Cia Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris

• Decision Date: 10 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 23424.,23424.
• Citation: 374 F.2d 33
• Parties: CIA ANON VENEZOLANA DE NAVEGACION, Appellant, v. Frank L. HARRIS and Pate Stevedoring Company, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

374 F.2d 33 (1967)

CIA ANON VENEZOLANA DE NAVEGACION, Appellant, v. Frank L. HARRIS and Pate Stevedoring Company, Inc., Appellees.

No. 23424.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 10, 1967.

Alex F. Lankford, III, C. Wayne Loudermilch, Mobile, Ala., Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, Ala., of counsel, for appellant.

Ross Diamond, Jr., Marshall J. DeMouy, W. Boyd Reeves, Mobile, Ala., Diamond & Lattof, Armbrecht, Jackson & DeMouy, Mobile, Ala., of counsel, for appellees.

Before GEWIN and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, District Judge.

HUNTER, District Judge.

The controversy concerns the enforcement of an agreement of compromise and settlement. The District Judge held that the settlement was authorized and conclusively disposed of all issues which might have been litigated in the original action. An order was entered enforcing the agreement. We find no basis for setting aside that order and affirm.

The pertinent sequence of events is:

                  March, 1964           Harris, a longshoreman, filed a libel
                                        against appellant, Cia Anon Venezolana
                                        De Navegacion (hereinafter referred to
                                        as Anon). The suit was for damages allegedly
                                        caused by the negligence of Anon
                                        and the unseaworthiness of its vessel
                                        Anon impleaded Pate Stevedoring Co
                                        Inc. seeking indemnity
                  November 17, 1965     Attorneys representing Harris, Pate, and
                                        Anon entered into negotiations which culminated
                                        in an agreement to settle. This
                                        accord was reached on November 17
                                        1965. Under the terms of the agreement
                                        Harris was to receive $16,000. Anon
                                        agreed to contribute $8,000; Pate agreed
                                        to contribute $8,000.
                  December 2, 1965      The case was scheduled to be tried but
                                        was upset because of the settlement.
                  December 13, 1965     Mr. Wood, Appellant's counsel, contacted
                                        Harris' attorney and advised that even
                                        though he had the express authority of
                                        his client to enter into the agreement,
                                        such authority had been withdrawn.
                  December 15, 1965     Harris filed a motion to enforce the settlement
                                        agreement.
                  December 23, 1965     Pate joined in the motion and Wood
                                        withdrew as counsel.
                  December 27, 1965     Mr. Lankford entered his appearance as
                                        counsel for Appellant and moved to continue
                                        the hearing of the motion for enforcement.
                  December 30, 1965     The Court heard evidence and received
                                        affidavits. At the conclusion of the hearing,
                                        the District Court granted the motion
                                        and entered judgment against Appellant
                                        and Pate in the amount of $8,000
                                        each.
                

Appellant argues that the motion, which had been captioned as a motion for summary judgment, should not have been granted because the pleadings reveal the existence of issues of material fact as to liability and indemnity. In the alternative it is argued that at least there was a genuine issue concerning Wood's authority to settle.

The record reveals that counsel negotiated and agreed on a compromise prior to the scheduled trial date, fully cognizant of the contested factual issues raised by the pleadings. The actual merits of the case as presented by the pleadings were no longer of any consequence following the agreement. Federal courts have held under a great variety of circumstances that a settlement agreement once entered into cannot be repudiated by either party and will be summarily enforced.¹ In the case of J. Kahn and Co., Inc. v. Clark (5th Cir., 1949) 178 F. 2d 111, this Court stated:

"`Compromises of disputed claims are favored by the courts.\' Williams v. First National Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 30 S.Ct. 441, 445, 54 L.Ed. 625; Gilliam v. Alford, 69 Tex. 267, 6 S.W. 757. Where the parties, acting in good faith, settle a controversy, the courts will enforce the compromise without regard to what the result might, or would have been, had the parties chosen to litigate rather than settle. Hennessy v. Bacon, 137 U.S. 78, 11 S.Ct. 17, 34 L.Ed. 605; Crisp County v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 5 Cir., 73 F.2d 327, 96 A.L.R. 391; Camoron v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 22; Little v. Allen, 56 Tex. 133.

"This court, in Crisp County v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., supra, held that an agreement of the parties settling a disputed liability is as conclusive of their rights as a judgment would be if it had been litigated instead of compromised * * *." (Emphasis added.) 178 F.2d at 114.

There is no question here of the fairness of the settlement. There is no question of good faith. The District Court was eminently correct in holding that the factual issues presented by the pleadings became irrelevant upon effectuation of the agreement. The issue quickly narrows to a simple inquiry: Did Wood have authority to bind his client? Appellant insists that there exists a genuine issue of fact on this issue. We do not agree. Wood entered into the agreement. He related the terms of the settlement. Counsel for Pate testified as to Wood's statements that he, Wood, had full authority to settle. He further asserted that Wood had revealed that authority to opposing counsel.²

In support of its contentions, Appellant relies upon the affidavit of Elpidio Generali, general manager for the general agents of Appellant. Generali states in his affidavit that Vincent Barron, the manager of the claims section for the company who...