Bell v. Harrington Mfg. Co.

Decision Date19 November 1975
Docket NumberNo. 20112,20112
Citation265 S.C. 468,219 S.E.2d 906
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
Parties, 18 UCC Rep.Serv. 626 A. L. BELL, Respondent, v. HARRINGTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Appellant.

Burroughs, Green, Sasser & Hudson, Conway, for appellant.

J. Reuben Long, Eldridge R. Inman and Kenneth C. Inman, Conway, for respondent.

GREGORY, Justice:

A. L. Bell, the respondent herein, purchased a new bulk curing tobacco barn, manufactured by Harrington Manufacturing Company, appellant herein, from one of its authorized dealers in Loris, South Carolina. Respondent initially brought this action against appellant based on the breach of express oral warranties and for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The case was tried before the Honorable James A. Spruill, Jr. at the April, 1974 term of the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County. The jury awarded respondent Six Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Five ($6,225.00) Dollars and appellant then moved for judgment Non obstante veredicto or, in the alternative, a new trial Nisi. This case is here on appeal from denial of that motion.

The only question to be resolved is whether there was sufficient testimony on the record to justify the verdict and the amount of damages.

In the course of trying to sell respondent one of their barns, appellant's authorized dealer and agent made the following representations and warranties to respondent, all of which respondent alleges induced him to purchase the barn: (1) that the barn was of first quality materials and workmanship, (2) that it carried a 7 1/2 horse power belower system, which would furnish more air and dry and cure tobacco more efficiently and with less cost, (3) that it operated electronically and had an automatic firing system which would automatically advance itself through a range of temperatures after being manually set for each range, (4) that the barn was the most well constructed, most durable barn on the market, (5) that competent men at all times would be on the spot within two hours to correct anything that might go wrong, (6) that there would be plenty of parts available if needed, and (7) that they (Harrington Manufacturing Company) had been constructing, selling, and distributing the barns long enough so that all the bugs and defects were ironed out.

Section 10.2--313 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1962, provides in relevant parts as follows:

(1)(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise . . . made by the seller to the buyer, whether directly or indirectly, which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods conform to the affirmation or promise.

(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.

(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. (1966 (54) 2716.)

We think that although some of the salesman's promises and descriptions constituted mere 'sales puffing' or commendations of the barn, that there was sufficient testimony from which the jury could reasonably find the existence of express oral warranties by promise and description that the barn was of first-rate quality and that necessary parts and prompt service would be available if needed.

In addition to the express warranties, the finding of which was a question of fact for the jury, the barn was also covered by an implied warranty of merchantability under Section 10.2--314 of the South Carolina Code, 1962, which provides in relevant parts that 'unless excluded or modified ( § 10.2--316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied on a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.'

Appellant, Harrington Manufacturers, is a merchant with respect to bulk barns within the meaning of that term as used in the Uniform Commercial Code Sections. Subsection (2) of Section 10.2--314, supra, provides that for goods to be merchantable they must be at least such as 'pass without objection in the trade under the contract description (and they must be) fit for the ordinary purposes of which such goods are used.' There was no evidence presented of any oral disclaimers or...

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12 cases
  • Osburn v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • June 3, 1980
    ...v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo.App.1978); Arnold v. Ford Motor Co., 90 N.M. 549, 566 P.2d 98 (1977); Bell v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977); White & Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commer......
  • Hall v. Palmetto Enterprises II, Inc., of Clinton
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 2, 1984
    ...inference that can be drawn from the evidence does not support the factual findings implicit in the verdict. Bell v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975); Moran v. Jones, 315 S.E.2d 136 (S.C.App.1984). Here the verdict must be sustained because ample evidence in the reco......
  • Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Lighthouse Realty, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 25, 1985
    ...factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict. Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 249 S.E.2d 898 (1978); Bell v. Harrington Manufacturing Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975). A broker owes a duty to its principal to keep it fully and promptly informed of all material facts that come t......
  • Willis v. Floyd Brace Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 1983
    ...v. Kerr McGee Chemical Corporation, 266 S.C. 64, 221 S.E.2d 531 (1976). It was further stated in Bell v. Harrington Manufacturing Company, 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1975): It is well established that reversal of a jury's verdict can only result when the only reasonable inference fr......
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