Bell v. Rice
| Decision Date | 03 February 1897 |
| Parties | BELL v. RICE ET AL. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
1. Generally, where a child renders services for a parent (the family relation existing at the time), the law presumes, by reason of the kinship of the parties and such family relation, that such services were gratuitously rendered.
2. Such presumption is not a conclusive one, and the child may recover the value of the services rendered if the evidence shows that they were rendered under such circumstances as to justify the inference of a contract on the part of the parent to pay for them.
3. Whether the evidence warrants such a conclusion is a question for the jury.
4. A stepfather residing in the state of Illinois became an imbecile. No conservator was appointed for him. At the request of those who had charge of his property and business, his stepdaughter caused him to be brought to the home of herself and husband, in the state of Nebraska, where he remained until his death, some 90 weeks afterwards. During this time the stepdaughter furnished him boarding, lodging, medicine, and medical attendance, and such care as his demented condition required. For these services she filed a claim against his estate. Held, that the services rendered to the stepfather were necessaries, for which his estate was liable.
5. The defense of the statute of limitations is a meritorious one, but one that may be waived; and, if it is not insisted upon in some manner in the trial court, it will not be considered here for the first time.
6. A brother gave to his sister his note for $1,000. The brother died, and the note was filed, and allowed as a claim against his estate, and his administratrix, on settling the estate, paid said claim in full to the father of her intestate's sister. The daughter was at the time living with her father, and the money was paid to, and retained by him with her knowledge and consent, without any agreement on his part to pay interest for the use of said money, or to repay it at any particular time. After the father's death, the daughter filed a claim against his estate for this money. Held: (1) That the evidence warranted the conclusion that the money was not a gift by the daughter to the father; (2) that it was not money to which the father was entitled to appropriate to himself by reason of the relation existing between himself and daughter; (3) that the transaction was in the nature of a gratuitous loan to the father; (4) that the money was payable to the daughter on demand; (5) that her father's estate was liable to her for the claim, but, as she made no demand for its payment during the lifetime of her father, her claim should only draw interest from the date she filed it against the estate.
Error to district court, Lancaster county; Strode, Judge.
Separate petitions in the county court by Anna Rice and Sophia Mills against W. Q. Bell, administrator of Thomas H. Rice, deceased, for the allowance of claims. The claims were allowed, and certain of the heirs appealed to the district court, where there was a judgment for claimants, and the heirs bring error. Modified.Abbott, Selleck & Lane, for plaintiffs in error.
W. E. Stewart, Tibbets Bros., and Morey & Ferris, for defendants in error.
In the county court of Lancaster county, sitting as a court of probate, Sophia Mills and Anna Rice each filed a claim against the estate of Thomas H. Rice, deceased. From the judgment of the county court allowing these claims, the administrator of the estate refused to appeal, whereupon certain heirs of the estate, in pursuance of the provisions of the statute, appealed the judgments of the county court to the district court. The two claims were there tried without pleadings. They were tried together to the court, without a jury. The district court allowed the claims of Sophia Mills and Anna Rice against the said estate, and said heirs have filed here a petition in error to review the action of the district court.
1. We will first direct our attention to the claim of Sophia Mills. She claimed that the estate was indebted to her in the sum of $1,350, for boarding, lodging, and caring for the deceaser for the 90 weeks immediately preceding his death, on which claim she admitted that she had been paid $862.91, leaving a balance due her of $867.19. By the judgment of the district court, she was awarded $311.95. The evidence shows that Mrs. Mills, in 1887, resided, with her husband, in Waverly, Neb.; that she was the stepdaughter of the deceased, who at that time resided in Monmouth, Ill.; that in September, 1887, the deceased became an imbecile. The management of his affairs and estate was taken charge of by certain of his friends in Illinois, although no conservator or guardian was appointed for him. About this time, at the suggestion of those having charge of the estate and the affairs of the deceased, Mrs. Mills caused him to be brought to her house in Nebraska, where he remained until he died, some 90 weeks afterwards. During this time, Mrs. Mills boarded, lodged, and cared for him, furnished him medicine and medical attendance. It was necessary, owing to his lack of the use of his mental faculties, to keep a constant watch upon him, to prevent his straying away. He had lost power to control and direct the functions of his body, and had to be waited upon like an infant; and the evidence shows that the services of Mrs. Mills in the premises were reasonably worth from $10 to $30 per week.
It is urged against the judgment of the district court that its finding is unsupported by sufficient evidence. It is first said that the evidence does not warrant the amount awarded Mrs. Mills. Adding the amount of money received by her from the estate of the deceased during his lifetime to the amount awarded her by the court, we have a total of $1,174, which Mrs. Mills has received for her services in the premises. This amount the evidence justifies. But it is said that since the evidence does not disclose an express promise on the part of the deceased to pay Mrs. Mills for her services, since she was his stepdaughter, and the deceased lived with her in her family, a family relation existed between them; and that the presumption is that the services rendered by Mrs. Mills were gratuitously rendered, because of the relation existing between herself and the deceased. But this evidence does not bring Mrs. Mills' case within the rule that, where services are rendered by a child for a parent, the presumption is that such services were rendered gratuitously, because of the relation existing between the parties. The deceased was not a visitor at the house of Mrs. Mills, nor was he at her house because he had been invited by her to come there, and make it his home. If, because of the relationship of Mrs. Mills to the deceased, the law presumes that the services rendered by her were gratuitously rendered, still this was not a conclusive presumption; and we think that the services of Mrs. Mills were rendered under such circumstances as to overthrow this presumption, and justify the application to this case of the general rule that where services are rendered by one party for another, and knowingly accepted by him, the law will imply a promise on his part to pay what such services are reasonably worth. Smith v. Myers, 19 Mo. 433. In Koch v. Hebel, 32 Mo. App. 103, a daughter filed a claim against her father's estate for services rendered by her for him in his lifetime. The evidence showed that while the daughter was away from home, working for herself, her mother was taken ill; that the daughter then returned to the home of her parents (but whether at their request did not appear), and remained with and cared for them until the death of the survivor; and that her father had on certain occasions spoken of compensating her for these services. The court held that, because of the family relationship existing between the claimant and the deceased, the law presumed that the...
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