves to be fatal. Bell's case history was typical except that he lived longer than most patients do after the onset of disability. It is not even suggested that his death was due to anything except heart trouble; in fact, the appellee and its insurer did not offer any evidence to contradict the appellants' proof.

The transcript in the first case was introduced at the hearing below. What the Commission did was to re-examine that testimony and conclude that the claimants had not shown that Bell's original injury was accidental. The Commission reasoned that the statutory presumption imposed upon these claimants a heavier burden of proof than that which ordinarily obtains. Implicit in the Commission's written opinion is the thought that even though the proof in Bell's own case was strong enough to establish an accidental injury, the same evidence was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption in a death case.

We think the Commission erred in retrying the issue of...