Bell v. Dist. Court of Holyoke

• Decision Date: 28 October 1943
• Citation: 314 Mass. 622,51 N.E.2d 328
• Parties: BELL v. DISTRICT COURT OF HOLYOKE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

314 Mass. 622

51 N.E.2d 328

BELL

v.DISTRICT COURT OF HOLYOKE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Oct. 28, 1943.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; O'Connell, Judge.

Proceeding by William J. Bell for a writ of certiorari to quash a decision of the District Court of Holyoke, affirming an order of the Board of Fire Commissioners of the City of Holyoke suspending petitioner as a member of the fire department of such city. The petition was dismissed by the Superior Court, and petitioner brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, and RONAN, JJ.

J. R. Nolen, of Holyoke, for petitioner.

J. P. Dowling, of Holyoke, for respondent.

RONAN, Justice.

The petitioner, a permanent member of the fire department of Holyoke, a city that has accepted G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 48, § 59, providing for a two platoon systen for its fire department and also has accepted G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 48, § 58A, inserted by St.1941, c. 638, providing for the hours of duty for permanent members of the fire department, was suspended on December 24, 1942, for two weeks without compensation, by the board of fire commissioners of said city, because he was employed in a department store in Springfield on December 22, 1942, in violation of a rule or regulation of the department which provided that ‘No member shall, during his time off duty, enter the employ of any person, firm or corporation without permission of the board of fire commissioners.’ The District Court found that the suspension was not made without proper cause or in bad faith, and affirmed the action of the board. A petition for certiorari to quash the decision of the District Court was ordered dismissed in the Superior Court. The case is here on exceptions taken by the petitioner.

The only contention now made by the petitioner is that the rule is upon its face unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore void. The validity of the rule is to be upheld unless it is shown that it cannot have any rational relation to the maintenance and administraction of an efficient municipal fire fighting force capable, consistently with its manpower and equipment, of rendering a high degree of protection to the lives and property of the citizens of the community.

The nature of the duties assumed by a member of a fire department is such that it cannot be anticipated when he will be called upon to assist in the extinguishment of fires. He is actually on duty at certain hours, but he is potentially on duty whenever the emergency arises that calls for his services. Even when ‘at liberty’ under the platoon system he is subject to be summoned in case of a conflagration and kept ‘on duty * * * while the conflagration continues.’ G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 48, § 59. It has been held that the liberty to which a fireman is entitled under this section while off duty is not absolute, and that a regulation, that the sounding of a second or general alarm shall summon to the fire members of the off duty platoon (except those upon leave of absence for twenty-four hours) whose companies respond to the fire and that no member shall so place himself that he cannot answer such a summons, has been determined to be reasonable. Sander v. Somerville, 241 Mass. 305, 135 N.E. 131. It is to be noted that the provisions in the earlier statute, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 48, § 59, imposing an obligation upon members off duty to hold themselves in readiness to respond to alarms for conflagrations was recognized in the later statute, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 48, § 58A, inserted by St.1941, c. 638, in regulating the hours of duties for permanent members of the fire department in cities and towns that have accepted this section.

The petitioner was employed in a department store located several miles from Holyoke without any permission from the board of fire commissioners. There is nothing to show that the board knew of his presence there. It could be found that, while so engaged, he would not be able without considerable delay to arrive in Holyoke and undertake his work as a fireman in the event of a conflagration in that city. As a practical matter his services would not be available to the city to assist in coping with an emergency. If he had the right to absent himself without permission and engage in another occupation in another city, then every other member had an equal right. Such a situation would seriously impair the ability of the department to function properly and to furnish adequate protection to the city and its citizens. It has been decided that the employment of an assistant engineer of a fire department in another city materially interfered with his ability to respond to a fire in the shortest possible time, was...