Bell v. City of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 22 April 1929
• Docket Number: 66
• Citation: 146 A. 567,297 Pa. 185
• Parties: Bell et ux. v. Pittsburgh (et al., Aplnt.)
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

146 A. 567

297 Pa. 185

Bell et ux. v. Pittsburgh (et al., Aplnt.)

No. 66

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 22, 1929

Argued March 22, 1929

Appeal, No. 66, March T., 1929, by Allegheny County, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1919, No. 902, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of Helen Bell and Walter Bell her husband, v. City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny. Affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before GRAY, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $8,000. Allegheny County appealed.

Error assigned was refusal of judgment for Allegheny County n.o.v quoting record.

Judgment affirmed.

William B. McFall, Jr., of Dalzell, Dalzell & McFall, for appellant. -- The county was liable: Com. v. Brice, 22 Pa. 211; Bucher v. Northumberland Co., 209 Pa. 618; Collins v. Com., 262 Pa. 573; Hubbard v. Crawford Co., 221 Pa. 438; Cousins v. Butler Co., 73 Pa.Super. 86; Scibilia v. Phila., 279 Pa. 549; Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127.

A. L. Balter, of Brasley, Rubin, Balter & Cole, for appellee. -- A county is liable for its torts when it is acting not as a governmental agent but as a private corporation or is performing special duties imposed on it with its consent or voluntarily assumed by it.

It is well settled that a state is not liable for the negligence of its officers and agents: Collins v. Com., 262 Pa. 572; Lias v. Historical Assn., 88 Pa.Super. 534; Cousins v. Butler Co., 73 Pa.Super. 86.

It is equally well established that this immunity from liability for the negligence of its officers and agents applies not only to the state itself, but also to agencies or instrumentalities of the state, when in the exercise of public or governmental powers or in the performance of public or governmental duties: Cousins v. Butler Co., 73 Pa.Super. 86; Scibilia v. Phila., 82 Pa.Super. 328.

The above rule has been modified to the extent that both a municipal corporation and a quasi-municipal corporation are liable for the negligence of their agents, even in the performance of governmental duties, when the legislature has imposed the duty of maintenance: Scibilia v. Phila., 82 Pa.Super. 328; Bucher v. Northumberland Co., 209 Pa. 618; Hubbard v. Crawford Co., 221 Pa. 438; Gehringer v. Lehigh Co., 231 Pa. 497.

In determining the distinction between the governmental and the business functions of a public body, the test applied by the courts has been the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring the powers: Scibilia v. Phila., 82 Pa.Super. 328.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

The City-County Building in Allegheny County was erected under the Act of 1913, P.L. 96, as amended by the Act of 1915, P.L. 12. The act provided for the erection, use and management of the structure, with authority in the two governing bodies to enter into an agreement to effectuate the full exercise of the powers thus conferred. This agreement covered the use and occupation of certain parts of the building by the city and of other parts by the county. Where one of the parties occupied more space than its share, a specified rate per cubic foot as rental was provided for the excess. The agreement also covered maintenance, repair, care and operation of the building. There are elevators in each end, one half of which are operated by the county with its labor, the other half by the city under a similar arrangement. The building is lighted and heated at their joint expense. It contains the county offices, the courts of common pleas, the Bar Association and the Law Library, also such city offices as the mayor's, treasurer's, city controller's, police bureau, department of public safety, department of public health, public welfare, director of supplies, council chambers, city solicitor, and practically all others, including bureau of water, bureau of granting permits and licenses and all revenue-producing bureaus.

Part of the building is rented to private business enterprises including a cigar stand, public telephones and a tunnel under the building. Persons desiring to transact business with any of these departments are invited into the building where they may use the elevators indiscriminately, that is, either those of the city or county, irrespective of whether the visitor is on city or county business; the operators of the elevators do not know the character of the journey on which their occupants are engaged.

Helen Bell entered an elevator to go to the public welfare department of the city, to obtain a permit for the city hospital. She was directed by the dispatcher to enter an elevator which was standing open, waiting for passengers. The elevator was in the part occupied by the county and was operated by its employee. There was no one else in the car when she got on. She had taken about two steps when it started upward quickly and she was thrown to the floor. The outer door of the elevator shaft had been closed but the inner door on the cage was still open and her right arm was caught between the elevator and shaft and almost torn from her body. She brought suit against the county and the city and recovered a verdict of $8,000 against the county, on which judgment was entered.

The question presented is whether, when, in the joint ownership maintenance and operation of a building by a city and county, partly for business and partly for governmental purposes, an elevator, used indiscriminately to carry persons to and from the offices, is so operated as to injure a passenger, the county is liable for the negligent act of its servant who causes the injury. We may assume that the county in its own separate activities was engaged in purely governmental...