Bell v. Hargrove
Decision Date | 14 December 2021 |
Docket Number | S21G0459 |
Citation | 867 S.E.2d 101,313 Ga. 30 |
Parties | BELL v. HARGROVE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John R. Monroe, John Monroe Law, PC, 156 Robert Jones Road, Dawsonville, Georgia 30534, for Appellant.
Andrew Alan Pinson, Solicitor-General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Drew F. Waldbeser, Zachariah Weston Lindsey, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30334, for Amicus Appellant.
Bennett Davis Bryan, Assistant County Attorney, Laura Karen Johnson, Omari J. Crawford, DeKalb County Law Department, 1300 Commerce Drive, 5th Floor, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Rebecca Jean Dobras, Assistant Attorney General, DeKalb County Department of Law, 1300 Commerce Dr, 5th Floor, Decatur, Georgia 30030, for Appellee.
Georgia law generally requires a person to apply for and receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before carrying a handgun or other weapon in public.1 The General Assembly has identified specific categories of people to whom "[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued," including people with certain criminal convictions. OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2). To assist probate judges in determining whether an applicant has a disqualifying conviction, the General Assembly has provided a mechanism for a probate judge to obtain a criminal history report for an applicant. See id. § 16-11-129 (d). Once a probate judge has a sworn application and a criminal history report in hand, the probate judge's discretion to deny a weapons carry license is limited. Under OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), a probate judge "shall issue" a license "unless" (1) "facts establishing ineligibility have been reported," or (2) "the judge determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the [statutory] requirements." We granted certiorari to determine whether a probate judge may deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant's criminal history records report fails to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, we conclude that a probate judge has no such authority. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. See Bell v. Hargrove , 357 Ga. App. 802, 849 S.E.2d 554 (2020).
1. On February 13, 2018, Clinton Bell filed an application for a Georgia weapons carry license with the DeKalb County Probate Court. After running a criminal history records check on Bell, law enforcement returned a criminal history report to Probate Judge Bedelia Hargrove. The report stated that Bell had been arrested on May 27, 1986, for the "Misdemeanor" offense of "Pointing or Aiming Gun or Pistol at Another."2 But the report did not include any information about whether the State had prosecuted Bell for the offense or the results, if any, of such a prosecution.
Based on Bell's 1986 arrest, the probate judge denied his application for a weapons carry license, concluding that, if Bell's 1986 arrest had resulted in a conviction and the conviction had involved domestic violence, Bell would be ineligible for a weapons carry license. The judge reasoned that OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) provides that "[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued to ... [a]ny person who is prohibited from possessing or shipping a firearm in interstate commerce pursuant to subsections (g) and (n) of 18 [USC §] 922," and 18 USC § 922 (g) (9), in turn, prohibits the possession or shipment of a firearm in interstate commerce by someone "who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Although Bell had sworn under penalty of perjury in his application that he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence3 and nothing whatsoever in the criminal history report indicated that the 1986 arrest involved domestic violence, the judge concluded that the "incomplete" information on the report about the "disposition" of his 1986 arrest did not allow her to rule out a "possible" conviction for a misdemeanor domestic violence offense. Concluding that she could not determine whether Bell had met all the qualifications for a weapons carry license, the judge denied Bell's application.
Bell filed suit against the probate judge in superior court, alleging that her denial of his application violated OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) and that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering her to issue him a weapons carry license. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and, after a hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of the probate judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, see Bell , 357 Ga. App. at 814 (1), 849 S.E.2d 554, and we granted certiorari.
2. When a probate judge denies an application for a Georgia weapons carry license, the applicant has a statutory right to "bring an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain such license." OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). "To obtain the right to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, the petitioner must show either a clear legal right to the relief sought or a gross abuse of discretion." Hertz v. Bennett , 294 Ga. 62, 62 (1), 751 S.E.2d 90 (2013). Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Bell failed to carry his burden to obtain mandamus relief, the plain language of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) leads us to conclude otherwise.
When construing a statute, "we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant." Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013) (punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we "afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning," "view[ing] the statutory text in the context in which it appears," and "read[ing] the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." Id. at 172-173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (punctuation omitted). When, as here, statutory text is "clear and unambiguous," our interpretive task begins and ends with the text itself. Id. at 173, 751 S.E.2d 337 (punctuation omitted).
Id. (emphasis supplied).
By its plain terms, subsection (d) (4) sets out a mandatory requirement that a probate judge "shall" issue a license "unless" a listed exception applies.4 OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) ; see Mead v. Sheffield , 278 Ga. 268, 269, 601 S.E.2d 99 (2004) ( )5 ; see also Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1370 (11th ed. 2006) (defining "unless" as "except on the condition that"). The statute enumerates only two exceptions to this command, both of which require that the probate judge make an affirmative factual determination that the applicant does not qualify for a weapons carry license. First, a probate judge may deny a license if "facts establishing ineligibility have been reported." OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). Second, a probate judge may deny a license if "the judge determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the [statutory] requirements." Id. (emphasis supplied). The statute recognizes no other exceptions to a probate judge's duty to grant an application for a weapons carry license. Accordingly, "unless" one of the two exceptions applies, the probate judge must issue a weapons carry license. See id.
3. With this understanding of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) in mind, we turn to the heart of the question presented on certiorari: Does a probate judge have discretion to deny an application for a weapons carry license based solely on a determination that an applicant's criminal history report raises a question about whether the applicant has a disqualifying conviction? Applying the plain language of the statute, the clear answer to this question is "no." Information that merely indicates or leaves open the...
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