Bell v. McManus, 87-214

• Decision Date: 19 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-214,87-214
• Citation: 742 S.W.2d 559,294 Ark. 275
• Parties: Melvyn BELL and Darlene Bell, Appellants, v. Rory McMANUS, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 559

742 S.W.2d 559

294 Ark. 275

Melvyn BELL and Darlene Bell, Appellants, v. Rory McMANUS, Appellee.

No. 87-214.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 19, 1988.

Tripper Cronkhite, Little Rock, for appellants.

Carey E. Bashem, Dale Price, Little Rock, for appellee.

PURTLE, Justice.

During the trial the court dismissed appellant Melvyn Bell as a plaintiff and subsequently granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict that set aside the jury award of punitive damages to appellant Darlene Bell. The appellants argue four points for reversal: (1) the trial court erred in holding that compensatory damages must be awarded in order to sustain an award for punitive damages; (2) the trial court erred in dismissing Melvyn Bell's cause of action because he was not present at the trial; (3) the trial court erred in holding that there was no substantial evidence of compensatory or nominal damages; and (4) the trial court erred in not granting appellants' motion for a new trial. We do not find prejudicial error and therefore affirm the action of the trial court.

The appellants filed a complaint in the circuit court which alleged that appellee masterminded the burglary of their home by two teenagers who stole $7,400 worth of their personal property. The complaint asserted that the appellee's actions were intentional, malicious, criminal, and constituted not only a trespass, but the intentional infliction of emotional distress which insulted the appellants' property and sense of well being.

At the trial Mrs. Bell testified that "we were appalled that it happened. We felt violated and very angry. We have always worked for everything we've had and to have someone else, who doesn't want to work, come in and steal from us is not a very good feeling to be violated like that." There was no other material testimony relating to damages for trespass or outrage. The trial court dismissed Mr. Bell's cause of action because he was not present at trial.

The court instructed the jury on the tort of outrage without objection. The appellants offered their own version of AMI 2201, which would have allowed the jury to consider as elements of damage the fair market value of the property stolen, and the infringement of the Bells' right to maintain their home and property without being violated by intruders. The court modified the proposed compensatory instruction by instructing the jury to compensate Mrs. Bell only for any mental anguish experienced by her in the past. The jury was also instructed on punitive damages.

The jury returned a verdict signed by nine members, which stated:

We, the jury, find for the plaintiff, Darlene Bell, and assess her damages as follows: compensatory -0-; punitive, $3,700.00.

The trial court refused appellants' motion for judgment on the verdict. The court granted the appellee a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied the appellants' motion for a new trial.

The first argument advanced by the appellants questions the trial court's holding that punitive damages cannot stand in the absence of an award of compensatory damages. They argue that the cases hold that punitive damages depend upon a showing that compensatory damages have been suffered rather than that compensatory damages were awarded. We are of the opinion that such argument attempts to draw a line too thin to follow.

The court's instruction on the tort of outrage provided that Mrs. Bell had the burden of proving that she suffered damages and that appellee wilfully and wantonly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which proximately caused her damages in the nature of emotional distress. The instruction was proper.

Although there was evidence of a trespass, no such instruction was offered by appellants. The appellants presented their case to the jury on the tort of outrage and the jury simply found that Mrs. Bell had not suffered compensatory damages. In the absence of an award for damages for the underlying cause of action, punitive damages are improper. Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 582 S.W.2d 28 (1979); and Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Reeves, 210 Ark. 178, 194 S.W.2d 876 (1946).

In M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 280, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980), we defined the tort of outrage: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct wilfully or wantonly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress."

Appellant's second argument is that the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Bell's cause of action. In Growth Properties v. Cannon, 282 Ark. 472, 669 S.W.2d 447 (1986), several children and their spouses were awarded compensatory and punitive damages caused by the tort of outrage when the defendant trespassed upon the gravesites and vaults of the plaintiffs' deceased parents. We affirmed the trial court in all but...