Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 96-1297

Citation126 F.3d 328
Decision Date01 October 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-1297,96-1297
PartiesJames M. BELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.); Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church; Women's Division of the General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church; American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., Defendants-Appellees, and Elenora Giddings Ivory; Jane Hull Harvey; Anna Rhee; Jay Lintner; Robert Tiller; Lionel Derenoncourt; Otis Turner; Vernon Broyles, Defendants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

ARGUED: James Wright Crabtree, Smathers & Thompson, Charlotte, NC, for Appellant. Alissa Aaronson Horvitz, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Katharine B. Houlihan, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellees.

Before HALL and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge K.K. HALL and Judge DUFFY joined.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

OPINION

The Reverend James M. Bell, an ordained minister, served as executive director of Interfaith Impact, a multi-denominational outreach program. In June 1995, his employment was terminated as part of Interfaith Impact's "complete reduction in force." Interfaith Impact's board of directors advised Bell that the termination was "based solely upon the financial condition" of the program and was "absolutely no reflection on the quality of your work." Bell sued Interfaith Impact's four principal constituent religious organizations, as well as others, for breach of contract and various torts arising from the termination. The district court dismissed the complaint against the constituent religious organizations because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that, by reason of the First Amendment, a civil court has no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical decisions by churches "as to how they are going to expend their funds." For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

More than twenty religious groups, including as principal contributors four national religious organizations, 1 created and funded Inter faith Impact, a nonprofit corporation in Washington, D.C., "to advance the jointly shared religious purposes of its members, namely, to carry out their theological imperative to increase the possibilities for peace, economic and social justice." Interfaith Impact's charter states as its mission:

(1) promoting a public policy that reflects prophetic Jewish-Christian values, (2) advocating to the United States government the enactment of public policies that are just, promote peace and protect the environment (reflecting JewishChristian values), (3) developing and nurturing people of faith ... to be effective advocates for public policies that are just, promote peace and protect the environment, (4) maximizing the voice, visibility, and ability of member agencies and denominations or faith groups to advocate for[such policies], (5) educating ... the general public on the public policy issues of major concern to the inter-religious community.

In the fall of 1991, Interfaith Impact "called" Bell, an ordained minister, to serve as its executive director. In the engagement letter, Interfaith Impact recognized that Bell's service would be an extension of his ministry with the United Church of Christ, in which he was an ordained minister. It stated:

We are happy that the four entities required by the United Church of Christ to recognize your ordained ministry in this position will do so. Those entities are you and your sense of call; the recognition of this being a place of ministry by your local church; the Potomac Association of the United Church of Christ; and Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace.

The letter confirmed a financial arrangement that designated $25,000 of Bell's salary as "housing allowance" to enable him to claim a parsonage exemption from income taxes and a contribution that Inter faith Impact would make to the United Church of Christ's pension program so that Bell would continue to receive pension and health benefits from that church. The letter concluded, "We hope this will be a rewarding ministry for you."

Because of diminished support from constituent faith groups in the spring of 1995, the full explanation for which does not appear in the record, Interfaith Impact began to experience serious financial difficulties. In May 1995, the Presbyterian Church, one of Interfaith Impact's main financial contributors, decided that because of the financial crisis it would not allocate further funds for Interfaith Impact for the year 1996. It also conditioned fulfillment of its 1995 commitment on a complete reduction of force and vacation of the premises rented by Interfaith Impact. The Presbyterian Church explained, "The current situation is not to be seen as the fault of the current staff who are in many ways victims of the circumstances the faith groups find themselves in due to diminished resources."

In response to the Presbyterian Church's withdrawal of support, the board of directors of Interfaith Impact promptly effected a complete reduction of force, intending to continue the program's ministry with a volunteer staff. In its letter of termination to Bell, dated June 23, 1995, the board stated:

Your termination is based solely upon the financial condition of Interfaith IMPACT which has [led] the Board of Directors to enact a complete "reduction in force." In this termination, there is absolutely no reflection on the quality of your work.

The letter concluded, "I would again express to you my admiration and appreciation of your work, my regret for the situation that makes this reduction necessary, and my gratitude for the helpfulness which you are continuing to give to Interfaith IMPACT."

Several months later, Bell filed this action against the board of directors and against the four principal contributing religious organizations, challenging their expressed reason for ending the program and terminating his employment. He complained, in six counts, that the defendants (1) interfered with his contract, (2) intentionally inflicted on him emotional distress, (3) breached a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) interfered with his prospective advantage, (5) wrongfully terminated him, and (6) that the religious organization defendants breached their pledge to contribute to Interfaith Impact on a yearly basis. The district court dismissed the complaint against the individual board members for lack of personal jurisdiction and against the religious organizations because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 He appeals only on the ground that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

II

In keeping with the First Amendment's proscription against the "establishment of religion" or prohibiting the "free exercise thereof," civil courts have long taken care not to intermeddle in internal ecclesiastical disputes. As early as Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871) (decided on general common law and not constitutional law), the Supreme Court disavowed the ability to resolve a dispute between a national religious organization and one of its local churches based on differing interpretations of church law, reasoning that

All who unite themselves to ... a [religious] body do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.

Id. 80 U.S. at 729. And later in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929), the Court similarly refused, on constitutional grounds, to force a Roman Catholic Archbishop to appoint the plaintiff to a chaplaincy which was denied to him based on an interpretation of Roman Catholic canon law. Justice Brandeis there formulated the rule that "[i]n the absence of fraud,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
59 cases
  • Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Methodist Church
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Eastern District of North Carolina
    • July 27, 1999
    ...line of cases and the "church-minister" or "ministerial" exception).7 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. See also Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir.1997) (minister's wrongful termination claim barred by First Amendment because civil court has no jurisdiction over eccl......
  • Malicki v. Doe
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • March 14, 2002
    ...disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization.'" Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir.1997) (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372; and General Council, 439 U.S. at 1373, 99 S.Ct. 35).......
  • Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • May 24, 2007
    ...secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization." Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). She claims Defendants have not propounded a justification for disabili......
  • Montrose Christian v. Walsh
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • April 12, 2001
    ...ourselves into a realm where the Constitution forbids us to tread, the internal management of a church"); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir.1997) ("It has thus become established that the decisions of religious entities about the appointment and removal of ministers an......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • THE LIMITS OF CHURCH AUTONOMY.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 98 No. 3, March 2023
    • March 1, 2023
    ...School and Antidiscrimination Employment Laws, 54 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 955, 99(1-91 (2021). (157) Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)......
  • A rock solid foundation for the wall of separation between church and state in employment decisions concerning clergy.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 78 No. 9, October 2004
    • October 1, 2004
    ...third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization.'" Id. at 357 (quoting Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)). Having acknowledged the importance of insulating a religious organization from court intervention into internal matt......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT