Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co.
| Decision Date | 21 November 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 10267,10267 |
| Citation | 135 W.Va. 25,62 S.E.2d 285 |
| Parties | BELL, v. SOUTH PENN NATURAL GAS CO. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Under a contract of an employer which provides for payments, based upon specified periods of employment, to an employee if he is laid off or dismissed, a former employee, whose employment was terminable at will, who has voluntarily quit such employment, is not entitled to recover from the employer the payments provided by the contract.
2. When the facts in an action or a proceeding at law are not in dispute and they lead all reasonable minds to the same conclusion, the question in issue is one of law for the court.
Harold M. Garrett, A. F. McCue, Clarksburg, Fred H. Barnett, Parkersburg, for plaintiff in error.
Ben Moats, Dorr Casto, Parkersburg, for defendant in error.
This is a proceeding by notice of motion for judgment, returnable March 1, 1949, in the Circuit Court of Wood County, in which the plaintiff, Charles E. Bell, seeks to recover from the defendant, South Penn Natural Gas Company, a corporation, for severance pay which the plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, claims it owes him by virtue of a contract for the benefit of the plaintiff and other employees, entered into between the South Penn Oil Company, a corporation, the defendant, and Employees' Federation Delegates, an organization acting in behalf of the plaintiff and other employees of the defendant, on May 4, 1945. The amount claimed is stated in the notice and, with interest from February 7, 1949, is also specified in an affidavit attached to and filed with the notice. The defendant denied liability to the plaintiff in any sum by its plea of the general issue and its counter affidavit filed with the plea. The case was tried on May 26, 1949, and on that day a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $920. The circuit court overruled the motion of the defendant to set aside the verdict and, by order entered December 14, 1949, entered judgment for the amount of the verdict with interest and costs. To that judgment, upon the petition of the defendant, this Court granted this writ of error.
The contract upon which the claim of the plaintiff is based is established by the written minutes of a conference of the contracting parties held at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on May 4, 1945, and in its pertinent portions provided that the defendant should pay all its employees, who were 'laid off or dismissed' from service from January 1, 1945, to April 30, 1945, inclusive, and after April 30, 1945, in West Virginia, until further notice, if such employees had served the defendant 'continuously for a period in excess of one year at the time of lay-off or dismissal'. The rate of payment was 1/2 of one month's wages for an employee who had served more than one year but less than five years, and 1/2 of one month's wages for an employee who had served for five years, and an additional 1/2 of one month's wages for each year of his service in excess of five years. The contract further provided that no payment should be made to 'men' who 'quit' or 'resigned of their own accord'. The contract, as disclosed by the minutes of the conference, which also related to matters other than the subject of severance pay of employees, was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff.
Neither party to this proceeding questions the validity of the contract or that it was entered into for the benefit of those employees of the defendant to whom its provisions apply. The controlling question in controversy between the parties to this litigation is whether the contract applies to the plaintiff. He vigorously contends that it does. The defendant, with equal emphasis, insists that it does not.
It is clear that the material facts in evidence, except those which relate to the termination of the employment of the plaintiff in January, 1949, are not disputed. As to that phase of the case, the plaintiff contends that he was discharged by the defendant and that, for that reason, he is within the terms of the contract and entitled to the payments which it provides. On the contrary, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff was not discharged, that he voluntarily resigned and quit his employment, and that because he voluntarily terminated his employment with the defendant he is not entitled to receive any of the benefits provided by the contract for its employees who are laid off or dismissed. The inquiry whether the evidence which bears upon the termination of the employment of the plaintiff with the defendant in January, 1949, is actually conflicting and presents a question of fact for the jury or a question of law for the court will be discussed and answered later in this opinion.
The plaintiff is a married man and during the entire period of his employment with the defendant, which began on July 14, 1936, and continued for more than twelve years and until January 31, 1949, his family resided in the City of Parkersburg in Wood County. During the time he worked for the defendant, he was employed as a 'roustabout', a word of well known meaning in the oil and gas industry, and his duties ordinarily consisted in 'pulling wells', pulling rods, mowing, other similar work, and starting gas engines which, according to the evidence, is a strenuous act or operation. He was employed for no definite period of time and his wages accrued upon a monthly basis. At the time his employment with the defendant ended in January, 1949, his monthly wages, exclusive of a bonus of $30 per month, amounted to $230, and his family consisted of his wife and a son of high school age. In the years 1947 and 1948 the plaintiff was twice injured in the course of his employment and in each instance he suffered a hernia. During the first six years of his employment he worked at Yawkey, in Lincoln County, and during the remaining period of approximately the same length of time he was stationed at Murphytown, in Wood County. Yawkey is about 110 miles, and Murphytown is 6 or 7 miles, from Parkersburg, where his wife and his son resided.
In September, 1948, after the plaintiff had received operative treatment for hernia and while he was on duty at Murphytown, the vice president and general superintendent of the defendant and its district superintendent called upon the plaintiff and discussed with him the subject of his employment. At that time the plaintiff was told in substance that, because of his physical condition, it was the opinion of these officials that he should not engage in the work of starting gas engines; that he should seek other employment and engage in work which he was physically able to perform, and which would not require him to start gas engines; that he need not obtain such other employment 'in any hurry'; but that he should give thought to the matter. At this meeting the plaintiff requested and received from the district superintendent of the defendant a letter of recommendation which stated that the plaintiff had been an employee of the company for the past twelve years and had a great deal of experience in oil field work 'such as drilling, cleaning out, roustabouting and pumping', and that he was 'a man of intelligence, good habits, and a good worker'. The plaintiff did not seek or obtain other employment but continued to work for the defendant at Murphytown until January 31, 1949. Some time after the conversation in September, 1948, between the plaintiff and the above mentioned officials of the defendant, its district superintendent created a position for the plaintiff by which he could continue his employment with the defendant at Shirley, 72 miles from Parkersburg, at a slight increase in his monthly wages. In this position the plaintiff would not be required to engage in the work of starting gas engines but it would be necessary for him to use an automobile for transportation purposes in connection with his work. The district superintendent also made arrangements for living quarters for the plaintiff at that place.
On or about Friday, January 21, 1949, the plaintiff was offered this newly created position and...
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...contrary, may be terminated, with or without cause, at the will of either party to the contract of employment. Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Company, 135 W.Va. 25, 62 S.E.2d 285; 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, § 31. When a contract of employment is of indefinite duration it may be terminat......
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