Bell v. State
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PC-2295 |
| Citation | 173 N.E.3d 709 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Christopher BELL, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
Attorney for Appellant: Amy E. Karozos, Public Defender of Indiana, Jonathan O. Chenoweth, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] After Christopher Bell was convicted of murder, a felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class A felony, the trial court adjudicated him as an habitual offender upon Bell's admission to his prior convictions. Bell was unsuccessful on his direct appeal. Subsequently, Bell filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), wherein he argued: (1) the trial court failed to properly advise him of his right to jury determination of his habitual offender status and to obtain his personal waiver thereof; and (2) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel ("IAAC") by failing to raise the jury waiver issue on appeal. The post-conviction court ("PC Court") denied Bell's petition for PCR.
[2] Our review of the record as a whole has undermined our confidence in the outcome of Bell's direct appeal. The trial court's omissions resulted in structural and fundamental error. Further, had appellate counsel asserted the jury waiver issue, Bell would have prevailed in challenging the habitual offender proceedings on direct appeal. Bell has, thus, demonstrated that he suffered prejudicial error. For these reasons, we conclude that the PC Court clearly erred in denying Bell's petition for PCR; accordingly, we vacate the trial court's habitual offender determination and reverse and remand for a new trial on the habitual offender information.
[3] Bell raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the PC Court clearly erred in finding that Bell's appellate counsel did not render IAAC in failing to raise a jury waiver issue on direct appeal.
[4] The underlying crimes were committed on September 17, 2012. On direct appeal, this Court recited the pertinent facts as follows:
Bell v. State , No. 82A04-1309-CR-478, slip. op. at 3, 2014 WL 2155015 (internal citation and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
[5] The case transcript on direct appeal reveals that, after the jury returned its verdicts in the felony phase and the habitual offender phase began, the following colloquy ensued before Bell entered his stipulation:
Prior Case Tr. Vol. II pp. 117-119 (emphasis added).
[6] At Bell's sentencing hearing:
[T]he trial court found that double-jeopardy concerns prevented it from entering judgment on the conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class A felony ...; therefore, the court reduced the conviction to a Class C felony. The court then sentenced Bell to sixty years for murder, enhanced by thirty years for being a[n ] habitual offender. The court also sentenced Bell to a concurrent term of six years for Class C felony conspiracy to commit robbery, for an aggregate sentence of ninety years.
Id. (emphasis added).
[7] Attorney Scott Barnhart ("appellate counsel") represented Bell on appeal and alleged the trial court gave an erroneous accomplice liability instruction and violated Indiana's prohibition against double jeopardy. On May 23, 2014, this Court affirmed Bell's convictions. Bell v. State , No. 82A04-1309-CR-478, slip. op. at 6. Our Supreme Court subsequently denied transfer. Bell v. State , 18 N.E.3d 1004 (Ind. 2014).
[8] On January 14, 2016, Bell, pro se, filed a petition for PCR, which he subsequently amended twice, by counsel. In his second amended petition for PCR, Bell argued that: (1) by admitting to his prior convictions with respect to the habitual offender count, without personally waiving his right to a jury, he entered an involuntary guilty plea to the habitual offender information; and (2) appellate counsel rendered IAAC by failing to allege fundamental error therefrom.
[9] In lieu of an evidentiary hearing on the petition for PCR, the parties proceeded by e-filing exhibits and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 16, 2020, the PC Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment denying Bell's petition for PCR. The PC Court found, in pertinent part, that: (1) Bell stipulated to his prior convictions in a bench trial and did not enter a guilty plea;3 (2) "[b]ecause [Bell]’s admission[ ] to his prior convictions was a stipulation of facts, the [trial c]ourt was not required to first advise him of Boykin[4 ] rights and obtain his waiver of those rights, including the right to a jury trial"; and (3) appellate counsel did not render IAAC. PCR App. Vol. II p. 96. Bell now appeals.
[10] Bell challenges the PC Court's denial of his petition for PCR. Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v. State , 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied, cert. denied ; Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). "The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal." Gibson , 133 N.E.2d at 681. "Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata." Id. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. ; P.-C.R. 1(5).
[11] When, as here, the petitioner "appeals from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he ‘must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.’ " Gibson , 133 N.E.2d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State , 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000) ). We generally review the post-conviction court's factual findings for clear error, neither reweighing the evidence nor judging the credibility of witnesses. Hinesley v. State , 999 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Here, the PC Court made its ruling on a paper record and, thus, we are reviewing the same information that was available to the PC Court. In such cases, this Court owes no deference to the PC Court's findings. Baysinger v. State , 835 N.E.2d 223, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We, therefore, review the denial of Bell's petition for PCR de novo. Id.
[12] Bell argues that fundamental error occurred when the trial court accepted his stipulation to his prior felony convictions without first: (1) advising him of his right to a jury determination of his habitual offender status; and (2) obtaining his personal waiver thereof. He also asserts that appellate counsel rendered IAAC by failing to allege fundamental error therefrom. See Bell's Br. p. 10 ().
[13] Regarding Bell's claim that he received IAAC, the standard for evaluating claims of IAAC is the same standard as for trial counsel. Garrett v. State , 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013). A petitioner must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Lee v. State , 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). As our Supreme Court has previously opined:
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