Bell v. Schexnayder
| Decision Date | 27 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-40079,94-40079 |
| Citation | 36 F.3d 447 |
| Parties | 94 Ed. Law Rep. 725 Marshall D. BELL, Sr., Individually & on Behalf of Yolanda M. Bell, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dema Thomas SCHEXNAYDER, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Don Hernandez, New Orleans, LA, Joslyn R. Alex, Alex & Assoc., Breaux Bridge, Louisiana, LA, for appellants.
Andrew H. Meyers, Preis & Kraft, Lafayette, LA, for Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co.
J.I. Funderburk, Funderburk & Herpin, Abbeville, LA, for Schexnayder.
James R. McClelland, Aycock, Horne & Coleman, Franklin, LA, for School Bd.
L. Albert Forrest, New Iberia, LA, for State Farm.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before REAVLEY, DAVIS and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
The only issue we face is whether the district court erred in denying attorney's fees to appellants under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 after settlement was announced. We affirm.
Yolanda Bell and her parents, Marshall and Charlene Bell, brought this suit against Dema Schexnayder and the Saint Mary Parish School Board. It was brought pursuant to Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1681-88 (), and sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees under Sec. 1988. Two insurance companies, National Union Fire Insurance Company and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, were added as third-party defendants. 1
The record reveals the following. The case was scheduled for trial on October 4, 1993. The Bells offered to settle the case for $85,000. On September 21, 1993, National Union, on behalf of defendants, rejected this offer and instead offered by letter to settle "all claims existing in the above referenced litigation and/or arising out of the subject incident" for $2500 plus the waiver of all discovery sanctions which had been imposed on plaintiffs. Counsel for the Bells wrote back on September 24, 1993, rejecting this offer and submitting "a counteroffer of $30,000 to settle these claims." On September 30 counsel for the Bells reduced their settlement demand to $18,000. On October 1, with trial only three days away, the parties agreed by telephone to settle for $10,000 plus a waiver of sanctions. That same day counsel for the school board wrote the other counsel, advising them that he had informed the district judge "that the matter has been settled and should be removed from his docket." He further requested immediate notification if that counsel's understanding was incorrect.
On October 14, the court signed a sixty day order of dismissal. The order states that the court, "having been advised by counsel for the parties that the above action has been settled," was dismissing the case "without prejudice to the right, upon good cause shown within sixty (60) days, to reopen it if settlement is not consummated and seek summary judgment enforcing the compromise."
On November 24, counsel for the Bells filed an attorney's fee application under Sec. 1988, seeking $19,991 in fees. Counsel On January 13, 1994, the district court held a hearing on the fee application and motion to enforce settlement. It concluded that all claims in this matter had been settled and therefore denied the request for fees. The only sworn evidence before the court was the affidavit of counsel for National Union, which stated that "at all times during settlement negotiations, it was made clear that any and all settlement offers were made in settlement of all claims asserted in the litigation and/or arising out of the subject incident including but not limited to the claim for attorney[']s fees asserted in the original petition under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988."
identified himself, rather than the Bells, as the movant. Prior to filing the fee application plaintiffs and their counsel had never indicated that any issue remained for the trial court to resolve or that the settlement was exclusive of attorney's fees. On December 10 defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement, and a memorandum in support of the motion to enforce settlement and in opposition to the attorney's fee application.
The Bells complain that the district court erred in denying the request for fees and granting the motion to enforce settlement.
Attorney's fees under Sec. 1988 are not necessarily precluded in cases that are resolved by settlement or otherwise resolved without a full trial on the merits. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3465, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (). However, our review of district court rulings on Sec. 1988 fee applications is highly deferential. As we explained in Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 919 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.1990):
When a district court awards a fee pursuant to section 1988 of 42 U.S.C., we review the award only for an abuse of discretion.... "A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation".... We cannot overemphasize the concept that a district court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a fee award. This tenet is "appropriate in view of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters."
Id. at 379 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).
In addition to its broad discretion to award attorney's fees, a district court has inherent power to recognize, encourage, and when necessary enforce settlement agreements reached by the parties. Lyles v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 684 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir.1982) (); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.) 2 ("It is well established that courts retain the inherent power to enforce agreements entered into in settlement of litigation pending before them."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862, 97 S.Ct. 165, 50 L.Ed.2d 140 (1976); CIA Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35-36 (5th Cir.1967) ( ).
Young v. Powell, 729 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.1984), addressed similar facts. The plaintiff in...
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